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From: 王贇 <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"open list:X86 MM" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" 
	<netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" 
	<bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: fix panic by disable ftrace on fault.c
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 09:52:26 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d8853e49-8b34-4632-3e29-012eb605bea9@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d85f9710-67c9-2573-07c4-05d9c677d615@intel.com>

Hi, Dave, Peter

Nice to have you guys digging the root cause, please allow me to paste whole
trace and the way of reproduce here firstly before checking the details:

Below is the full trace, triggered with the latest linux-next master branch:

[   58.999453][    C0] traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
[   58.999472][    C0] double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   58.999478][    C0] CPU: 0 PID: 799 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.14.0+ #107
[   58.999485][    C0] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[   58.999488][    C0] RIP: 0010:perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x0/0x70
[   58.999505][    C0] Code: 48 03 43 28 48 8b 0c 24 bb 01 00 00 00 4c 29 f0 48 39 c8 48 0f 47 c1 49 89 45 08 e9 48 ff ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <55> 53 e8 89 18 f2 ff 48 c7 c2 20 4d 03 00 65 48 03 15 5a 34 d2 7e
[   58.999511][    C0] RSP: 0018:fffffe000000b000 EFLAGS: 00010046
[   58.999517][    C0] RAX: 0000000080120005 RBX: fffffe000000b050 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   58.999522][    C0] RDX: ffff888106f5a180 RSI: ffffffff812696d1 RDI: 000000000000001c
[   58.999526][    C0] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   58.999530][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[   58.999533][    C0] R13: fffffe000000b044 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
[   58.999537][    C0] FS:  00007f21fc62c740(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   58.999543][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   58.999547][    C0] CR2: fffffe000000aff8 CR3: 0000000106e2e001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[   58.999551][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   58.999555][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   58.999559][    C0] Call Trace:
[   58.999562][    C0]  <NMI>
[   58.999565][    C0]  perf_trace_buf_alloc+0x26/0xd0
[   58.999579][    C0]  ? is_prefetch.isra.25+0x260/0x260
[   58.999586][    C0]  ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1b8/0x280
[   58.999592][    C0]  perf_ftrace_function_call+0x18f/0x2e0
[   58.999604][    C0]  ? perf_trace_buf_alloc+0xbf/0xd0
[   58.999642][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   58.999669][    C0]  0xffffffffa00ba083
[   58.999688][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   58.999708][    C0]  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x5/0x120
[   58.999721][    C0]  kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x5/0x120
[   58.999728][    C0]  __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1b8/0x280
[   58.999747][    C0]  do_user_addr_fault+0x410/0x920
[   58.999763][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   58.999780][    C0]  exc_page_fault+0x92/0x300
[   58.999796][    C0]  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   58.999805][    C0] RIP: 0010:__get_user_nocheck_8+0x6/0x13
[   58.999814][    C0] Code: 01 ca c3 90 0f 01 cb 0f ae e8 0f b7 10 31 c0 0f 01 ca c3 90 0f 01 cb 0f ae e8 8b 10 31 c0 0f 01 ca c3 66 90 0f 01 cb 0f ae e8 <48> 8b 10 31 c0 0f 01 ca c3 90 0f 01 ca 31 d2 48 c7 c0 f2 ff ff ff
[   58.999819][    C0] RSP: 0018:fffffe000000b370 EFLAGS: 00050046
[   58.999825][    C0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffe000000b3d0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   58.999828][    C0] RDX: ffff888106f5a180 RSI: ffffffff8100a91e RDI: fffffe000000b3d0
[   58.999832][    C0] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   58.999836][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000014 R12: 00007fffffffeff0
[   58.999839][    C0] R13: ffff888106f5a180 R14: 000000000000007f R15: 000000000000007f
[   58.999867][    C0]  ? perf_callchain_user+0x25e/0x2f0
[   58.999886][    C0]  perf_callchain_user+0x266/0x2f0
[   58.999907][    C0]  get_perf_callchain+0x194/0x210
[   58.999938][    C0]  perf_callchain+0xa3/0xc0
[   58.999956][    C0]  perf_prepare_sample+0xa5/0xa60
[   58.999984][    C0]  perf_event_output_forward+0x7b/0x1b0
[   58.999996][    C0]  ? perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x62/0x70
[   59.000008][    C0]  ? perf_trace_buf_alloc+0xbf/0xd0
[   59.000026][    C0]  __perf_event_overflow+0x67/0x120
[   59.000042][    C0]  perf_swevent_overflow+0xcb/0x110
[   59.000065][    C0]  perf_swevent_event+0xb0/0xf0
[   59.000078][    C0]  perf_tp_event+0x292/0x410
[   59.000085][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000120][    C0]  ? tracing_gen_ctx_irq_test+0x8f/0xa0
[   59.000129][    C0]  ? perf_swevent_event+0x28/0xf0
[   59.000142][    C0]  ? perf_tp_event+0x2d7/0x410
