All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 16:40:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ec1fa864-6611-41c8-b405-41e3d713d590@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhREpJ3bkcU+cOz_Cg7KaF=QokngvXyhCpus--=d8HSP_g@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/22/2021 3:12 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2021 at 5:52 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 3:17 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>>> The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
>>> callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
>>> current task is referenced.  Fix this by removing the task_struct
>>> argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
>>> current task.  While we are changing the hook declaration we also
>>> rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
>>> to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
>>> current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>> ---
>>>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |    3 +--
>>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h             |    8 +++-----
>>>   include/linux/security.h              |    4 ++--
>>>   kernel/audit.c                        |    4 ++--
>>>   kernel/auditfilter.c                  |    3 +--
>>>   kernel/auditsc.c                      |   10 +++++++++-
>>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |    2 +-
>>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |    2 +-
>>>   security/apparmor/lsm.c               |   13 ++++++++++---
>>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    2 +-
>>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |   14 +++++++-------
>>>   security/security.c                   |    6 +++---
>>>   security/selinux/hooks.c              |   19 +++----------------
>>>   security/smack/smack.h                |   16 ----------------
>>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |    9 ++++-----
>>>   15 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
>> I never saw any comments, positive or negative, on this patch so I'll
>> plan on merging it early next week.  If you've got objections, now is
>> the time to speak up.
> I just merged this patch, with the AppArmor tweak suggested by Serge,
> into selinux/next.  Thanks everyone.

Has the security tree been abandoned as a path for general LSM
changes? Except for the initial Landlock pull and a couple touch-ups
to capabilities nothing has gone in via security this year. This
change should have gone in through security, not selinux. I'm glad
that this change is going in, don't get me wrong on that. I am
somewhat concerned about the LSM infrastructure work I'm doing,
and how it's going to get upstream. The diffstats from that look
a lot like the one here. I seriously doubt that taking the full
set of changes for stacking through the Smack tree is going to fly. ;)


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-23  0:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-29 19:17 [PATCH] lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj() Paul Moore
2021-09-29 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-19 22:52 ` Paul Moore
2021-11-19 23:23   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-11-19 23:59     ` John Johansen
2021-11-20 15:04       ` Paul Moore
2021-11-20  0:42   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-20 15:06     ` Paul Moore
2021-11-20 17:54       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-22 23:12   ` Paul Moore
2021-11-22 23:25     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-11-23  0:40     ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2021-11-23  3:14       ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ec1fa864-6611-41c8-b405-41e3d713d590@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.