From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org Subject: [Bug 92271] Provide a way to really delete files, please Date: Sun, 01 Feb 2015 01:51:46 +0000 Message-ID: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.136]:41811 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752877AbbBABvt (ORCPT ); Sat, 31 Jan 2015 20:51:49 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 867C02025B for ; Sun, 1 Feb 2015 01:51:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bugzilla2.web.kernel.org (bugzilla2.web.kernel.org [172.20.200.52]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5595D2021B for ; Sun, 1 Feb 2015 01:51:47 +0000 (UTC) In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92271 --- Comment #13 from Theodore Tso --- I don't like making promises that I can't be 100% sure I can keep. For example, it's possible to create storage devices that simulate a read/write disk but which is backed on top of a write-only drive, where the copy-on-write is done at the storage device level. You can set up such a beast using ceph, for example. The only real solution if you want to be able to give away a phone and make sure that the next owner can't recover anything at all is to use encryption. So for example, if you buy a Nexus 6, it comes with encryption enabled by default, and if you do a factory reset, one of the things that happens is that the key which can be derived from your pin/password (the downside is you have to type in your pin after every single reboot/power cycle), and that will guarantee that your data is secure. In fact, all of GCE's VM storage options provide encryption as a non-optional feature. See https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks This is how Google Compute Engine guarantees security for its local SSD product offering --- each SSD attached to each VM gets its own encryption key, and when the VM is destroyed, the encryption key is flushed, and that way you don't have to feed the SSD to a shredder (which is the *only* other way to 100% guarantee that all of the data is deleted). In the commercial world (never mind the military world), you really care about your reputation, which means that you must make sure that data can never leak, which is why you don't trust the FTL, and you don't trust vendors claims around "trim" or "secure trim". You use crypto. So if you want to use crypto, what to do? You can either use dm-crypt or ecryptfs, which is what Android and Chrome are currently using, or we're currently working on an ext4 encryption feature which will give you per-file control over which keys get used for which files. This feature is still very much in development, so if it breaks, you can keep both pieces, but this is why I'm not terribly interested in wasting time trying to wire up secure discard. If someone else wants to send me patches, I'll look at them, but personally I don't think it's a good use of my time. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are watching the assignee of the bug.