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From: "Armin Kuster" <akuster808@gmail.com>
To: openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: [dunfell 6/6] hostapd: fix CVE-2021-30004
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 18:50:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d126440422d9585ea400c04b29b0f3e0a07c05c8.1619228936.git.akuster808@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1619228936.git.akuster808@gmail.com>

From: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com>

In wpa_supplicant and hostapd 2.9, forging attacks may occur because
AlgorithmIdentifier parameters are mishandled in tls/pkcs1.c and
tls/x509v3.c.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30004

Upstream patches:
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15

Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e2bd6a52bf689b77b237eaee3067d2b0b6eee3d5)
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 98c5cddf677addcb9aa296a7437b92100a478566)
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 730de4763a508234d09c755c838cdc4c8dd49493)
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
 .../hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch      | 123 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb                    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2540fc26b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters
+
+The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
+However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
+addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
+not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
+but did not reject any other unexpected information.
+
+Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
+unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
+potential forging attacks.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-30004
+
+Reference to upstream patch:
+[https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15]
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/tls/pkcs1.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+index 141ac50..e09db07 100644
+--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+ 	pos = hdr.payload;
+ 	end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -261,6 +263,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+ 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -269,6 +273,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters",
++		    next, da_end - next);
++
++	/*
++	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++	 */
++	if (da_end > next &&
++	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++		os_free(decrypted);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) {
+ 		char txt[100], txt2[100];
+diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+index 1bd5aa0..bf2289f 100644
+--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+@@ -1834,6 +1834,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+ 	pos = hdr.payload;
+ 	end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -1855,6 +1856,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+ 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -1862,6 +1865,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters",
++		    next, da_end - next);
++
++	/*
++	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++	 */
++	if (da_end > next &&
++	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++		os_free(data);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) {
+ 		if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) {
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb
index 87899f3da2..e586018685 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
     file://CVE-2019-5061.patch \
     file://CVE-2021-0326.patch \
     file://CVE-2021-27803.patch \
+    file://CVE-2021-30004.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f188fc53a495fe7af3b6d77d3c31dee8"
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-24  1:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-24  1:50 [dunfell 0/6] Dunfell patch review April 23rd Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` [dunfell 1/6] uml-utilities: fix installed-vs-shipped with usrmerge Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` [dunfell 2/6] telepathy-glib: respect GI_DATA_ENABLED when enabling vala-bindings Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` [dunfell 3/6] libyui: switch to libyui-old repo which still has this SRCREV Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` [dunfell 4/6] hostapd: fix CVE-2019-5061 Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` [dunfell 5/6] hostapd: fix CVE-2021-0326 and CVE-2021-27803 Armin Kuster
2021-04-24  1:50 ` Armin Kuster [this message]
2021-04-24 10:37 ` [oe] [dunfell 0/6] Dunfell patch review April 23rd Martin Jansa

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