From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C17D0C433EF for ; Sun, 12 Jun 2022 19:52:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234720AbiFLTwt (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Jun 2022 15:52:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60252 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234538AbiFLTwp (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Jun 2022 15:52:45 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06EAB57137 for ; Sun, 12 Jun 2022 12:52:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B11FDB80D1C for ; Sun, 12 Jun 2022 19:52:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 72D65C341CD for ; Sun, 12 Jun 2022 19:52:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1655063562; bh=dRR+eYIy1Y5LeUSpyfPws7nTexOuVzdcCUTg3xU8PIU=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tYeHbroAKQBxA/VcFLSqSmEF/hz1VUxoAs5FrPWvrh0lGiRjx07UvC+cgfTShxAhH cyRuiKoNuSxR+kOzKYhiIQ2zZ+C1nipscv0CCeOknrUsSlrNHUYHOeFIyTk2TDHdkZ M9FlEIFJeHUgPTB7gkRmFE2C/Hd4SAyCGGqaTBUwO+IX8nIxgOpwieuhfjstXOOEfv cwWPHzbNaEwKLz9L2WnFOcwJSOlX4HVS3XbGIPWEe59pWCdDqPJ7/Smwl5YR2iXXBE OFWzHabTTpYVE8znT4VvXjthoc0Gzrm9aDccSmd55k8Xfowi+79A6f00A6RKoscIoR aZN5piCREFQHA== Received: by aws-us-west-2-korg-bugzilla-1.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id 62646C05FD6; Sun, 12 Jun 2022 19:52:42 +0000 (UTC) From: bugzilla-daemon@kernel.org To: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [Bug 216073] [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)! Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2022 19:52:41 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: CC filesystem_xfs@kernel-bugs.kernel.org X-Bugzilla-Product: Memory Management X-Bugzilla-Component: Other X-Bugzilla-Version: 2.5 X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: willy@infradead.org X-Bugzilla-Status: NEW X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P1 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: akpm@linux-foundation.org X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D216073 --- Comment #18 from willy@infradead.org --- On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:43:45PM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote: > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:05 PM Matthew Wilcox wro= te: > > > > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote: > > > Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can > > > reproduce the problem reliably: > > > > > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! > > > > The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-) >=20 > Right. >=20 > $ grep usercopy: > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > 2882303761517129920, size 11)! > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > 8574853690513436864, size 11)! > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset > 7998392938210013376, size 11)! That's a different problem. And, er, what? How on earth do we have an offset that big?! struct vm_struct *area =3D find_vm_area(ptr); offset =3D ptr - area->addr; if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area)) usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n); That first offset is 0x2800'0000'0000'30C0 You said it was easy to replicate; can you add: printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr); so that we can start to understand how we end up with such a bogus offset? --=20 You may reply to this email to add a comment. You are receiving this mail because: You are watching someone on the CC list of the bug.=