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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks()
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 05:47:47 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2001090547340.27794@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFqZXNvbNqrTJWxdQU4P-7O-kLRcGW+QcL7LY5Ca8rULLm2ScA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:

> > >  {
> > >       const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > >       struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> > > -     struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
> > >       struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
> >
> > Seems like there are a bunch of unrelated cleanups mixed in here.
> 
> These are not unrelated - we need to avoid dereferencing the security
> structs before checking selinux_disabled(), because they may be NULL
> or uninitialized when SELinux has been diabled.

Ok.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


      reply	other threads:[~2020-01-08 18:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-07 13:31 [PATCH 0/2] LSM: Drop security_delete_hooks() Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 18:09   ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:45   ` James Morris
2020-01-10 20:22     ` Paul Moore
2020-01-10 20:21   ` Paul Moore
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks() Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:47   ` [PATCH 2/2] security, selinux: " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-08  5:31     ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08  8:15       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 13:45         ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08 14:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 16:46   ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: " Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 18:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:59   ` James Morris
2020-01-08  8:21     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 18:47       ` James Morris [this message]

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