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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 10:35:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c51dd20a-2cea-1bd1-bee7-48ca25f9bdb9@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181123073735.GA12959@gmail.com>

On 11/22/2018 11:37 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote:

>>> I think all the call paths from prctl and seccomp coming here
>>> has tsk == current.
>>
>> We had that discussion before with SSBD:
>>
>> seccomp_set_mode_filter()
>>    seccomp_attach_filter()
>>       seccomp_sync_threads()
>>          for_each_thread(t)
>> 	    if (t == current)
>>               continue;
>> 	    seccomp_assign_mode(t)
>> 	      arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(t);
>>
>> seccomp_assign_mode(current...)
>>   arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate();
>>
>>> But if task_update_spec_tif gets used in the future where tsk is running
>>> on a remote CPU, this could lead to the MSR getting out of sync with the
>>> running task's TIF flag. This will break either performance or security.
>>
>> We also had that discussion with SSBD and decided that we won't chase
>> threads and send IPIs around. Yes, it's not perfect, but not the end of the
>> world either. For PRCTL it's a non issue.


Looks like seccomp thread can be running on a remote CPU when its TIF_SPEC_IB flag
gets updated.
 
I wonder if this will cause STIBP to be always off in this scenario, when
two tasks with SPEC_IB flags running on a remote CPU have STIBP bit always
*off* in SPEC MSR.

Let's say we have tasks A and B running on a remote CPU:

task A: SPEC_IB flag is on
task B: SPEC_IB flag is off but is currently running on remote CPU, SPEC MSR's STIBP bit is off

Now arch_seccomp_spec_mitigation is called, setting SPEC_IB flag on task B.
SPEC MSR becomes out of sync with running task B's SPEC_IB flag.

Task B context switches to task A. Because both tasks have SPEC_IB flag set and the flag
status is unchanged, SPEC MSR's STIBP bit is not updated.
SPEC MSR STIBP bit remains off if tasks A and B are the only tasks running
on the CPU.

There is an equivalent scenario where the SPEC MSR's STIBP bit remains on even though both
running task A and B's SPEC_IB flags are turned off.

Wonder if I may be missing something so the above scenario is not of concern?

Thanks.

Tim


> 
> Fair enough and agreed - but please add a comment for all this, as it's a 
> non-trivial and rare call context and a non-trivial implementation 
> trade-off as a result.
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-26 18:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 95+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-21 20:14 [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:28   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 20:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 22:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:53         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-11-21 22:56             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:07               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:04         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-21 23:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 17:30             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-22 17:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 21:17                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 02/24] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 03/24] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 04/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 05/24] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 20:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 06/24] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 07/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 08/24] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 09/24] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 10/24] sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:41   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 11/24] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 12/24] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 13/24] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 14/24] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:59   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 15/24] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22  8:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:07       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22 10:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 10:48           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 16/24] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:57   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 17/24] x86/speculation: Move IBPB control out of switch_mm() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  0:01   ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-22  7:42     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:40   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:52   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 22:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 18/24] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:23   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:44     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 19/24] ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:13   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22 23:00     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-26 18:35         ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-26 21:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:05             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27  7:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:30                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 12:52                   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 13:18                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 21:57                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27 22:07                       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:20                         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:36                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  1:50                           ` Tim Chen
2018-11-28 10:43                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  6:05                           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-28 14:33                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content tip-bot for Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:43   ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 21/24] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:34   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:17     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 23:28       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 22/24] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:10   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22  9:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22  9:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 12:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 12:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 23/24] x86/speculation: Enable PRCTL mode for spectre_v2_app2app Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 24/24] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:24   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:45     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:48 ` [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Tim Chen
2018-11-22  9:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra

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