From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 08:56:18 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1706010855410.20834@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27e537cc-1d1c-1a48-d3fd-a04921f7b620@huawei.com>
On Wed, 31 May 2017, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> On 30/05/17 13:32, James Morris wrote:
>
> > This seems like pointless churn in security-critical code in anticipation
> > of features which are still in development and may not be adopted.
> >
> > Is there a compelling reason to merge this now? (And I don't mean worrying
> > about non-existent compliers).
>
> I propose to take this patch as part of those I will be submitting.
> It took me some unplanned time to add support for hardened user copy,
> but now it's done - at least to a point that I can test it without failures.
>
> So I'm back on track to provide an example of the smalloc api and I can
> also use Tetsuo's work (thanks again, btw).
> This patch would be sandwiched between the smalloc ones and the LSM rework.
>
> It can get merged when the rest (hopefully) is merged.
>
> But I have a more prosaic question: since smalloc is affecting the
> memory subsystem, can it still be merged through the security tree?
It needs acks from the maintainers of the affected subsystems.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: jmorris@namei.org (James Morris)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 08:56:18 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1706010855410.20834@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27e537cc-1d1c-1a48-d3fd-a04921f7b620@huawei.com>
On Wed, 31 May 2017, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> On 30/05/17 13:32, James Morris wrote:
>
> > This seems like pointless churn in security-critical code in anticipation
> > of features which are still in development and may not be adopted.
> >
> > Is there a compelling reason to merge this now? (And I don't mean worrying
> > about non-existent compliers).
>
> I propose to take this patch as part of those I will be submitting.
> It took me some unplanned time to add support for hardened user copy,
> but now it's done - at least to a point that I can test it without failures.
>
> So I'm back on track to provide an example of the smalloc api and I can
> also use Tetsuo's work (thanks again, btw).
> This patch would be sandwiched between the smalloc ones and the LSM rework.
>
> It can get merged when the rest (hopefully) is merged.
>
> But I have a more prosaic question: since smalloc is affecting the
> memory subsystem, can it still be merged through the security tree?
It needs acks from the maintainers of the affected subsystems.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 08:56:18 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1706010855410.20834@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27e537cc-1d1c-1a48-d3fd-a04921f7b620@huawei.com>
On Wed, 31 May 2017, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> On 30/05/17 13:32, James Morris wrote:
>
> > This seems like pointless churn in security-critical code in anticipation
> > of features which are still in development and may not be adopted.
> >
> > Is there a compelling reason to merge this now? (And I don't mean worrying
> > about non-existent compliers).
>
> I propose to take this patch as part of those I will be submitting.
> It took me some unplanned time to add support for hardened user copy,
> but now it's done - at least to a point that I can test it without failures.
>
> So I'm back on track to provide an example of the smalloc api and I can
> also use Tetsuo's work (thanks again, btw).
> This patch would be sandwiched between the smalloc ones and the LSM rework.
>
> It can get merged when the rest (hopefully) is merged.
>
> But I have a more prosaic question: since smalloc is affecting the
> memory subsystem, can it still be merged through the security tree?
It needs acks from the maintainers of the affected subsystems.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-31 22:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-27 11:17 [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 0:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo
2017-05-31 9:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " José Bollo
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [PATCH v2] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris [this message]
2017-05-31 22:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris
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