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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gwendal@chromium.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	apronin@chromium.org, dlunev@google.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2022 06:02:07 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ywg3r5bJs+5QAll0@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220823152108.v2.2.I9ded8c8caad27403e9284dfc78ad6cbd845bc98d@changeid>

On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:18PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
> 
> Under certain circumstances it might be desirable to enable the creation
> of TPM-backed secrets that are only accessible to the kernel. In an
> ideal world this could be achieved by using TPM localities, but these
> don't appear to be available on consumer systems. An alternative is to
> simply block userland from modifying one of the resettable PCRs, leaving
> it available to the kernel. If the kernel ensures that no userland can
> access the TPM while it is carrying out work, it can reset PCR 23,
> extend it to an arbitrary value, create or load a secret, and then reset
> the PCR again. Even if userland somehow obtains the sealed material, it
> will be unable to unseal it since PCR 23 will never be in the
> appropriate state.
> 
> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> 
> Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>

Same issues as the other patch.

> ---
> Matthew's original version of this patch is at:
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096491/

Suggestion: find a lore URL instead for Matthew's patch,
and then add "Link: <lore URL>" to your commit before
sob's. It's a useful reference also in the commit log.

> 
> Changes in v2:
>  - Fixed sparse warnings
> 
>  drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig          | 10 +++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c |  8 +++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h            | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c       | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c       | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c     |  2 +-
>  6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> index 927088b2c3d3f2..4483b61a428b11 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> @@ -211,4 +211,14 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE
>  	  This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE.
>  
>  source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig"
> +
> +config TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR
> +	bool "Restrict userland access to PCR 23"
> +	depends on TCG_TPM
> +	help
> +	  If set, block userland from extending or resetting PCR 23. This
> +	  allows it to be restricted to in-kernel use, preventing userland
> +	  from being able to make use of data sealed to the TPM by the kernel.
> +	  This is required for secure hibernation support, but should be left
> +	  disabled if any userland may require access to PCR23.
>  endif # TCG_TPM
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> index dc4c0a0a512903..7a4e618c7d1942 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> @@ -198,6 +198,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  	priv->response_read = false;
>  	*off = 0;
>  
> +	if (priv->chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
> +		ret = tpm2_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size);
> +	else
> +		ret = tpm1_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size);
> +
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * If in nonblocking mode schedule an async job to send
>  	 * the command return the size.
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index a80b341d38eb8c..077c3ca0a127ba 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
>  unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
>  int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>  int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> +			     const void *buf, size_t bufsiz);
>  int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
>  int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space, unsigned int buf_size);
>  void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space);
> @@ -244,4 +246,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>  void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip);
>  int tpm_dev_common_init(void);
>  void tpm_dev_common_exit(void);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR
> +#define TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR 23
> +
> +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size);
> +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size);
> +#else
> +static inline int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer,
> +				      size_t size)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer,
> +				      size_t size)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
>  #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> index 8ec743dec26544..318e75ae42fb85 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
> @@ -845,3 +845,38 @@ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR
> +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size)
> +{
> +	struct tpm_header *header = (struct tpm_header *)buffer;
> +	char len, offset;
> +	__be32 *pcr;
> +	int pos;
> +
> +	switch (be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal)) {
> +	case TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND:
> +		if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32)))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		pcr = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
> +		if (be32_to_cpu(*pcr) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		break;
> +	case TPM_ORD_PCR_RESET:
> +		if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		len = buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
> +		if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + len))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		offset = TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR/3;
> +		if (len < offset)
> +			break;
> +		pos = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + offset;
> +		if (buffer[pos] & (1 << (TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR - 2 * offset)))
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index 69126a6770386e..dbf7f5552c6782 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -821,3 +821,25 @@ int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc)
>  
>  	return -1;
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR
> +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size)
> +{
> +	int cc = tpm_find_and_validate_cc(chip, NULL, buffer, size);
> +	__be32 *handle;
> +
> +	switch (cc) {
> +	case TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND:
> +	case TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET:
> +		if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32)))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		handle = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
> +		if (be32_to_cpu(*handle) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> index ffb35f0154c16c..6f51cd92c6400f 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  				    struct tpm_space *space,
>  				    const void *cmd, size_t len)

Split the export to a separate commit.

>  {
> -- 
> 2.31.0
> 

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2022-08-26  3:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-23 22:25 [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-08-26  2:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 17:02     ` Evan Green
2022-09-08  5:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-08-26  3:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-09-07 17:03     ` Evan Green
2022-09-13 12:26   ` Stefan Berger
2022-09-20  4:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 15:35       ` Evan Green
2022-09-21 18:02         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 18:05           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-21 19:02             ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:04   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:22     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-08-24 11:56   ` Ben Boeckel
2022-08-24 17:34     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:06   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:23     ` Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 22:23     ` Evan Green
2022-09-24  4:31       ` Kees Cook
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-08-23 22:25 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-09-20 23:24   ` Kees Cook
2022-08-31 18:34 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Limonciello, Mario
2022-09-07 17:03   ` Evan Green
2022-09-20  8:46 ` Pavel Machek
2022-09-20 16:39   ` Evan Green
2022-09-21 18:09   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-09-20 22:52 ` Kees Cook

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