[RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.

This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.

Looking forward to your feedback,
Ahmad

---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org

Ahmad Fatoum (4):
  keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
  dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
  ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
  ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
 include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

[RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.

This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.

Looking forward to your feedback,
Ahmad

---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org

Ahmad Fatoum (4):
  keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
  dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
  ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
  ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
 include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

[dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.

This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.

Looking forward to your feedback,
Ahmad

---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org

Ahmad Fatoum (4):
  keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
  dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
  ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
  ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
 include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

[RFC PATCH v1 1/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys. The code is taken from
dm-crypt, which is migrated to use the helper in a later commit.

The implementation must be partially in a header to support configurations
where the key type symbol is defined in a module, but key support in general
is built-in.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
I am not sure whether the chosen header and source file are the best
places for this. This could be made header-only too if that's preferred.

To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/linux/key.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/key.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 7febc4881363..916612f5b313 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #include <linux/assoc_array.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/time64.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -487,6 +489,48 @@ extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_init(void);
 
+/*
+ * internal use, so key core code need not link against
+ * all supported key types
+ * */
+enum __key_type {
+	KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN, KEY_TYPE_USER, KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED, KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED
+};
+
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key, enum __key_type type,
+				   unsigned int *len);
+
+/**
+ * key_extract_material - Extract decrypted data out of a key
+ * @key: a logon, user, encrypted or trusted key
+ * @len: pointer to variable to store key size into
+ *
+ * Extract decrypted data out of supported key types
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key material if successfull or an error
+ * pointer if key type is not compiled in, the buffer is too
+ * small or the key was revoked.
+ */
+static inline const void *key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+					       unsigned int *len)
+{
+	extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+	enum __key_type type = KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	const struct key_type *t = key->type;
+
+	if (t == &key_type_logon || t == &key_type_user)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_USER;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_encrypted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_trusted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED;
+
+	return __key_extract_material(key, type, len);
+}
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #define key_validate(k)			0
@@ -504,6 +548,7 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_init()			do { } while(0)
 #define key_free_user_ns(ns)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_remove_domain(d)		do { } while(0)
+#define key_extract_material(k, l)	ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index c45afdd1dfbb..69cd1cb8c413 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
@@ -1140,6 +1143,43 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
 
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+				   enum __key_type type, unsigned int *len)
+{
+	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
+	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_TYPE_USER:
+		ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+		if (!ukp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ukp->datalen;
+		return ukp->data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED:
+		ekp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!ekp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ekp->decrypted_datalen;
+		return ekp->decrypted_data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED:
+		tkp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!tkp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = tkp->key_len;
+		return tkp->key;
+	default:
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__key_extract_material);
+
 /**
  * register_key_type - Register a type of key.
  * @ktype: The new key type.
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

[RFC PATCH v1 1/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys. The code is taken from
dm-crypt, which is migrated to use the helper in a later commit.

The implementation must be partially in a header to support configurations
where the key type symbol is defined in a module, but key support in general
is built-in.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
I am not sure whether the chosen header and source file are the best
places for this. This could be made header-only too if that's preferred.

To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/linux/key.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/key.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 7febc4881363..916612f5b313 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #include <linux/assoc_array.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/time64.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -487,6 +489,48 @@ extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_init(void);
 
+/*
+ * internal use, so key core code need not link against
+ * all supported key types
+ * */
+enum __key_type {
+	KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN, KEY_TYPE_USER, KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED, KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED
+};
+
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key, enum __key_type type,
+				   unsigned int *len);
+
+/**
+ * key_extract_material - Extract decrypted data out of a key
+ * @key: a logon, user, encrypted or trusted key
+ * @len: pointer to variable to store key size into
+ *
+ * Extract decrypted data out of supported key types
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key material if successfull or an error
+ * pointer if key type is not compiled in, the buffer is too
+ * small or the key was revoked.
+ */
+static inline const void *key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+					       unsigned int *len)
+{
+	extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+	enum __key_type type = KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	const struct key_type *t = key->type;
+
+	if (t == &key_type_logon || t == &key_type_user)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_USER;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_encrypted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_trusted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED;
+
+	return __key_extract_material(key, type, len);
+}
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #define key_validate(k)			0
@@ -504,6 +548,7 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_init()			do { } while(0)
 #define key_free_user_ns(ns)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_remove_domain(d)		do { } while(0)
+#define key_extract_material(k, l)	ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index c45afdd1dfbb..69cd1cb8c413 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
@@ -1140,6 +1143,43 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
 
