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From: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Cc: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Thread safety of coroutine-sigaltstack
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 16:42:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <eb4fb436-e7d7-2f5c-c1a4-9f5e57804e54@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <823a843f-af47-f091-1bd1-e33487524eb9@redhat.com>

On 21.01.21 14:34, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> On 01/21/21 10:27, Max Reitz wrote:
>> On 20.01.21 18:25, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>>> On 01/20/21 17:26, Max Reitz wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I’ve run into trouble with Vladimir’s async backup series on MacOS,
>>>> namely that iotest 256 fails with qemu exiting because of a SIGUSR2.
>>>>
>>>> Turns out this is because MacOS (-xcode) uses coroutine-sigaltstack,
>>>> when I use this on Linux, I get the same error.
>>>>
>>>> (You can find the series applied on my block branch e.g. here:
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/XanClic/qemu.git block
>>>> )
>>>>
>>>> Some debugging later I found that the problem seems to be two threads
>>>> simultaneously creating a coroutine.  It makes sense that this case
>>>> would appear with Vladimir’s series and iotest 256, because 256 runs two
>>>> backup jobs in two different threads in a transaction, i.e. they’re
>>>> launched simultaneously.  The async backup series makes backup use many
>>>> concurrent coroutines and so by default launches 64+x coroutines when
>>>> the backup is started.  Thus, the case of two coroutines created
>>>> concurrently in two threads is very likely to occur.
>>>>
>>>> I think the problem is in coroutine-sigaltstack’s qemu_coroutine_new().
>>>> It sets up a SIGUSR2 handler, then changes the signal handling stack,
>>>> then raises SIGUSR2, then reverts the signal handling stack and the
>>>> SIGUSR2 handler.  As far as I’m aware, setting up signal handlers and
>>>> changing the signal handling stack are both process-global operations,
>>>> and so if two threads do so concurrently, they will interfere with each
>>>> other.
>>>
>>> Signal action (disposition) is process-wide.
>>>
>>> Signal mask and signal stack are thread-specific.
>>
>> Ah, OK.  Thanks for the insight!
>>
>>> A signal may be pending for the whole process, or for a specific thread.
>>> In the former case, the signal is delivered to one of the threads that
>>> are not blocking the signal.
>>>
>>>> What usually happens is that one thread sets up everything,
>>>> while the other is already in the process of reverting its changes: So
>>>> the second thread reverts the SIGUSR2 handler to the default, and then
>>>> the first thread raises SIGUSR2, thus making qemu exit.
>>>
>>> I agree. The way SIGUSR2 is blocked (for the thread), made pending (for
>>> the thread), and then allowed to be delivered (consequently, to the
>>> thread), looks OK. But by the time it is delivered, the action has been
>>> changed.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> (Could be worse though.  Both threads could set up the sigaltstack, then
>>>> both raise SIGUSR2, and then we get one coroutine_trampoline()
>>>> invocation in each thread, but both would use the same stack.  But I
>>>> don’t think I’ve ever seen that happen, presumably because the race time
>>>> window is much shorter.)
>>>
>>> No, the "alternate stack for signal handlers" that sigaltstack()
>>> configures is thread-specific. (I mean one could theoretically mess it
>>> up if the stack were located in the same place between different
>>> threads, but we call qemu_alloc_stack(), so that doesn't happen.)
>>>
>>> https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sigaltstack.html
>>>
>>
>> Explains why I haven’t seen it. :)
>>
>>>> Now, this all seems obvious to me, but I’m wondering...  If
>>>> coroutine-sigaltstack really couldn’t create coroutines concurrently,
>>>> why wouldn’t we have noticed before?  I mean, this new backup case is
>>>> kind of a stress test, yes, but surely we would have seen the problem
>>>> already, right?  That’s why I’m not sure whether my analysis is correct.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway, I’ve attached a patch that wraps the whole SIGUSR2 handling
>>>> section in a mutex, and that makes 256 pass reliably with Vladimir’s
>>>> async backup series.  Besides being unsure whether the problem is really
>>>> in coroutine-sigaltstack, I also don’t know whether getting out the big
>>>> guns and wrapping everything in the mutex is the best solution.  So,
>>>> it’s an RFC, I guess.
>>>
>>> A simple grep for SIGUSR2 seems to indicate that SIGUSR2 is not used by
>>> system emulation for anything else, in practice. Is it possible to
>>> dedicate SIGUSR2 explicitly to coroutine-sigaltstack, and set up the
>>> action beforehand, from some init function that executes on a "central"
>>> thread, before qemu_coroutine_new() is ever called?
>>
>> Doesn’t sound unreasonable, but wouldn’t the signal handler then have to
>> check whether the SIGUSR2 comes from coroutine-sigaltstack or from the
>> outside?  Or should we then keep SIGUSR2 blocked all the time?
> 
> Blocking SIGUSR2 in all threads at all times, except when temporarily
> unblocking it with sigsuspend(), is one approach, but I don't think it
> would necessarily be 100% safe against other processes sending SIGUSR2
> asynchronously. And IMO that's not even a goal -- sending a signal
> requires permission:
> 
> https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/kill.html
> 
>      For a process to have permission to send a signal to a process
>      designated by pid, unless the sending process has appropriate
>      privileges, the real or effective user ID of the sending process
>      shall match the real or saved set-user-ID of the receiving process.
> 
> (I assume (hope) that SELinux / sVirt further restricts this, so one
> qemu process couldn't simply signal another, due to their different labels.)
> 
> Thus, when the host kernel permits a different process to generate
> SIGUSR2 for QEMU, it's OK to let things just crash and burn. Every other
> process with such a permission should *know better* than to send an
> unsolicited SIGUSR2 to QEMU.
> 
> I mean, what happens if you send an external SIGUSR2 to QEMU right now?
> The default action for SIGUSR2 is to terminate the process:
> 
> https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/signal.h.html

I had the same thought (if you can send SIGUSR2, you can send SIGKILL), 
but terminating the process is one thing; redirecting control flow to a 
signal handler that has not been audited for what happens when it is 
invoked from an actual signal from the outside is another.