[   59.000150][    C0]  ? tracing_gen_ctx_irq_test+0x8f/0xa0
[   59.000157][    C0]  ? perf_swevent_event+0x28/0xf0
[   59.000171][    C0]  ? perf_tp_event+0x2d7/0x410
[   59.000179][    C0]  ? tracing_gen_ctx_irq_test+0x8f/0xa0
[   59.000198][    C0]  ? tracing_gen_ctx_irq_test+0x8f/0xa0
[   59.000206][    C0]  ? perf_swevent_event+0x28/0xf0
[   59.000233][    C0]  ? perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x87/0xc0
[   59.000244][    C0]  ? perf_trace_buf_alloc+0x86/0xd0
[   59.000250][    C0]  perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x87/0xc0
[   59.000276][    C0]  perf_trace_lock_acquire+0x12b/0x170
[   59.000308][    C0]  lock_acquire+0x1bf/0x2e0
[   59.000317][    C0]  ? perf_output_begin+0x5/0x4b0
[   59.000348][    C0]  perf_output_begin+0x70/0x4b0
[   59.000356][    C0]  ? perf_output_begin+0x5/0x4b0
[   59.000394][    C0]  perf_log_throttle+0xe2/0x1a0
[   59.000431][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000447][    C0]  ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x135/0x2d0
[   59.000462][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000471][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000495][    C0]  ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x135/0x2d0
[   59.000506][    C0]  ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x5/0x40
[   59.000519][    C0]  ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0x40
[   59.000528][    C0]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x23/0x80
[   59.000539][    C0]  ? lock_release+0xc7/0x2b0
[   59.000560][    C0]  ? __perf_event_account_interrupt+0x116/0x160
[   59.000576][    C0]  __perf_event_account_interrupt+0x116/0x160
[   59.000589][    C0]  __perf_event_overflow+0x3e/0x120
[   59.000604][    C0]  handle_pmi_common+0x30f/0x400
[   59.000611][    C0]  ? perf_ftrace_function_call+0x268/0x2e0
[   59.000620][    C0]  ? perf_ftrace_function_call+0x53/0x2e0
[   59.000663][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000689][    C0]  ? 0xffffffffa00ba083
[   59.000729][    C0]  ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x120/0x620
[   59.000737][    C0]  ? handle_pmi_common+0x5/0x400
[   59.000743][    C0]  intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x120/0x620
[   59.000767][    C0]  perf_event_nmi_handler+0x30/0x50
[   59.000779][    C0]  nmi_handle+0xba/0x2a0
[   59.000806][    C0]  default_do_nmi+0x45/0xf0
[   59.000819][    C0]  exc_nmi+0x155/0x170
[   59.000838][    C0]  end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x55
[   59.000845][    C0] RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0xd/0x60
[   59.000853][    C0] Code: 00 75 10 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 71 01 00 48 8b 80 88 15 00 00 f3 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 8b 05 09 77 e0 7e 89 c1 48 8b 34 24 <65> 48 8b 14 25 c0 71 01 00 81 e1 00 01 00 00 a9 00 01 ff 00 74 10
[   59.000858][    C0] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000003dd0 EFLAGS: 00000046
[   59.000863][    C0] RAX: 0000000080010001 RBX: ffffffff82a1db40 RCX: 0000000080010001
[   59.000867][    C0] RDX: ffff888106f5a180 RSI: ffffffff81009613 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   59.000871][    C0] RBP: ffff88813bc40d08 R08: ffff888106f5abb8 R09: 00000000fffffffe
[   59.000875][    C0] R10: ffffc90000003be0 R11: 00000000ffd17b4b R12: ffff88813bc118a0
[   59.000878][    C0] R13: ffff88813bc40c00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff82a1db40
[   59.000906][    C0]  ? x86_pmu_enable+0x383/0x440
[   59.000924][    C0]  ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0xd/0x60
[   59.000942][    C0]  ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x284/0x620
[   59.000954][    C0]  </NMI>
[   59.000957][    C0] WARNING: stack recursion on stack type 6
[   59.000960][    C0] Modules linked in:
[   59.120070][    C0] ---[ end trace 07eb1e3908914794 ]---
[   59.120075][    C0] RIP: 0010:perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x0/0x70
[   59.120087][    C0] Code: 48 03 43 28 48 8b 0c 24 bb 01 00 00 00 4c 29 f0 48 39 c8 48 0f 47 c1 49 89 45 08 e9 48 ff ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <55> 53 e8 89 18 f2 ff 48 c7 c2 20 4d 03 00 65 48 03 15 5a 34 d2 7e
[   59.120092][    C0] RSP: 0018:fffffe000000b000 EFLAGS: 00010046
[   59.120098][    C0] RAX: 0000000080120005 RBX: fffffe000000b050 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   59.120102][    C0] RDX: ffff888106f5a180 RSI: ffffffff812696d1 RDI: 000000000000001c
[   59.120106][    C0] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   59.120110][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[   59.120114][    C0] R13: fffffe000000b044 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
[   59.120118][    C0] FS:  00007f21fc62c740(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   59.120125][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   59.120129][    C0] CR2: fffffe000000aff8 CR3: 0000000106e2e001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[   59.120133][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   59.120137][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   59.120141][    C0] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[   59.120540][    C0] Kernel Offset: disabled