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+				   enum __key_type type, unsigned int *len)
+{
+	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
+	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_TYPE_USER:
+		ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+		if (!ukp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ukp->datalen;
+		return ukp->data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED:
+		ekp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!ekp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ekp->decrypted_datalen;
+		return ekp->decrypted_data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED:
+		tkp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!tkp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = tkp->key_len;
+		return tkp->key;
+	default:
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__key_extract_material);
+
 /**
  * register_key_type - Register a type of key.
  * @ktype: The new key type.
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

[dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 1/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.

For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
type symbol offered by a module.

Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys. The code is taken from
dm-crypt, which is migrated to use the helper in a later commit.

The implementation must be partially in a header to support configurations
where the key type symbol is defined in a module, but key support in general
is built-in.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
I am not sure whether the chosen header and source file are the best
places for this. This could be made header-only too if that's preferred.

To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/linux/key.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/key.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 7febc4881363..916612f5b313 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #include <linux/assoc_array.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/time64.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -487,6 +489,48 @@ extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred);
 extern void key_init(void);
 
+/*
+ * internal use, so key core code need not link against
+ * all supported key types
+ * */
+enum __key_type {
+	KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN, KEY_TYPE_USER, KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED, KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED
+};
+
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key, enum __key_type type,
+				   unsigned int *len);
+
+/**
+ * key_extract_material - Extract decrypted data out of a key
+ * @key: a logon, user, encrypted or trusted key
+ * @len: pointer to variable to store key size into
+ *
+ * Extract decrypted data out of supported key types
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the key material if successfull or an error
+ * pointer if key type is not compiled in, the buffer is too
+ * small or the key was revoked.
+ */
+static inline const void *key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+					       unsigned int *len)
+{
+	extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
+	extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+	enum __key_type type = KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	const struct key_type *t = key->type;
+
+	if (t == &key_type_logon || t == &key_type_user)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_USER;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_encrypted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED;
+	else if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) && t == &key_type_trusted)
+		type = KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED;
+
+	return __key_extract_material(key, type, len);
+}
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #define key_validate(k)			0
@@ -504,6 +548,7 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_init()			do { } while(0)
 #define key_free_user_ns(ns)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_remove_domain(d)		do { } while(0)
+#define key_extract_material(k, l)	ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index c45afdd1dfbb..69cd1cb8c413 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
@@ -1140,6 +1143,43 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
 
+const void *__key_extract_material(const struct key *key,
+				   enum __key_type type, unsigned int *len)
+{
+	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
+	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_TYPE_USER:
+		ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+		if (!ukp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ukp->datalen;
+		return ukp->data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_ENCRYPTED:
+		ekp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!ekp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = ekp->decrypted_datalen;
+		return ekp->decrypted_data;
+	case KEY_TYPE_TRUSTED:
+		tkp = key->payload.data[0];
+		if (!tkp)
+			break;
+
+		*len = tkp->key_len;
+		return tkp->key;
+	default:
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__key_extract_material);
+
 /**
  * register_key_type - Register a type of key.
  * @ktype: The new key type.
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

[RFC PATCH v1 2/4] dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

There is a common function now to extract key material out of a few
different key types, which includes all types currently supported by
dm-crypt. Make use of it.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 65 ++++++--------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 50f4cbd600d5..576d6b7ce231 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2421,61 +2421,14 @@ static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static int set_key_user(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
-
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
-	if (!ukp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_encrypted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
-
-	ekp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!ekp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ekp->decrypted_datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ekp->decrypted_data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_trusted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
-
-	tkp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!tkp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != tkp->key_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, tkp->key, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
 {
 	char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
 	int ret;
+	unsigned int len;
 	struct key_type *type;
 	struct key *key;
-	int (*set_key)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key);
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	/*
 	 * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
@@ -2493,18 +2446,14 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_logon;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (!strncmp(key_string, "user:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_user;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) &&
 		   !strncmp(key_string, "encrypted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_encrypted;
-		set_key = set_key_encrypted;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) &&
 	           !strncmp(key_string, "trusted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_trusted;
-		set_key = set_key_trusted;
 	} else {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -2521,14 +2470,18 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	down_read(&key->sem);
 
