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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com, e1000-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3][RFC] SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo"
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2008 12:05:39 +1100 (EST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.1.10.0812191204390.4137@tundra.namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.1.10.0812191144370.4137@tundra.namei.org>

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Map all of these proc/ filesystem types to "proc" for the policy lookup at
filesystem mount time.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d337748..470763a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		sbsec->proc = 1;
 
 	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
-- 
1.6.0.4


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  reply	other threads:[~2008-12-19  1:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-12-04  1:18 networking probs in next-20081203 Andrew Morton
2008-12-04 15:14 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2008-12-04 17:41   ` Kok, Auke
2008-12-04 17:52     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2008-12-04 18:11       ` [E1000-devel] " Stephen Smalley
2008-12-04 18:21         ` David Miller
2008-12-04 19:32           ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-04 20:06             ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-04 21:00               ` [E1000-devel] " Eric W. Biederman
2008-12-05  2:03                 ` James Morris
2008-12-05  7:49                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-12-05 14:12                 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-11 10:41                   ` James Morris
2008-12-12  5:24                     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2008-12-12  9:26                       ` James Morris
2008-12-12  9:29                         ` James Morris
2008-12-12 10:51                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-12-12 21:40                             ` [E1000-devel] " James Morris
2008-12-12 21:24                         ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-15 13:28                           ` James Morris
2008-12-19  1:04                             ` [PATCH 0/3][RFC] Fix security and SELinux handling of proc/* filesystems James Morris
2008-12-19  1:05                               ` James Morris [this message]
2008-12-19 12:29                                 ` [PATCH 1/3][RFC] SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo" David P. Quigley
2008-12-19  1:06                               ` [PATCH 2/3][RFC] security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount() James Morris
2008-12-19 12:52                                 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-19  1:07                               ` [PATCH 3/3][RFC] SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts James Morris
2008-12-19 12:52                                 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-12-19  6:40                               ` [PATCH 0/3][RFC] Fix security and SELinux handling of proc/* filesystems David Miller

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