>>> ... I've tried to see if POSIX says anything on signals being delivered
>>> with mutexen held. I can't find anything specific (the spec seems to
>>> talk about delivery of a signal while the thread waits in
>>> pthread_mutex_lock(), but that's not what we care about, here). I'm just
>>> somewhat uncomfortable with bracketing this whole hackery into a mutex
>>> even... Keeping sigaction() out of the picture could be a small
>>> performance benefit, too.
>>
>> Speaking of signal being delivered in the mutexed section...  What would
>> happen if we get an external signal after SIGUSR2 was delivered and
>> coroutine_trampoline() set up the sigsetjmp(), but before the stack is
>> switched back?  Wouldn’t this new signal then trash the stack?  Should
>> we block all signals while using the alternate stack?
>>
>> (Looking at the x64 objdump, the stack actually seems to be used to
>> store @self across sigsetjmp().)
> 
> I wouldn't worry about it. Signals are a crude interface for programs.
> If a program documents that a particular signal can be sent to it for a
> particular purpose (which implies the asynchronous generation of that
> signal of course), then processes that have proper permission to send
> that signal are *welcome* to send that signal at *any* time. If the
> program mishandles the signal, that's a bug in the signalee.
> 
> Conversely, if a signal is not documented like that by the program, but
> another process (having the needed permission) still sends the signal,
> breakage is expected, and the signaler process is at fault. In my book,
> it's no different from sending a signal that is simply neither caught
> nor ignored nor blocked by the signalee process, and whose default
> disposition is to terminate the process (marked "T" or "A" in the table
> linked above). E.g., if you send a SIGILL to a process out of the blue,
> the process is totally expected to blow up, or at least to misbehave.

I don’t really understand.  If you send any handled signal (like SIGINT) 
to a thread that has the alternate stack set up, the coroutine 
trampoline stack is thrashed (I think), and while I haven’t investigated 
it, I would expect undefined behavior on siglongjmp().  I find that much 
worse than terminating.

Giving a process A the permission to send signals to a process B usually 
does not automatically allow A to induce undefined behavior in B.
(And the breakage you get when someone violates a protocol should never 
be undefined behavior.)

Perhaps we have the policy of “If another process can send signals, then 
we consider it to have full control over qemu, like a debugger.”  Then 
that’s OK.  Otherwise, I don’t find it OK.


In any case, this question of what other signals do while the alternate 
stack is up is a separate problem from the original one, so we can look 
at one after the other.

>>> The logic in the patch doesn't look broken, but the comments should be
>>> updated minimally -- the signal stack is thread-specific (similarly to
>>> how a thread has its own stack anyway, regardless of signals).
>>
>> Sure, I can do that.
>>
>> I agree that there probably are better solutions than to wrap everything
>> in a lock.  OTOH, it looks to me like this lock is the most simple
>> solution.  If Daniel is right[1] and we should drop
>> coroutine-sigaltstack altogether (at some point...), perhaps it is best
>> to go for the most simple solution now.
>>
>> [1]
>> https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-block/2021-01/msg00808.html
> 
> SUSv3 marked ucontext functions obsolescent:
> 
> https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/000095399/functions/makecontext.html#tag_03_356_08
> 
> and they are entirely missing from SUSv4 (aka the latest POSIX):
> 
> https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/xrat/V4_xsh_chap03.html#tag_22_03_01_07
> 
> So you can use ucontext if you #define _XOPEN_SOURCE as 500 or 600, but
> (in theory) not if you #define it as 700. How this works out in practice
> on OSX -- i.e. how long they intend to support _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 --, I
> can't tell.

Daniel made it sound like there was a libucontext that might be the way 
to go forward.

> I don't disagree with Daniel though; you can always bring back
> coroutine-sigaltstack from the git history, if Apple decides to drop
> ucontext.

It may be a bit more hassle (the configure option has to be removed, 
then maybe readded), but, well, yes.

> If you went for the mutex for the time being, I wouldn't try to nack it. :)

Hm.  OK.  Doesn’t sound too bad. ;)

Max



  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-21 15:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-20 16:26 Thread safety of coroutine-sigaltstack Max Reitz
2021-01-20 16:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-20 16:58 ` Eric Blake
2021-01-20 17:25 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-21  9:27   ` Max Reitz
2021-01-21 13:34     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-21 15:42       ` Max Reitz [this message]
2021-01-21 16:04         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-21 16:05         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-21 15:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-21 16:07       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-21 16:44         ` Peter Maydell
2021-01-21 17:24           ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-22 20:38             ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-22 21:34               ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-22 21:41                 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-22  7:55       ` Markus Armbruster
2021-01-22  8:48   ` Max Reitz
2021-01-22 10:14     ` Peter Maydell
2021-01-22 10:16       ` Max Reitz
2021-01-22 12:24       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-23  0:06       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-23 13:35         ` Peter Maydell
2021-01-25 22:15           ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-25 22:45             ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-26  8:57               ` Laszlo Ersek

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