-	ret = set_key(cc, key);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	key_material = key_extract_material(key, &len);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_material) && len != cc->key_size)
+		key_material = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_material)) {
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 		key_put(key);
 		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
-		return ret;
+		return PTR_ERR(key_material);
 	}
 
+	memcpy(cc->key, key_material, len);
+
 	up_read(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

[RFC PATCH v1 2/4] dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

There is a common function now to extract key material out of a few
different key types, which includes all types currently supported by
dm-crypt. Make use of it.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 65 ++++++--------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 50f4cbd600d5..576d6b7ce231 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2421,61 +2421,14 @@ static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static int set_key_user(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
-
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
-	if (!ukp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_encrypted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
-
-	ekp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!ekp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ekp->decrypted_datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ekp->decrypted_data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_trusted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
-
-	tkp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!tkp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != tkp->key_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, tkp->key, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
 {
 	char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
 	int ret;
+	unsigned int len;
 	struct key_type *type;
 	struct key *key;
-	int (*set_key)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key);
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	/*
 	 * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
@@ -2493,18 +2446,14 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_logon;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (!strncmp(key_string, "user:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_user;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) &&
 		   !strncmp(key_string, "encrypted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_encrypted;
-		set_key = set_key_encrypted;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) &&
 	           !strncmp(key_string, "trusted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_trusted;
-		set_key = set_key_trusted;
 	} else {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -2521,14 +2470,18 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	down_read(&key->sem);
 
-	ret = set_key(cc, key);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	key_material = key_extract_material(key, &len);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_material) && len != cc->key_size)
+		key_material = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_material)) {
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 		key_put(key);
 		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
-		return ret;
+		return PTR_ERR(key_material);
 	}
 
+	memcpy(cc->key, key_material, len);
+
 	up_read(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

[dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 2/4] dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

There is a common function now to extract key material out of a few
different key types, which includes all types currently supported by
dm-crypt. Make use of it.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 65 ++++++--------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 50f4cbd600d5..576d6b7ce231 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2421,61 +2421,14 @@ static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static int set_key_user(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
-
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
-	if (!ukp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_encrypted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
-
-	ekp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!ekp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != ekp->decrypted_datalen)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, ekp->decrypted_data, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int set_key_trusted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
-{
-	const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
-
-	tkp = key->payload.data[0];
-	if (!tkp)
-		return -EKEYREVOKED;
-
-	if (cc->key_size != tkp->key_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	memcpy(cc->key, tkp->key, cc->key_size);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
 {
 	char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
 	int ret;
+	unsigned int len;
 	struct key_type *type;
 	struct key *key;
-	int (*set_key)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key);
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	/*
 	 * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
@@ -2493,18 +2446,14 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_logon;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (!strncmp(key_string, "user:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_user;
-		set_key = set_key_user;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) &&
 		   !strncmp(key_string, "encrypted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_encrypted;
-		set_key = set_key_encrypted;
 	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) &&
 	           !strncmp(key_string, "trusted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
 		type = &key_type_trusted;
-		set_key = set_key_trusted;
 	} else {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -2521,14 +2470,18 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	down_read(&key->sem);
 
-	ret = set_key(cc, key);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	key_material = key_extract_material(key, &len);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_material) && len != cc->key_size)
+		key_material = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_material)) {
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 		key_put(key);
 		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
-		return ret;
+		return PTR_ERR(key_material);
 	}
 
+	memcpy(cc->key, key_material, len);
+
 	up_read(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

[RFC PATCH v1 3/4] ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check

[Ahmad Fatoum]

key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a
valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type.

Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs
and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the
apparently unneeded check.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
-		ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon");
-		err = -ENOKEY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
 	if (!ukp) {
 		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

[RFC PATCH v1 3/4] ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check

[Ahmad Fatoum]

key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a
valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type.

Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs
and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the
apparently unneeded check.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
-		ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon");
-		err = -ENOKEY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
 	if (!ukp) {
 		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

[dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check

[Ahmad Fatoum]

key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a
valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type.

Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs
and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the
apparently unneeded check.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
-		ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon");
-		err = -ENOKEY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
 	if (!ukp) {
 		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

[RFC PATCH v1 4/4] ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Currently, UBIFS auth_key can only be a logon key: This is a user key
that's provided to the kernel in plaintext and that then remains within
the kernel. Linux also supports trusted and encrypted keys, which have
stronger guarantees: They are only exposed to userspace in encrypted
form and, in the case of trusted keys, can be directly rooted to a trust
source like a TPM chip.

