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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@gnu.org>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: rashmica.g@gmail.com, alastair@d-silva.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 22/22] ieee1275: enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 18:08:24 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c5b90cce-94ae-982c-d775-d41eb2530a33@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210630084031.2663622-23-dja@axtens.net>


On 6/30/21 4:40 AM, Daniel Axtens wrote:
> If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2 or greater,
> enter lockdown.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>


> ---
>   docs/grub.texi                 |  4 ++--
>   grub-core/Makefile.core.def    |  1 +
>   grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   include/grub/lockdown.h        |  3 ++-
>   4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> index 02fcda11e3bd..b13316cdb491 100644
> --- a/docs/grub.texi
> +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> @@ -6189,8 +6189,8 @@ Measured boot is currently only supported on EFI platforms.
>   @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
>   
>   The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
> -if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
> -be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed.
> +if UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the
> +GRUB will be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed.
>   
>   The @samp{lockdown} variable is set to @samp{y} when the GRUB is locked down.
>   Otherwise it does not exit.
> diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> index 4aa4cf263d94..775a031f1843 100644
> --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> @@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ kernel = {
>     powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
>     powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
>     powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
> +  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
>   
>     sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
>     sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
> diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> index 4586bec939b2..5faf4e736074 100644
> --- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> +++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
>   #ifdef __sparc__
>   #include <grub/machine/kernel.h>
>   #endif
> +#include <grub/lockdown.h>
>   
>   /* The maximum heap size we're going to claim. Not used by sparc.
>      We allocate 1/4 of the available memory under 4G, up to this limit. */
> @@ -442,6 +443,30 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
>       }
>   }
>   
> +static void
> +grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot (void)
> +{
> +  grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
> +  int rc;
> +  grub_uint32_t is_sb;
> +
> +  grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/", &root);
> +
> +  rc = grub_ieee1275_get_integer_property (root, "ibm,secure-boot", &is_sb,
> +                                           sizeof (is_sb), 0);
> +
> +  /* ibm,secure-boot:
> +   * 0 - disabled
> +   * 1 - audit
> +   * 2 - enforce
> +   * 3 - enforce + OS-specific behaviour
> +   *
> +   * We only support enforce.
> +   */
> +  if (rc >= 0 && is_sb >= 2)
> +    grub_lockdown ();
> +}
> +
>   grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
>   
>   void
> @@ -467,6 +492,8 @@ grub_machine_init (void)
>   #else
>     grub_install_get_time_ms (grub_rtc_get_time_ms);
>   #endif
> +
> +  grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot ();
>   }
>   
>   void
> diff --git a/include/grub/lockdown.h b/include/grub/lockdown.h
> index 40531fa823bf..ebfee4bf06e7 100644
> --- a/include/grub/lockdown.h
> +++ b/include/grub/lockdown.h
> @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
>   #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED       0
>   #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED        1
>   
> -#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
> +#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI) || \
> +    (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275))
>   extern void
>   EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
>   extern int


      reply	other threads:[~2021-07-19 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-30  8:40 [PATCH v2 00/22] appended signature secure boot support Daniel Axtens
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 01/22] ieee1275: drop HEAP_MAX_ADDR, HEAP_MIN_SIZE Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:33   ` Stefan Berger
2021-07-14 16:21   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 02/22] ieee1275: claim more memory Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:35   ` Stefan Berger
2021-07-15 21:51   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-07-16  3:59     ` Patrick Steinhardt
2021-07-21 14:45       ` Daniel Kiper
2021-07-21 15:24         ` Stefan Berger
2021-07-22 17:11         ` Stefan Berger
2021-07-28 11:17       ` Daniel Kiper
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 03/22] ieee1275: request memory with ibm, client-architecture-support Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:40   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 04/22] Add suport for signing grub with an appended signature Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:43   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 05/22] docs/grub: Document signing grub under UEFI Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:44   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 06/22] docs/grub: Document signing grub with an appended signature Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:46   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 07/22] dl: provide a fake grub_dl_set_persistent for the emu target Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:48   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 08/22] pgp: factor out rsa_pad Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:52   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 09/22] crypto: move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:54   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 10/22] posix_wrap: tweaks in preparation for libtasn1 Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 12:56   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 11/22] libtasn1: import libtasn1-4.16.0 Daniel Axtens
2021-07-20 21:46   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 12/22] libtasn1: disable code not needed in grub Daniel Axtens
2021-07-20 21:47   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 13/22] libtasn1: changes for grub compatibility Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 13:04   ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-21  6:16     ` Daniel Axtens
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 14/22] libtasn1: compile into asn1 module Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 13:05   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 15/22] test_asn1: test module for libtasn1 Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 19:35   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 16/22] grub-install: support embedding x509 certificates Daniel Axtens
2021-07-12 20:24   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 17/22] appended signatures: import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Daniel Axtens
2021-07-19 21:09   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 18/22] appended signatures: parse PKCS#7 signedData and X.509 certificates Daniel Axtens
2021-07-19 22:02   ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-21  6:36     ` Daniel Axtens
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 19/22] appended signatures: support verifying appended signatures Daniel Axtens
2021-07-20  1:31   ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-21  7:10     ` Daniel Axtens
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 20/22] appended signatures: verification tests Daniel Axtens
2021-07-20 12:49   ` Stefan Berger
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 21/22] appended signatures: documentation Daniel Axtens
2021-07-19 22:24   ` Stefan Berger
2022-04-21  7:15     ` Daniel Axtens
2021-06-30  8:40 ` [PATCH v2 22/22] ieee1275: enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot Daniel Axtens
2021-07-19 22:08   ` Stefan Berger [this message]

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