From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4537BC43603 for ; Sat, 14 Dec 2019 00:32:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36D63214AF for ; Sat, 14 Dec 2019 00:32:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726771AbfLNAcH (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 Dec 2019 19:32:07 -0500 Received: from www262.sakura.ne.jp ([202.181.97.72]:54074 "EHLO www262.sakura.ne.jp" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726752AbfLNAcH (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 Dec 2019 19:32:07 -0500 Received: from fsav301.sakura.ne.jp (fsav301.sakura.ne.jp [153.120.85.132]) by www262.sakura.ne.jp (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id xBE0W5Kg059018; Sat, 14 Dec 2019 09:32:05 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp) Received: from www262.sakura.ne.jp (202.181.97.72) by fsav301.sakura.ne.jp (F-Secure/fsigk_smtp/550/fsav301.sakura.ne.jp); Sat, 14 Dec 2019 09:32:05 +0900 (JST) X-Virus-Status: clean(F-Secure/fsigk_smtp/550/fsav301.sakura.ne.jp) Received: from [192.168.1.9] (softbank126040062084.bbtec.net [126.40.62.84]) (authenticated bits=0) by www262.sakura.ne.jp (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPSA id xBE0W5s3059014 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Sat, 14 Dec 2019 09:32:05 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp) Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: allow an LSM to disable all hooks at once To: James Morris , Ondrej Mosnacek Cc: Linux Security Module list , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Casey Schaufler , SElinux list , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , John Johansen , Kees Cook , Micah Morton References: <20191211140833.939845-1-omosnace@redhat.com> <66706222-b6af-5099-e485-b99391ad70b3@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> From: Tetsuo Handa Message-ID: Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2019 09:32:01 +0900 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org On 2019/12/14 3:48, James Morris wrote: > On Thu, 12 Dec 2019, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > >> I'd say the burden of implementing this would lie on the arms of >> whoever prepares the patches for dynamic load/unload. > > Correct, and I don't see any such patches being accepted. > > Go and look at some exploits, where LSM is used as a rootkit API... > Evaluating trust of LSM modules is a job of module signing / integrity checking etc. Disallowing loadable LSM modules (because of worrying about rootkit API) is as stupid as enforcing CONFIG_MODULES=n.