Add support for auth_key to be either a logon, encrypted or trusted key.
At mount time, the keyring will be searched for a key with the supplied
name in that order.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
index e6ee99762534..12d08458b3d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ compr=zlib              override default compressor and set it to "zlib"
 auth_key=		specify the key used for authenticating the filesystem.
 			Passing this option makes authentication mandatory.
 			The passed key must be present in the kernel keyring
-			and must be of type 'logon'
+			and must be of type 'logon', 'encrypted' or 'trusted'.
 auth_hash_name=		The hash algorithm used for authentication. Used for
 			both hashing and for creating HMACs. Typical values
 			include "sha256" or "sha512"
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index 6a0b8d858d81..af8e9eb58a60 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 
 #include "ubifs.h"
@@ -256,9 +258,10 @@ out_destroy:
 int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 {
 	struct key *keyring_key;
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
 	int err;
+	unsigned int len;
 	char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	if (!c->auth_hash_name) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "authentication hash name needed with authentication");
@@ -277,6 +280,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		 c->auth_hash_name);
 
 	keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_trusted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld",
@@ -286,12 +293,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
-	if (!ukp) {
-		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-		err = -EKEYREVOKED;
+	key_material = key_extract_material(keyring_key, &len);
+	err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(key_material);
+	if (err < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) {
@@ -324,7 +329,7 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 	}
 
-	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, key_material, len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

[RFC PATCH v1 4/4] ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Currently, UBIFS auth_key can only be a logon key: This is a user key
that's provided to the kernel in plaintext and that then remains within
the kernel. Linux also supports trusted and encrypted keys, which have
stronger guarantees: They are only exposed to userspace in encrypted
form and, in the case of trusted keys, can be directly rooted to a trust
source like a TPM chip.

Add support for auth_key to be either a logon, encrypted or trusted key.
At mount time, the keyring will be searched for a key with the supplied
name in that order.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
index e6ee99762534..12d08458b3d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ compr=zlib              override default compressor and set it to "zlib"
 auth_key=		specify the key used for authenticating the filesystem.
 			Passing this option makes authentication mandatory.
 			The passed key must be present in the kernel keyring
-			and must be of type 'logon'
+			and must be of type 'logon', 'encrypted' or 'trusted'.
 auth_hash_name=		The hash algorithm used for authentication. Used for
 			both hashing and for creating HMACs. Typical values
 			include "sha256" or "sha512"
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index 6a0b8d858d81..af8e9eb58a60 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 
 #include "ubifs.h"
@@ -256,9 +258,10 @@ out_destroy:
 int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 {
 	struct key *keyring_key;
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
 	int err;
+	unsigned int len;
 	char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	if (!c->auth_hash_name) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "authentication hash name needed with authentication");
@@ -277,6 +280,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		 c->auth_hash_name);
 
 	keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_trusted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld",
@@ -286,12 +293,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
-	if (!ukp) {
-		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-		err = -EKEYREVOKED;
+	key_material = key_extract_material(keyring_key, &len);
+	err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(key_material);
+	if (err < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) {
@@ -324,7 +329,7 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 	}
 
-	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, key_material, len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

[dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 4/4] ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Currently, UBIFS auth_key can only be a logon key: This is a user key
that's provided to the kernel in plaintext and that then remains within
the kernel. Linux also supports trusted and encrypted keys, which have
stronger guarantees: They are only exposed to userspace in encrypted
form and, in the case of trusted keys, can be directly rooted to a trust
source like a TPM chip.

