Re: [PATCH] fuse: allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in root userns to access allow_other mount

[Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>]

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On Thu, 2021-11-11 at 14:11 -0800, Dave Marchevsky wrote:
> 
> This patch adds an escape hatch to the descendant userns logic
> specifically for processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root userns.
> Such
> processes can already do many dangerous things regardless of
> namespace,
> and moreover could fork and setns into any child userns with a FUSE
> mount, so it's reasonable to allow them to interact with all
> allow_other
> FUSE filesystems.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
> Cc: kernel-team@fb.com

This will also want a:

Fixes: 73f03c2b4b52 ("fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's
namespace or a descendant")
Cc: stable@kernel.org

The patch itself looks good to my untrained eye, but could
probably use some attention from somebody who really understands
the VFS :)

-- 
All Rights Reversed.

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