Re-reading the whole thread again ... On 29.06.23 03:00, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > On Wed, 21 Jun 2023, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote: >> On 21.06.23 16:12, Petr Pavlu wrote: >> >> >> Hello Petr >> >> >>> When attempting to run Xen on a QEMU/KVM virtual machine with virtio >>> devices (all x86_64), dom0 tries to establish a grant for itself which >>> eventually results in a hang during the boot. >>> >>> The backtrace looks as follows, the while loop in __send_control_msg() >>> makes no progress: >>> >>> #0 virtqueue_get_buf_ctx (_vq=_vq@entry=0xffff8880074a8400, len=len@entry=0xffffc90000413c94, ctx=ctx@entry=0x0 ) at ../drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c:2326 >>> #1 0xffffffff817086b7 in virtqueue_get_buf (_vq=_vq@entry=0xffff8880074a8400, len=len@entry=0xffffc90000413c94) at ../drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c:2333 >>> #2 0xffffffff8175f6b2 in __send_control_msg (portdev=, port_id=0xffffffff, event=0x0, value=0x1) at ../drivers/char/virtio_console.c:562 >>> #3 0xffffffff8175f6ee in __send_control_msg (portdev=, port_id=, event=, value=) at ../drivers/char/virtio_console.c:569 >>> #4 0xffffffff817618b1 in virtcons_probe (vdev=0xffff88800585e800) at ../drivers/char/virtio_console.c:2098 >>> #5 0xffffffff81707117 in virtio_dev_probe (_d=0xffff88800585e810) at ../drivers/virtio/virtio.c:305 >>> #6 0xffffffff8198e348 in call_driver_probe (drv=0xffffffff82be40c0 , drv=0xffffffff82be40c0 , dev=0xffff88800585e810) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:579 >>> #7 really_probe (dev=dev@entry=0xffff88800585e810, drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:658 >>> #8 0xffffffff8198e58f in __driver_probe_device (drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 , dev=dev@entry=0xffff88800585e810) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:800 >>> #9 0xffffffff8198e65a in driver_probe_device (drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 , dev=dev@entry=0xffff88800585e810) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:830 >>> #10 0xffffffff8198e832 in __driver_attach (dev=0xffff88800585e810, data=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:1216 >>> #11 0xffffffff8198bfb2 in bus_for_each_dev (bus=, start=start@entry=0x0 , data=data@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 , >>> fn=fn@entry=0xffffffff8198e7b0 <__driver_attach>) at ../drivers/base/bus.c:368 >>> #12 0xffffffff8198db65 in driver_attach (drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/base/dd.c:1233 >>> #13 0xffffffff8198d207 in bus_add_driver (drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/base/bus.c:673 >>> #14 0xffffffff8198f550 in driver_register (drv=drv@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/base/driver.c:246 >>> #15 0xffffffff81706b47 in register_virtio_driver (driver=driver@entry=0xffffffff82be40c0 ) at ../drivers/virtio/virtio.c:357 >>> #16 0xffffffff832cd34b in virtio_console_init () at ../drivers/char/virtio_console.c:2258 >>> #17 0xffffffff8100105c in do_one_initcall (fn=0xffffffff832cd2e0 ) at ../init/main.c:1246 >>> #18 0xffffffff83277293 in do_initcall_level (command_line=0xffff888003e2f900 "root", level=0x6) at ../init/main.c:1319 >>> #19 do_initcalls () at ../init/main.c:1335 >>> #20 do_basic_setup () at ../init/main.c:1354 >>> #21 kernel_init_freeable () at ../init/main.c:1571 >>> #22 0xffffffff81f64be1 in kernel_init (unused=) at ../init/main.c:1462 >>> #23 0xffffffff81001f49 in ret_from_fork () at ../arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 >>> #24 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () >>> >>> Fix the problem by preventing xen_grant_init_backend_domid() from >>> setting dom0 as a backend when running in dom0. >>> >>> Fixes: 035e3a4321f7 ("xen/virtio: Optimize the setup of "xen-grant-dma" devices") >> >> >> I am not 100% sure whether the Fixes tag points to precise commit. If I >> am not mistaken, the said commit just moves the code in the context >> without changing the logic of CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT, this was >> introduced before. >> >> >>> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu >>> --- >>> drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c | 4 +++- >>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c b/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c >>> index 76f6f26265a3..29ed27ac450e 100644 >>> --- a/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c >>> +++ b/drivers/xen/grant-dma-ops.c >>> @@ -362,7 +362,9 @@ static int xen_grant_init_backend_domid(struct device *dev, >>> if (np) { >>> ret = xen_dt_grant_init_backend_domid(dev, np, backend_domid); >>> of_node_put(np); >>> - } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT) || xen_pv_domain()) { >>> + } else if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT) || >>> + xen_pv_domain()) && >>> + !xen_initial_domain()) { >> >> The commit lgtm, just one note: >> >> >> I would even bail out early in xen_virtio_restricted_mem_acc() instead, >> as I assume the same issue could happen on Arm with DT (although there >> we don't guess the backend's domid, we read it from DT and quite >> unlikely we get Dom0 being in Dom0 with correct DT). >> >> Something like: >> >> @@ -416,6 +421,10 @@ bool xen_virtio_restricted_mem_acc(struct >> virtio_device *dev) >> { >> domid_t backend_domid; >> >> + /* Xen grant DMA ops are not used when running as initial domain */ >> + if (xen_initial_domain()) >> + return false; >> + >> if (!xen_grant_init_backend_domid(dev->dev.parent, >> &backend_domid)) { >> xen_grant_setup_dma_ops(dev->dev.parent, backend_domid); >> return true; >> (END) >> >> >> >> If so, that commit subject would need to be updated accordingly. >> >> Let's see what other reviewers will say. > > This doesn't work in all cases. Imagine using PCI Passthrough to assign > a "physical" virtio device to a domU. The domU will run into the same > error, right? > > The problem is that we need a way for the virtio backend to advertise > its ability of handling grants. Right now we only have a way to do with > that with device tree on ARM. On x86, we only have > CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT, and if we take > CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT at face value, it also enables grants for > "physical" virtio devices. Note that in this case we are fixing a > nested-virtualization bug, but there are actually physical > virtio-compatible devices out there. CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT will > break those too. In case you want virtio device passthrough, you shouldn't use a kernel built with CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT. And supporting passing through virtio devices of the host to pv-domUs is a security risk anyway. We _could_ drop the requirement of the backend needing to set VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM for PV guests and allow grant-less virtio handling for all guests. For this to work xen_virtio_restricted_mem_acc() would need to check for VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM and return true if set. Maybe we'd want to enable that possibility via a boot parameter? Juergen