From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, kernel@pengutronix.de, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fscrypt: support trusted keys Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 16:13:09 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <b77836af-42a1-5aca-9363-d050352bd8aa@pengutronix.de> (raw) In-Reply-To: <285cb263d9c1c16f3918c98dd36074ef16568e6d.camel@linux.ibm.com> On 17.08.21 15:55, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Tue, 2021-08-17 at 15:04 +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: >> Hi, >> >> On 12.08.21 02:54, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>> On Wed, 2021-08-11 at 10:16 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: >>> >>>> Neither of you actually answered my question, which is whether the support for >>>> trusted keys in dm-crypt is a mistake. I think you're saying that it is? That >>>> would imply that fscrypt shouldn't support trusted keys, but rather encrypted >>>> keys -- which conflicts with Ahmad's patch which is adding support for trusted >>>> keys. Note that your reasoning for this is not documented at all in the >>>> trusted-encrypted keys documentation; it needs to be (email threads don't really >>>> matter), otherwise how would anyone know when/how to use this feature? >>> >>> True, but all of the trusted-encrypted key examples in the >>> documentation are "encrypted" type keys, encrypted/decrypted based on a >>> "trusted" type key. There are no examples of using the "trusted" key >>> type directly. Before claiming that adding "trusted" key support in >>> dm-crypt was a mistake, we should ask Ahmad why he felt dm-crypt needed >>> to directly support "trusted" type keys. >> >> I wanted to persist the dm-crypt key as a sealed blob. With encrypted keys, >> I would have to persist and unseal two blobs (load trusted key blob, load >> encrypted key blob rooted to trusted key) with no extra benefit. >> >> I thus added direct support for trusted keys. Jarkko even commented on the >> thread, but didn't voice objection to the approach (or agreement for that >> matter), so I assumed the approach is fine. >> >> I can see the utility of using a single trusted key for TPMs, but for CAAM, >> I see none and having an encrypted key for every trusted key just makes >> it more cumbersome. >> >> In v1 here, I added encrypted key support as well, but dropped it for v2, >> because I am not in a position to justify its use. Now that you and Eric >> discussed it, should I send v3 with support for both encrypted and trusted >> keys like with dm-crypt or how should we proceed? > > With some applications, the indirection is important. It allows the > "encrypted" key type to be updated/re-encypted based on a new "trusted" > key, without affecting the on disk encrypted key usage. Those applications were already able to use the encrypted key support in dm-crypt. For those where re-encryption/PCR-sealing isn't required, direct trusted key support offers a simpler way to integrate. > As much as I expected, directly using "trusted" keys is a result of the > new trusted key sources. More users = more use cases. You make it sound like a negative thing. > I have no opinion as to whether this is/isn't a valid usecase. So you'd be fine with merging trusted key support as is and leave encrypted key support to someone who has a valid use case and wants to argue in its favor? Cheers, Ahmad > > thanks, > > Mimi > > -- Pengutronix e.K. | | Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ | 31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 | Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-17 14:13 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-06 15:09 Ahmad Fatoum 2021-08-09 9:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-09 10:00 ` Ahmad Fatoum 2021-08-09 10:02 ` Ahmad Fatoum 2021-08-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-09 20:52 ` Eric Biggers 2021-08-10 18:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-10 18:46 ` Eric Biggers 2021-08-10 21:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-10 21:27 ` Eric Biggers 2021-08-11 0:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-11 11:34 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-11 17:16 ` Eric Biggers 2021-08-12 0:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-17 13:04 ` Ahmad Fatoum 2021-08-17 13:55 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-17 14:13 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message] 2021-08-17 14:24 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-18 2:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-18 4:53 ` Sumit Garg 2021-08-09 21:24 ` Eric Biggers 2021-08-10 7:41 ` Ahmad Fatoum 2021-08-10 17:35 ` Eric Biggers
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