From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4601C433E0 for ; Fri, 19 Mar 2021 21:44:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D6E860232 for ; Fri, 19 Mar 2021 21:44:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230221AbhCSVno (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Mar 2021 17:43:44 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:8668 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229942AbhCSVnH (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Mar 2021 17:43:07 -0400 IronPort-SDR: RSiSITZep4KuY9xDwMvGo553udx8tKIJxQp1wf3YX+3AcAaiHQDfTUJY1d1wv7SNk1u5wvSoC+ xP+qT3EzRbag== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9928"; a="190066754" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,262,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="190066754" Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Mar 2021 14:43:06 -0700 IronPort-SDR: iT/r8ByvMuU8XTKNeF3yq/D/QfUHXYpCYZjIvu/4fy4S0PaDOlSkasOytpgZFg7aZUrat2BnHp M2DQvWQ8JZmw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,262,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="603266289" Received: from yyu32-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.100.40]) ([10.212.100.40]) by fmsmga006-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Mar 2021 14:43:05 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 00/28] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack To: Peter Zijlstra , Borislav Petkov Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu , Haitao Huang References: <20210316151054.5405-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20210316211552.GU4746@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" Message-ID: Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 14:43:04 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20210316211552.GU4746@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 3/16/2021 2:15 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 08:10:26AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: >> Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks >> return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and >> IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1]. >> >> CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only >> application-level protection, and has three parts: >> >> - Shadow stack [2], >> - Indirect branch tracking [3], and >> - Selftests [4]. > > CET is marketing; afaict SS and IBT are 100% independent and there's no > reason what so ever to have them share any code, let alone a Kconfig > knob. > > In fact, I think all of this would improve is you remove the CET name > from all of this entirely. Put this series under CONFIG_X86_SHSTK (or > _SS) and use CONFIG_X86_IBT for the other one. > > Similarly with the .c file. > > All this CET business is just pure confusion. > What about this, we bring back CONFIG_X86_SHSTK and CONFIG_X86_IBT. For the CET name itself, can we change it to CFE (Control Flow Enforcement), or just CF? In signal handling, ELF header parsing and arch_prctl(), shadow stack and IBT pretty much share the same code. It is better not to split them into two sets of files. Thanks, Yu-cheng