Add support for auth_key to be either a logon, encrypted or trusted key.
At mount time, the keyring will be searched for a key with the supplied
name in that order.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
 fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
index e6ee99762534..12d08458b3d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ compr=zlib              override default compressor and set it to "zlib"
 auth_key=		specify the key used for authenticating the filesystem.
 			Passing this option makes authentication mandatory.
 			The passed key must be present in the kernel keyring
-			and must be of type 'logon'
+			and must be of type 'logon', 'encrypted' or 'trusted'.
 auth_hash_name=		The hash algorithm used for authentication. Used for
 			both hashing and for creating HMACs. Typical values
 			include "sha256" or "sha512"
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index 6a0b8d858d81..af8e9eb58a60 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 
 #include "ubifs.h"
@@ -256,9 +258,10 @@ out_destroy:
 int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 {
 	struct key *keyring_key;
-	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
 	int err;
+	unsigned int len;
 	char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	const void *key_material;
 
 	if (!c->auth_hash_name) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "authentication hash name needed with authentication");
@@ -277,6 +280,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		 c->auth_hash_name);
 
 	keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_trusted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld",
@@ -286,12 +293,10 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
-	if (!ukp) {
-		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-		err = -EKEYREVOKED;
+	key_material = key_extract_material(keyring_key, &len);
+	err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(key_material);
+	if (err < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) {
@@ -324,7 +329,7 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 	}
 
-	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
+	err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, key_material, len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free_hmac;
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 4/4] ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found

[kernel test robot]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5380 bytes --]

Hi Ahmad,

[FYI, it's a private test report for your RFC patch.]
[auto build test WARNING on 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Ahmad-Fatoum/keys-introduce-key_extract_material-helper/20210722-172029
base:   2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
config: alpha-randconfig-r011-20210722 (attached as .config)
compiler: alpha-linux-gcc (GCC) 10.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
        wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
        chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
        # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/1f09360d0a6ad6d739b7d5195e8c71516d0c3381
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Ahmad-Fatoum/keys-introduce-key_extract_material-helper/20210722-172029
        git checkout 1f09360d0a6ad6d739b7d5195e8c71516d0c3381
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-10.3.0 make.cross ARCH=alpha 

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

   fs/ubifs/auth.c: In function 'ubifs_init_authentication':
>> fs/ubifs/auth.c:285:6: warning: ignoring return value of 'IS_ERR' declared with attribute 'warn_unused_result' [-Wunused-result]
     285 |  if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS))
         |      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


vim +285 fs/ubifs/auth.c

   251	
   252	/**
   253	 * ubifs_init_authentication - initialize UBIFS authentication support
   254	 * @c: UBIFS file-system description object
   255	 *
   256	 * This function returns 0 for success or a negative error code otherwise.
   257	 */
   258	int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
   259	{
   260		struct key *keyring_key;
   261		int err;
   262		unsigned int len;
   263		char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
   264		const void *key_material;
   265	
   266		if (!c->auth_hash_name) {
   267			ubifs_err(c, "authentication hash name needed with authentication");
   268			return -EINVAL;
   269		}
   270	
   271		c->auth_hash_algo = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
   272						 c->auth_hash_name);
   273		if ((int)c->auth_hash_algo < 0) {
   274			ubifs_err(c, "Unknown hash algo %s specified",
   275				  c->auth_hash_name);
   276			return -EINVAL;
   277		}
   278	
   279		snprintf(hmac_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "hmac(%s)",
   280			 c->auth_hash_name);
   281	
   282		keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
   283		if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS))
   284			keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
 > 285		if (IS_ERR(keyring_key) && IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS))
   286			keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_trusted, c->auth_key_name, NULL);
   287	
   288		if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
   289			ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld",
   290				  PTR_ERR(keyring_key));
   291			return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
   292		}
   293	
   294		down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
   295	
   296		key_material = key_extract_material(keyring_key, &len);
   297		err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(key_material);
   298		if (err < 0)
   299			goto out;
   300	
   301		c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, 0);
   302		if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) {
   303			err = PTR_ERR(c->hash_tfm);
   304			ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d",
   305				  c->auth_hash_name, err);
   306			goto out;
   307		}
   308	
   309		c->hash_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(c->hash_tfm);
   310		if (c->hash_len > UBIFS_HASH_ARR_SZ) {
   311			ubifs_err(c, "hash %s is bigger than maximum allowed hash size (%d > %d)",
   312				  c->auth_hash_name, c->hash_len, UBIFS_HASH_ARR_SZ);
   313			err = -EINVAL;
   314			goto out_free_hash;
   315		}
   316	
   317		c->hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
   318		if (IS_ERR(c->hmac_tfm)) {
   319			err = PTR_ERR(c->hmac_tfm);
   320			ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d", hmac_name, err);
   321			goto out_free_hash;
   322		}
   323	
   324		c->hmac_desc_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(c->hmac_tfm);
   325		if (c->hmac_desc_len > UBIFS_HMAC_ARR_SZ) {
   326			ubifs_err(c, "hmac %s is bigger than maximum allowed hmac size (%d > %d)",
   327				  hmac_name, c->hmac_desc_len, UBIFS_HMAC_ARR_SZ);
   328			err = -EINVAL;
   329			goto out_free_hmac;
   330		}
   331	
   332		err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, key_material, len);
   333		if (err)
   334			goto out_free_hmac;
   335	
   336		c->authenticated = true;
   337	
   338		c->log_hash = ubifs_hash_get_desc(c);
   339		if (IS_ERR(c->log_hash)) {
   340			err = PTR_ERR(c->log_hash);
   341			goto out_free_hmac;
   342		}
   343	
   344		err = 0;
   345	
   346	out_free_hmac:
   347		if (err)
   348			crypto_free_shash(c->hmac_tfm);
   349	out_free_hash:
   350		if (err)
   351			crypto_free_shash(c->hash_tfm);
   352	out:
   353		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
   354		key_put(keyring_key);
   355	
   356		return err;
   357	}
   358	

