From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: jmorris@namei.org (James Morris) Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 15:48:45 +1000 (AEST) Subject: [PATCH V3 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root In-Reply-To: <0d9646956d9b2d99e8699c009de21f14fa592e7a.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> References: <0d9646956d9b2d99e8699c009de21f14fa592e7a.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> Message-ID: To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Wed, 23 Aug 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real root > and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the BPRM_FCAPS > record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root applications would > print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't necessary, cluttering the event > output, since the SYSCALL and PATH records indicated the presence of the setuid > bit and effective root user id. > > Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the > unnecessary record. > > Ref: 3fc689e96c0c (Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS) > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > security/commoncap.c | 6 +++--- > 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Acked-by: James Morris > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index eb2da69..49cce06 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > * > * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > * 1) cap_effective has all caps > - * 2) we are root > + * 2) we became root *OR* are root > * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > * > @@ -553,8 +553,8 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) > > if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) && > !(cap_full(effective, cred) && > - is_eff(root, cred) && > - is_real(root, cred) && > + (is_eff(root, cred) || > + is_real(root, cred)) && > root_privileged())) > ret = true; > return ret; > -- James Morris -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 15:48:45 +1000 (AEST) Message-ID: References: <0d9646956d9b2d99e8699c009de21f14fa592e7a.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Return-path: In-Reply-To: <0d9646956d9b2d99e8699c009de21f14fa592e7a.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kees Cook , James Morris , Eric Paris , Paul Moore , Steve Grubb List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com On Wed, 23 Aug 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real root > and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the BPRM_FCAPS > record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root applications would > print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't necessary, cluttering the event > output, since the SYSCALL and PATH records indicated the presence of the setuid > bit and effective root user id. > > Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the > unnecessary record. > > Ref: 3fc689e96c0c (Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS) > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > security/commoncap.c | 6 +++--- > 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Acked-by: James Morris > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index eb2da69..49cce06 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > * > * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > * 1) cap_effective has all caps > - * 2) we are root > + * 2) we became root *OR* are root > * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > * > @@ -553,8 +553,8 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) > > if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) && > !(cap_full(effective, cred) && > - is_eff(root, cred) && > - is_real(root, cred) && > + (is_eff(root, cred) || > + is_real(root, cred)) && > root_privileged())) > ret = true; > return ret; > -- James Morris