From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13C86C77B7F for ; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231615AbjEEQTK (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 May 2023 12:19:10 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52958 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230163AbjEEQTJ (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 May 2023 12:19:09 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AC90217FE2; Fri, 5 May 2023 09:19:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4845263F15; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EBDE1C433EF; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1683303547; bh=9eVD8TLEEJTPz7yUDaY/tcM4ySNHmYkUZSsW6auAYhI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=loLHgZ6lqZrIKBgo3yKKid4OzVFYz+8ZiKK82DAcPHoYWv38JEZTzJBc/0Jilf3Ac 13ZT853kkIOz5s92U2aLs8Qsw3/pa5XZXTWrM7RLBw1djPdirH/b7e328JT1KQDfo5 Ia02U9yr3HawpR+b0VyOH8cI2VeNJrHrSxmbVFpT3yoROBJG7kA8FvP3nIX4blUvei 1+YXY4yq6kvmuJAt1kUewv/TelPNq3i/P251E+XOAquYRG4fANOUEKMcFwQTJW2bcf 3FEbGZUddqObaXNkWfTnpVbHzIE26/z88HVTnkB5sY9x/JYwY+Z5S7f7VIT7tH5VvM nkytUGk7g4Aow== Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 18:19:01 +0200 From: Simon Horman To: Ross Philipson Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Message-ID: References: <20230504145023.835096-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +0000, Ross Philipson wrote: > Introduce background, overview and configuration/ABI information > for the Secure Launch kernel feature. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith > Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Hi Ross and Daniel, some minor nits from my side. > --- > Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + > Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst | 10 + > .../security/launch-integrity/principles.rst | 313 ++++++++++++ > .../launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst | 564 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../launch-integrity/secure_launch_overview.rst | 220 ++++++++ > 5 files changed, 1108 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_overview.rst > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst > index 6ed8d2f..fade37e 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst > @@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ Security Documentation > digsig > landlock > secrets/index > + launch-integrity/index > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..28eed91d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ I believe an SPDX tag should go at the top of each .rst file. > +===================================== > +System Launch Integrity documentation > +===================================== > + > +.. toctree:: > + > + principles > + secure_launch_overview > + secure_launch_details > + > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..73cf063 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ > +======================= > +System Launch Integrity > +======================= > + > +This document serves to establish a common understanding of what is system > +launch, the integrity concern for system launch, and why using a Root of Trust > +(RoT) from a Dynamic Launch may be desired. Through out this document > +terminology from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and National Institue for s/Institue/Institute/ ... > +Trust Chains > +============ > + > +Bulding upon the understanding of security mechanisms to establish load-time s/Bulding/Building/ ... > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst ... > +Secure Launch Resource Table > +============================ > + > +The Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT) is a platform-agnostic, standard format > +for providing information for the pre-launch environment and to pass > +information to the post-launch environment. The table is populated by one or > +more bootloaders in the boot chain and used by Secure Launch on how to setup > +the environment during post-launch. The details for the SLRT are documented > +in the TrenchBoot Secure Launch Specifcation [3]_. s/Specifcation/Specification/ ... From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 272B1C77B7C for ; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=ngnstP1CM4le7MozwnXat3S7zmivbFVJnfkx317w6wo=; b=jBlN8WGpR0sz4U Z8uCspI1J3v7N3XVT+LTpVltwgSx2RWL+tIZjzKF0wxEgDjc3ub+YesBxkxYJ7U1vzfv0hFN5RQbf aGel3TA2hJslGEC6a5f+Y7W+4CpeeDBr+n+iIZo1KEcSDAEARDuCYcIJSgNDvJBNrO1oXHtHPkkRw 9F7SxAgOdTXRe8CwA4Eu6xYzanf7d0cN5+o0JPSsWLJZClUvX3AyKtsMxGITFXfrspE0aKUEj8vZl kR4ZrXe9701lkxYL/U+Q0JyU8okxF1mjrKz9vAbZHN3tZUh/FpyQH+RdCD7soH9sdlNFMGQJtBlV9 xYO/ZyvSx/mgmR5Mo6dQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1puy9I-00BHoJ-2v; Fri, 05 May 2023 16:19:12 +0000 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org ([2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.96 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1puy9F-00BHn7-1J for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 05 May 2023 16:19:10 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C4A963F0D; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EBDE1C433EF; Fri, 5 May 2023 16:19:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1683303547; bh=9eVD8TLEEJTPz7yUDaY/tcM4ySNHmYkUZSsW6auAYhI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=loLHgZ6lqZrIKBgo3yKKid4OzVFYz+8ZiKK82DAcPHoYWv38JEZTzJBc/0Jilf3Ac 13ZT853kkIOz5s92U2aLs8Qsw3/pa5XZXTWrM7RLBw1djPdirH/b7e328JT1KQDfo5 Ia02U9yr3HawpR+b0VyOH8cI2VeNJrHrSxmbVFpT3yoROBJG7kA8FvP3nIX4blUvei 1+YXY4yq6kvmuJAt1kUewv/TelPNq3i/P251E+XOAquYRG4fANOUEKMcFwQTJW2bcf 3FEbGZUddqObaXNkWfTnpVbHzIE26/z88HVTnkB5sY9x/JYwY+Z5S7f7VIT7tH5VvM nkytUGk7g4Aow== Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 18:19:01 +0200 From: Simon Horman To: Ross Philipson Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Message-ID: References: <20230504145023.835096-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230504145023.835096-3-ross.philipson@oracle.com> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20230505_091909_535805_09D126A1 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.86 ) X-BeenThere: kexec@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+kexec=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +0000, Ross Philipson wrote: > Introduce background, overview and configuration/ABI information > for the Secure Launch kernel feature. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith > Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Hi Ross and Daniel, some minor nits from my side. > --- > Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + > Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst | 10 + > .../security/launch-integrity/principles.rst | 313 ++++++++++++ > .../launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst | 564 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../launch-integrity/secure_launch_overview.rst | 220 ++++++++ > 5 files changed, 1108 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_overview.rst > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst > index 6ed8d2f..fade37e 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst > @@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ Security Documentation > digsig > landlock > secrets/index > + launch-integrity/index > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..28eed91d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ I believe an SPDX tag should go at the top of each .rst file. > +===================================== > +System Launch Integrity documentation > +===================================== > + > +.. toctree:: > + > + principles > + secure_launch_overview > + secure_launch_details > + > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..73cf063 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ > +======================= > +System Launch Integrity > +======================= > + > +This document serves to establish a common understanding of what is system > +launch, the integrity concern for system launch, and why using a Root of Trust > +(RoT) from a Dynamic Launch may be desired. Through out this document > +terminology from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and National Institue for s/Institue/Institute/ ... > +Trust Chains > +============ > + > +Bulding upon the understanding of security mechanisms to establish load-time s/Bulding/Building/ ... > diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst b/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst ... > +Secure Launch Resource Table > +============================ > + > +The Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT) is a platform-agnostic, standard format > +for providing information for the pre-launch environment and to pass > +information to the post-launch environment. The table is populated by one or > +more bootloaders in the boot chain and used by Secure Launch on how to setup > +the environment during post-launch. The details for the SLRT are documented > +in the TrenchBoot Secure Launch Specifcation [3]_. s/Specifcation/Specification/ ... _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec