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From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: spectrev1+
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 21:09:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d46a7249-1d3e-89fd-f7e2-8a8c82f12120@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180604195120.lp5ryit4yrvjms76@treble>

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On 06/04/2018 03:51 PM, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 09:10:50PM +0200, speck for Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 12:36:23PM -0500, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 10:18:09AM -0700, speck for Dave Hansen wrote:
>>>> On 06/04/2018 10:14 AM, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>>>>> So is the general idea that we're going to insert 3,000 lfences???  Or
>>>>> is there some reasonable way to weed out false positives?
>>>>
>>>> I think the original ~800 "hits" from Coverity ended up in something
>>>> like 10 places that we had to mitigate, either with lfence or
>>>> array_index_nospec().  They had to be culled down manually, though.
>>>
>>> Right, but since the Smatch v1 scanner was introduced in April, that has
>>> ballooned to 50 array_index_nospec() call sites.  In many (most?) cases
>>> I think it's difficult to definitively say "this is a false positive"
>>> with full certainty.
>>>
>>> So I'm just wondering what (if any) criteria we're using to make that
>>> determination.
>>
>> Yeah, that Coverity stuff missed a metric ton of sites.
> 
> Based on what Jiri said, it sounds like *three* metric tons.
> 
>> Many of the smatch results need fixing, mostly because even if you
>> cannot find a cache side-channel after most of them, there's no saying
>> there's no other side-channel hiding in plain sight.
>>
>> And if you kill all possible user input speculation, you don't have to
>> worry about someone changing the code and adding whatever it needs
>> later.
> 
> So we need to add ~3,000 array_index_nospec() calls, preferably before
> next Tuesday.  No problem!

Given the severity of this (sub)variant (which allows more precise
manipulation of program control flow during speculation) I really think
next Tuesday is not the time to be having the unembargo. I made a
request once again during a call with Intel for this to be delayed.

There's another MS patch Tuesday next month folks...I'll go ask
Microsoft to ask Intel for the same.

Jon.

-- 
Computer Architect | Sent from my Fedora powered laptop


  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-05  1:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-31 12:50 [MODERATED] spectrev1+ Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 13:57 ` [MODERATED] spectrev1+ Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-01 11:14   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-01 12:46     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-31 14:11 ` David Woodhouse
2018-05-31 14:18   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-31 14:39     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 14:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-31 14:55   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 18:49     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-31 18:55       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 20:36         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-31 20:52           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 21:28             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 21:51               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-05-31 21:59                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-31 23:09                 ` Jon Masters
2018-05-31 20:54           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-06-01 11:03           ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-01 16:28             ` Jon Masters
2018-05-31 14:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-31 18:41 ` Jon Masters
2018-05-31 21:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-31 21:39     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-01 17:12   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 21:29     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 15:38       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 15:44         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-04 16:23           ` Greg KH
2018-06-05 17:58           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-05 21:58             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-05 22:14               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-06-05 22:23                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-05 22:48                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-06-05 23:56                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-06  8:06                       ` Norbert Manthey
2018-06-06  9:50                       ` [MODERATED] spectrev1+ Norbert Manthey
2018-06-06 10:48                         ` [MODERATED] spectrev1+ Greg KH
2018-06-06 16:14                           ` [MODERATED] Is: smack, Was:Re: spectrev1+ Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-06 16:24                             ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-06 18:30                             ` [MODERATED] " Norbert Manthey
2018-06-06 19:09                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-07 11:38                                 ` [MODERATED] " Norbert Manthey
2018-06-07 12:31                                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 15:45                                 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-07 16:10                                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-07 16:41                                     ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-07 16:58                                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-07 17:39                                         ` Norbert Manthey
2018-06-08  8:33                                           ` Martin Pohlack
2018-06-08  8:38                                           ` David Woodhouse
2018-06-09 12:31                                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-07 20:13                                       ` Is: smack, Was:Re: spectrev1+c Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-08 18:39                                     ` [MODERATED] Re: Is: smack, Was:Re: spectrev1+ Dave Hansen
2018-06-08  8:51                                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-09 12:28                                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-08 18:15                                 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-08 18:19                                   ` Andrew Cooper
2018-06-08 19:04                                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-09 12:35                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-07 18:00                       ` [MODERATED] spectrev1+ Jiri Kosina
2018-06-07 18:02                         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-06-12 17:00                 ` Jon Masters
2018-06-04 16:36         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-04 16:55           ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 17:02             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-06-04 18:53               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-04 19:07               ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 19:20                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-04 20:33                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-06-05  8:19                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 17:14             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-04 17:18               ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-04 17:36                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-04 19:10                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 19:51                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-05  1:09                       ` Jon Masters [this message]
2018-06-05  1:15                         ` Jon Masters

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