From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Patrick Callaghan <patrickc@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 09:33:34 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c6a57c24-2f30-f252-0f42-8d748ede65af@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1573578841.17949.48.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 11/12/2019 9:14 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2019-11-11 at 14:29 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
>> On 11/11/19 11:23 AM, Patrick Callaghan wrote:
>>
>>> - if (rbuf_len == 0)
>>> + if (rbuf_len == 0) { /* unexpected EOF */
>>> + rc = -EINVAL;
>>> break;
>>> + }
>>> offset += rbuf_len;
>>
>> Should there be an additional check to validate that (offset + rbuf_len)
>> is less than i_size before calling cypto_shash_update (since rbuf_len is
>> one of the parameters for this call)?
>
> The "while" statement enforces that.
>
> Mimi
Yes - but that check happens after the call to crypto_shash_update().
Perhaps integrity_kernel_read() will never return (rbuf_len) that will
=> violate the check in the "while" statement.
=> number of bytes read that is greater than the memory allocated for
rbuf even in error conditions.
Just making sure.
thanks,
-lakshmi
>
>>
>> if ((rbuf_len == 0) || (offset + rbuf_len >= i_size)) {
>> rc = -EINVAL;
>> break;
>> }
>> offset += rbuf_len;
>>
>>> rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, rbuf, rbuf_len);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-12 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-11 19:23 [PATCH] ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt Patrick Callaghan
2019-11-11 22:29 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-11-12 17:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-12 17:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message]
2019-11-12 18:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14 13:55 ` Patrick Callaghan
2019-11-14 18:45 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-11-15 15:25 ` Patrick Callaghan
2019-11-15 20:34 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-11-13 7:52 ` Sascha Hauer
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