And below is the way of reproduce:


// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <dirent.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>

static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms)
{
	usleep(ms * 1000);
}

static uint64_t current_time_ms(void)
{
	struct timespec ts;
	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts))
	exit(1);
	return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000;
}

#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) = htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val) << (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))

static bool write_file(const char* file, const char* what, ...)
{
	char buf[1024];
	va_list args;
	va_start(args, what);
	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), what, args);
	va_end(args);
	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
	int len = strlen(buf);
	int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
	if (fd == -1)
		return false;
	if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) {
		int err = errno;
		close(fd);
		errno = err;
		return false;
	}
	close(fd);
	return true;
}

static void kill_and_wait(int pid, int* status)
{
	kill(-pid, SIGKILL);
	kill(pid, SIGKILL);
	for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
		if (waitpid(-1, status, WNOHANG | __WALL) == pid)
			return;
		usleep(1000);
	}
	DIR* dir = opendir("/sys/fs/fuse/connections");
	if (dir) {
		for (;;) {
			struct dirent* ent = readdir(dir);
			if (!ent)
				break;
			if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
				continue;
			char abort[300];
			snprintf(abort, sizeof(abort), "/sys/fs/fuse/connections/%s/abort", ent->d_name);
			int fd = open(abort, O_WRONLY);
			if (fd == -1) {
				continue;
			}
			if (write(fd, abort, 1) < 0) {
			}
			close(fd);
		}
		closedir(dir);
	} else {
	}
	while (waitpid(-1, status, __WALL) != pid) {
	}
}

static void setup_test()
{
	prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0);
	setpgrp();
	write_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", "1000");
}

static void execute_one(void);

#define WAIT_FLAGS __WALL

static void loop(void)
{
	int iter = 0;
	for (;; iter++) {
		int pid = fork();
		if (pid < 0)
	exit(1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			setup_test();
			execute_one();
			exit(0);
		}
		int status = 0;
		uint64_t start = current_time_ms();
		for (;;) {
			if (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG | WAIT_FLAGS) == pid)
				break;
			sleep_ms(1);
		if (current_time_ms() - start < 5000) {
			continue;
		}
			kill_and_wait(pid, &status);
			break;
		}
	}
}

