From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89C2EC433EF for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 09:48:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233281AbiGGJsf (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jul 2022 05:48:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49350 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229951AbiGGJsb (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jul 2022 05:48:31 -0400 Received: from sender4-of-o51.zoho.com (sender4-of-o51.zoho.com [136.143.188.51]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C8C28DF69; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 02:48:29 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1657187276; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=IeW7CmKisiJaE3pVWkI/F+5MdcngjRiLaAY1zVvmVucvGKqAP3KI50yY1wpVc5qSJtkOGqTpZkTEpmuDn9oKzJwQrL6XeKVEWmC8Cb3WY5IZdIOlaDLLnhdjpqSUHZMObhB4JsofAm+c27oYXEUM91okzF7La277sAlWgHDJ/HY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1657187276; h=Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Message-ID:References:Subject:To; bh=AxgMRIxlOM7se1RN4hoSSzKpsvEX8snGSo/jMnDX/Ek=; b=KBTUiCEn80z6AHIupkVuG2OQijhEML5J0n1ZUPb1eKfyKwV7YDU/Ruv0U5oPN6j8WkBOtxx7eaC27lbQdF5QV1C30jfSQMB30NBgHV9fWPfTUcJNHoTGQIRqpQJPgTb4Cj3StZY2mQnWCYUIBuVCgGftCqymIpMHe6oJWurUaJE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass header.i=apertussolutions.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com; dmarc=pass header.from= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1657187276; s=zoho; d=apertussolutions.com; i=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com; h=Message-ID:Date:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:Subject:To:To:Cc:Cc:References:From:From:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Message-Id:Reply-To; bh=AxgMRIxlOM7se1RN4hoSSzKpsvEX8snGSo/jMnDX/Ek=; b=bNuNz5RLnm0oVDSPCegtHT9bLWpV9KooJQzx/hs9cDw7HfHcJYg/XFxb2wrvhPBs IuN/dTS0HjbgUYS4kuPBAerNnc1UDtc8HSUUMAAzfgc3xaYh+Mb67J1c/fXDXR7Xxnm NSenPKAzT0UAOe+5hVwNwALsCBMddgv5NNyIDGYM= Received: from [10.10.1.164] (static-72-81-132-2.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net [72.81.132.2]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1657187267545698.9829943472045; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 02:47:47 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 05:46:40 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.8.0 Subject: Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms Content-Language: en-US To: The development of GNU GRUB , Brendan Trotter Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Matthew Garrett , Daniel Kiper , Alec Brown , Kanth Ghatraju , Ross Philipson , "piotr.krol@3mdeb.com" , "krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com" , "persaur@gmail.com" , "Yoder, Stuart" , Andrew Cooper , "michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com" , James Bottomley , "lukasz@hawrylko.pl" , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris References: <20220329174057.GA17778@srcf.ucam.org> <7aab2990-9c57-2456-b08d-299ae96ac919@apertussolutions.com> From: "Daniel P. Smith" In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-ZohoMailClient: External Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 7/5/22 20:03, Brendan Trotter wrote: > Hi, Greetings! Not sure why I got dropped from distro, but no worries. > On Wed, Jul 6, 2022 at 4:52 AM Daniel P. Smith > wrote: >> On 6/10/22 12:40, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:> On Thu, 19 May 2022 at 22:59, >> To help provide clarity, consider the following flows for comparison, >> >> Normal/existing efi-stub: >> EFI -> efi-stub -> head_64.S >> >> Proposed secure launch: >> EFI -> efi-stub -> dl-handler -> [cpu] -> sl_stub ->head_64.S > > For more clarity; the entire point is to ensure that the kernel only > has to trust itself and the CPU/TPM hardware (and does not have to > trust a potentially malicious boot loader)..Any attempt to avoid a > one-off solution for Linux is an attempt to weaken security. Please elaborate so I might understand how this entrypoint allows for the kernel to only trust itself and the CPU/TPM. > The only correct approach is "efi-stub -> head_64.S -> kernel's own > secure init"; where (on UEFI systems) neither GRUB nor Trenchboot has > a valid reason to exist and should never be installed. > > > Cheers, > > Brendan v/r, dps