From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Wanpeng Li" <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Fix losing blocking by NMI in the guest interruptibility-state field
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 13:36:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b15a34cb-7440-4e02-923c-251bac0f24e1@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500025145-96878-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
On 14/07/2017 11:39, Wanpeng Li wrote:
> However, commit 0be9c7a89f750 (KVM: VMX: set "blocked by NMI" flag if EPT
> violation happens during IRET from NMI) just fixes the fault due to EPT violation.
> This patch tries to fix the fault due to the page fault of shadow page table.
>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 84e62ac..32ca063 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -5709,6 +5709,11 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> }
>
> if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
> +
> + if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
> + (intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
> + vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
> +
> cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
> /* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_reason && enable_ept);
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking is supposed to do the same. EPT and PML-full exits
need separate code because they store bit 12 in the exit qualification rather
than the VM-exit interruption info. I think the bug is in the handling of
vmx->nmi_known_unmasked.
The following patch fixes it for me, can you test it too?
Thanks,
Paolo
--------- 8< -------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: track NMI blocking state separately for each VMCS
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking is using a cached value of the guest
interruptibility info, which is stored in vmx->nmi_known_unmasked.
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking is run for both normal and nested guests,
so the cached value must be per-VMCS.
This fixes eventinj.flat in a nested non-EPT environment. With EPT it
works, because the EPT violation handler doesn't have the
vmx->nmi_known_unmasked optimization (it is unnecessary because, unlike
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking, it can just look at the exit qualification).
Thanks to Wanpeng Li for debugging the testcase and providing an initial
patch.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 32db3f5dce7f..504df356a10c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ struct loaded_vmcs {
struct vmcs *vmcs;
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
int cpu;
- int launched;
+ bool launched;
+ bool nmi_known_unmasked;
struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link;
};
@@ -5497,10 +5498,8 @@ static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
- vmx->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
- }
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0) != EMULATE_DONE)
@@ -5514,16 +5513,21 @@ static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nmi_known_unmasked)
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ bool masked;
+
+ if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
- return vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
+ masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+ return masked;
}
static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- vmx->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
if (masked)
vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
@@ -8719,7 +8723,7 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
- if (vmx->nmi_known_unmasked)
+ if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return;
/*
* Can't use vmx->exit_intr_info since we're not sure what
@@ -8743,7 +8747,7 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
else
- vmx->nmi_known_unmasked =
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
& GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-14 11:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-14 9:39 [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Fix losing blocking by NMI in the guest interruptibility-state field Wanpeng Li
2017-07-14 11:36 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2017-07-14 12:22 ` Wanpeng Li
2017-07-25 8:27 ` Wanpeng Li
2017-07-25 8:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
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