void execute_one(void)
{
*(uint32_t*)0x20000380 = 2;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000384 = 0x70;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000388 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000389 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000038a = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000038b = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000038c = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000390 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000398 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003a0 = 0;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 0, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 1, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 2, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 3, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 4, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 5, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 7, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 8, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 9, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 10, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 11, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 12, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 13, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 14, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 15, 2);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 17, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 18, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 19, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 20, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 21, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 22, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 23, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 24, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 25, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 26, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 27, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 28, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200003a8, 0, 29, 35);
*(uint32_t*)0x200003b0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200003b4 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003b8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003c0 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003c8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003d0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200003d8 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200003dc = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200003e0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200003e8 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200003ec = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200003ee = 0;
	syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, 0x20000380ul, -1, 0ul, -1, 0ul);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000080 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000084 = 0x70;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000088 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000089 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000008a = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000008b = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000008c = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000090 = 0x9c;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000098 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000a0 = 0;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 0, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 1, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 2, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 3, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 4, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 5, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 7, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 8, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 9, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 10, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 11, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 12, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 13, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 14, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 15, 2);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 17, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 18, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 19, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 20, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 21, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 22, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 23, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 24, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 25, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 26, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 27, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 28, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x200000a8, 0, 29, 35);
*(uint32_t*)0x200000b0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000b4 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000b8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000c0 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000c8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000d0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000d8 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000dc = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000e0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000e8 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200000ec = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200000ee = 0;
	syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, 0x20000080ul, -1, 0ul, -1, 0ul);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000140 = 2;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000144 = 0x70;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000148 = 0x47;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000149 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000014a = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x2000014b = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000014c = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000150 = 9;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000158 = 0x61220;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000160 = 0;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 0, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 1, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 2, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 3, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 4, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 5, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 7, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 8, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 9, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 10, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 11, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 12, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 13, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 14, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 15, 2);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 17, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 18, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 19, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 20, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 21, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 22, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 23, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 24, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 25, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 26, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 27, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 28, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint64_t, , 0x20000168, 0, 29, 35);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000170 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000174 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000178 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000180 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000188 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000190 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000198 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000019c = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200001a0 = 2;
*(uint32_t*)0x200001a8 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200001ac = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200001ae = 0;
	syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, 0x20000140ul, 0, -1ul, -1, 0ul);

}
int main(void)
{
		syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
	syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
	syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
			loop();
	return 0;
}

Regards,
Michael Wang


On 2021/9/13 下午10:49, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 9/12/21 8:30 PM, 王贇 wrote:
>> According to the trace we know the story is like this, the NMI
>> triggered perf IRQ throttling and call perf_log_throttle(),
>> which triggered the swevent overflow, and the overflow process
>> do perf_callchain_user() which triggered a user PF, and the PF
>> process triggered perf ftrace which finally lead into a suspected
>> stack overflow.
>>
>> This patch disable ftrace on fault.c, which help to avoid the panic.
> ...
>> +# Disable ftrace to avoid stack overflow.
>> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_fault.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> 
> Was this observed on a mainline kernel?
> 
> How reproducible is this?
> 
> I suspect we're going into do_user_addr_fault(), then falling in here:
> 
>>         if (unlikely(faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)) {
>>                 bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
>>                 return;
>>         }
> 
> Then something double faults in perf_swevent_get_recursion_context().
> But, you snipped all of the register dump out so I can't quite see
> what's going on and what might have caused *that* fault.  But, in my
> kernel perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x0/0x70 is:
> 
> 	   mov    $0x27d00,%rdx
> 
> which is rather unlikely to fault.
> 
> Either way, we don't want to keep ftrace out of fault.c.  This patch is
> just a hack, and doesn't really try to fix the underlying problem.  This
> situation *should* be handled today.  There's code there to handle it.
> 
> Something else really funky is going on.
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-14  1:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-09  3:13 [RFC PATCH] perf: fix panic by mark recursion inside perf_log_throttle 王贇
2021-09-09  6:10 ` 王贇
2021-09-10 15:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-13  3:00   ` 王贇
2021-09-13  3:21     ` 王贇
2021-09-13 10:24     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-13 10:36       ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-14  2:02         ` 王贇
2021-09-14  1:58       ` 王贇
2021-09-14 10:28         ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-15  1:51           ` 王贇
2021-09-15 15:17             ` [PATCH] x86/dumpstack/64: Add guard pages to stack_info Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-16  3:34               ` 王贇
2021-09-16  3:47               ` 王贇
2021-09-16  8:00                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-16  8:03                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-16 10:02                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-17  2:15                       ` 王贇
2021-09-17  3:02                       ` 王贇
2021-09-17 10:21                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-17 16:40                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-18  2:30                             ` 王贇
2021-09-18  6:56                               ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-18  2:38                             ` 王贇
2021-09-13  3:30 ` [PATCH] perf: fix panic by disable ftrace on fault.c 王贇
2021-09-13 14:49   ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-14  1:52     ` 王贇 [this message]
2021-09-14  3:02       ` 王贇
2021-09-14  7:23         ` 王贇
2021-09-14 16:16           ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-15  1:56             ` 王贇
2021-09-15  3:27               ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-15  7:22                 ` 王贇
2021-09-15  7:34                   ` 王贇
2021-09-15 15:19                     ` [PATCH] x86: Increase exception stack sizes Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-16  3:42                       ` 王贇
2021-09-21  7:28                       ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-21 12:41                       ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2021-09-14  2:08     ` [PATCH] perf: fix panic by disable ftrace on fault.c 王贇

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