From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 3/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 3
Date: Sat, 21 Jul 2018 22:35:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a75d6fb6638093b8f7e7bc15f60430aa32d5a000.1532339695.git.nstange@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1532339695.git.nstange@suse.de>
Currently, vmx_vcpu_run() checks if ->l1tf_flush_l1d is set and invokes
vmx_l1d_flush() if so.
This test is unncessary for the "always flush L1d" mode.
Move the check to vmx_l1d_flush()'s conditional mode code path.
Notes:
- vmx_l1d_flush() is likely to get inlined anyway and thus, there's no
extra function call.
- This change inverts the (static) branch prediction, but there hadn't been
any explicit likely()/unlikely() annotations before and so I decided
to leave it as is.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 5139738cc5a9..ec955b870756 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -9693,12 +9693,16 @@ static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* 'always'
*/
if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
+ bool flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
+
/*
* Clear the flush bit, it gets set again either from
* vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe VMEXIT
* handlers.
*/
vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
+ if (!flush_l1d)
+ return;
}
vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
@@ -10228,10 +10232,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
evmcs_rsp = static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) ?
(unsigned long)¤t_evmcs->host_rsp : 0;
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush)) {
- if (vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d)
- vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
- }
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
+ vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
asm(
/* Store host registers */
--
2.13.7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-23 10:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-23 9:54 [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 0/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 0 Nicolai Stange
2018-07-21 20:16 ` [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 1/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 1 Nicolai Stange
2018-07-21 20:25 ` [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 2/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 2 Nicolai Stange
2018-07-21 20:35 ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2018-07-22 9:35 ` [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 4/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 4 Nicolai Stange
2018-07-23 15:40 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-07-24 5:58 ` Nicolai Stange
2018-07-24 14:12 ` Andi Kleen
2018-07-24 14:39 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-07-24 15:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-25 11:45 ` Nicolai Stange
2018-07-27 7:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-27 9:17 ` Nicolai Stange
2018-07-27 9:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-07-29 20:00 ` Nicolai Stange
2018-07-22 11:06 ` [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 5/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 5 Nicolai Stange
2018-07-22 11:38 ` [MODERATED] [RFC PATCH 6/6] kvm: handle host mode irqs 6 Nicolai Stange
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