From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751982AbeAEO1m (ORCPT + 1 other); Fri, 5 Jan 2018 09:27:42 -0500 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([146.0.238.70]:44708 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751609AbeAEO1l (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Jan 2018 09:27:41 -0500 Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 15:27:34 +0100 (CET) From: Thomas Gleixner To: Tom Lendacky cc: "Woodhouse, David" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" , "peterz@infradead.org" , "torvalds@linux-foundation.org" , "ak@linux.intel.com" , "riel@redhat.com" , "keescook@google.com" , "gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" , "pjt@google.com" , "dave.hansen@intel.com" , "luto@amacapital.net" , "jikos@kernel.org" , "gregkh@linux-foundation.org" Subject: [PATCH V2] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Subject: x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 15:05:27 +0100 Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table isolation for mitigation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- V2: This time quilt refreshed ... --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -341,6 +341,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ -#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */ +#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); fpu__init_system(c); --- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c @@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) pr_info("%s\n", reason); } static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) pr_info("%s\n", reason); } @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(v } autosel: - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE)) + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) return; enable: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);