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From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: omosnace@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 18:09:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f2cebe3fcb2960a2b51638d457ae07781896a12c.camel@btinternet.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aa333bd1-9fd8-b4a4-eba2-aa8d722cbc7e@tycho.nsa.gov>

On Thu, 2020-01-09 at 12:19 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 1/9/20 10:07 AM, Richard Haines wrote:
> > Test filesystem permissions and setfscreatecon(3).
> > 
> >  From kernels 5.5 filesystem { watch } is also tested.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> > ---
> > diff --git a/policy/test_filesystem.te b/policy/test_filesystem.te
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000..2eee1fc
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/policy/test_filesystem.te
> > @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
> > +#
> > +######### Test filesystem permissions policy module ##########
> > +#
> > +attribute filesystemdomain;
> > +
> > +#################### Create a test file context
> > ######################
> > +type test_filesystem_filecon_t;
> > +unconfined_runs_test(test_filesystem_filecon_t)
> > +
> > +################# Test all functions ##########################
> > +type test_filesystem_t;
> > +domain_type(test_filesystem_t)
> > +unconfined_runs_test(test_filesystem_t)
> > +typeattribute test_filesystem_t testdomain;
> > +typeattribute test_filesystem_t filesystemdomain;
> > +
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:capability { sys_admin };
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:filesystem { mount remount quotamod
> > relabelfrom relabelto unmount quotaget };
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:dir { mounton add_name write };
> > +allow test_filesystem_t test_file_t:dir { mounton write
> > remove_name rmdir };
> > +# Create test file
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:dir { add_name write };
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:file { create relabelfrom relabelto
> > };
> > +
> > +fs_mount_all_fs(test_filesystem_t)
> > +fs_remount_all_fs(test_filesystem_t)
> > +fs_unmount_all_fs(test_filesystem_t)
> > +fs_relabelfrom_all_fs(test_filesystem_t)
> > +fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas(test_filesystem_t)
> > +files_search_all(test_filesystem_t)
> > +# Required for mount opts
> > "rootcontext=system_u:object_r:test_filesystem_t:s0";
> > +fs_associate(test_filesystem_t)
> > +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(test_filesystem_t)
> > +
> > +# For running quotacheck(8)
> > +files_type(test_filesystem_t)
> > +# Update quotas
> > +fs_set_all_quotas(test_filesystem_t)
> > +allow test_filesystem_t self:file { quotaon };
> > +# Create test file and change context:
> > +fs_associate(test_filesystem_filecon_t)
> > +allow test_filesystem_t test_filesystem_filecon_t:file { open read
> > getattr relabelto write };
> > +dontaudit test_filesystem_t kernel_t:process { setsched };
> 
> Why do you need these dontaudit statements?  It seems like a kernel
> bug 
> if something is triggering a setsched permission check on the
> kernel_t 
> domain?  Something the kernel module is doing during initialization?
> 

I've tracked this down to them all being called from block/ioprio.c
with: security_task_setioprio(task, ioprio) -> selinux_task_setioprio

Why the SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED I've no idea. The following
also use SET/GETSCHED permission:

selinux_task_getioprio, selinux_task_setnice, selinux_task_movememory



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-10 18:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-09 15:07 [PATCH V2 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests Richard Haines
2020-01-09 15:07 ` [PATCH V2 1/1] " Richard Haines
2020-01-09 17:14   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 17:40     ` Richard Haines
2020-01-09 17:19   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 17:45     ` Richard Haines
2020-01-10 18:09     ` Richard Haines [this message]
2020-01-10 18:18       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-12 16:04         ` Richard Haines
2020-01-13 13:52           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-13 14:07             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-13 18:00               ` Richard Haines
2020-01-13 18:54                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 17:46   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 17:51     ` Richard Haines
2020-01-09 18:04 ` [PATCH V2 0/1] " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 20:36   ` Richard Haines
2020-01-09 21:01     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-10 14:28       ` Richard Haines

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