From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Daniel Borkmann Subject: [PATCH net 2/2] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 14:04:35 +0100 Message-ID: References: Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org To: davem@davemloft.net Return-path: Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:34039 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1946449Ab3BHNEl (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Feb 2013 08:04:41 -0500 In-Reply-To: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 17a001b..1a9c5fb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); -- 1.7.11.7 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2013 13:04:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH net 2/2] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data Message-Id: List-Id: References: In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 17a001b..1a9c5fb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); -- 1.7.11.7