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From: hypervis0r <hypervis0r@phasetw0.com>
To: dalias@libc.org
Cc: ariadne@dereferenced.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/exec: require argv[0] presence in do_execveat_common()
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 12:54:08 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e166bc39-4d3e-ff03-6b14-3a05a487acc3@phasetw0.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220126132729.GA7942@brightrain.aerifal.cx>

> I'm not really opposed  to attempting to change this with consensus
> (like, actually  proposing it on the Austin Group tracker), but a less
> invasive change would be  just enforcing it for the case where exec is
> a privilege boundary  (suid/sgid/caps). There's really no motivation
> for changing  longstanding standard behavior in a
> non-privilege-boundary  case.

I don't really see it as a matter of "maintaining standard behavior".

there are very little uses for this ABI feature to be present and only 
serves to make applications harder to port between Linux and other *nix 
systems. The pros (major vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-4034) outweigh 
the cons (minor userland ABI change that only affects shellcode on 
shell-storm.org) in this particular scenario, and I am all for this patch.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-01 20:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-26  4:39 [PATCH] fs/exec: require argv[0] presence in do_execveat_common() Ariadne Conill
2022-01-26  6:42 ` Kees Cook
2022-01-26  7:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-01-26 11:18     ` Ariadne Conill
2022-01-26 12:33       ` Heikki Kallasjoki
2022-01-26 23:57         ` Kees Cook
2022-01-27  0:20           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-01-26 16:59     ` David Laight
2022-01-26 13:27 ` Rich Felker
2022-01-26 14:46   ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-26 17:37   ` Ariadne Conill
2022-02-01 20:54   ` hypervis0r [this message]
2022-01-26 15:02 Alexey Dobriyan
2022-01-27  0:00 ` Kees Cook

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