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org

[-- Attachment #2: config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 32997 bytes --]

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Hello everyone,

On 22.07.21 11:17, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
> no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.
> 
> For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
> this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
> is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
> reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
> type symbol offered by a module.
> 
> Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
> user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.
> 
> This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
> boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
> and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.
> 
> Looking forward to your feedback,

@Mike, Aliasdair: Do you think of key_extract_material as an improvement?

Does someone share the opinion that the helper is useful or should I drop
it and just send out the ubifs auth patch seperately?

Cheers,
Ahmad

> Ahmad
> 
> ---
> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
> To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
> To: dm-devel@redhat.com
> To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> 
> Ahmad Fatoum (4):
>   keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
>   dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
>   ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
>   ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found
> 
>  Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
>  fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
>  include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>  security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> 
> base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
> 


-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Hello everyone,

On 22.07.21 11:17, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
> no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.
> 
> For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
> this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
> is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
> reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
> type symbol offered by a module.
> 
> Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
> user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.
> 
> This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
> boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
> and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.
> 
> Looking forward to your feedback,

@Mike, Aliasdair: Do you think of key_extract_material as an improvement?

Does someone share the opinion that the helper is useful or should I drop
it and just send out the ubifs auth patch seperately?

Cheers,
Ahmad

> Ahmad
> 
> ---
> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
> To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
> To: dm-devel@redhat.com
> To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> 
> Ahmad Fatoum (4):
>   keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
>   dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
>   ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
>   ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found
> 
>  Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
>  fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
>  include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>  security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> 
> base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
> 


-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

Re: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 0/4] keys: introduce key_extract_material helper

[Ahmad Fatoum]

Hello everyone,

On 22.07.21 11:17, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> While keys of differing type have a common struct key definition, there is
> no common scheme to the payload and key material extraction differs.
> 
> For kernel functionality that supports different key types,
> this means duplicated code for key material extraction and because key type
> is discriminated by a pointer to a global, users need to replicate
> reachability checks as well, so builtin code doesn't depend on a key
> type symbol offered by a module.
> 
> Make this easier by adding a common helper with initial support for
> user, logon, encrypted and trusted keys.
> 
> This series contains two example of its use: dm-crypt uses it to reduce
> boilerplate and ubifs authentication uses it to gain support for trusted
> and encrypted keys alongside the already supported logon keys.
> 
> Looking forward to your feedback,

@Mike, Aliasdair: Do you think of key_extract_material as an improvement?

Does someone share the opinion that the helper is useful or should I drop
it and just send out the ubifs auth patch seperately?

Cheers,
Ahmad

> Ahmad
> 
> ---
> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
> To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
> To: dm-devel@redhat.com
> To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> 
> Ahmad Fatoum (4):
>   keys: introduce key_extract_material helper
>   dm: crypt: use new key_extract_material helper
>   ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
>   ubifs: auth: consult encrypted and trusted keys if no logon key was found
> 
>  Documentation/filesystems/ubifs.rst |  2 +-
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c               | 65 ++++--------------------------
>  fs/ubifs/auth.c                     | 25 +++++-------
>  include/linux/key.h                 | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>  security/keys/key.c                 | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> 
> base-commit: 2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c
> 


-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel