From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4ECA2C43381 for ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 17:19:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 204B820863 for ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 17:19:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="eTZPglq7" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727854AbfCRRTl (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Mar 2019 13:19:41 -0400 Received: from mail-vs1-f74.google.com ([209.85.217.74]:35379 "EHLO mail-vs1-f74.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727358AbfCRRR4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Mar 2019 13:17:56 -0400 Received: by mail-vs1-f74.google.com with SMTP id e63so3944536vsc.2 for ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:17:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=UykDW4hFaDHfzyUH5xSGMBQs4gGYEgUL/nC+SEDYWFU=; b=eTZPglq7PxVqxdqVAjoMC4HmmCrWD8Td2oOWhHZFu/cW19YPVAKsaJLDurjgd2ljVf XFoitnM7dNKXaO1X3w5n48lJ0Y+z6lMVYoHTi6MyqIKBKDduB9n8l/eQ3eoQ6ApOGJcf g0Ut1Mty7B6R+MM5DXRurd3w783o+tqjI10hk93IissEzK7cyNctMDjvmU3Tdk6WDEwH ffIMuMSLEoDbieTKF2ybjM0vJlmx+cWPNY/uy7bo6luMmancF6Vim1Jp4tv/8hL6d3pb M2HFyE+DxIM6V89Ha75sQlU/Ar8a05rWTSWi6zpfjkxsTGWw3NraARaPUHt9My5Uw9OY 7lHA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=UykDW4hFaDHfzyUH5xSGMBQs4gGYEgUL/nC+SEDYWFU=; b=s9jSIDJpk4ME5RcicrAI+zK8npDzAHsrIeeMMQsBNZ3Gxs9UwVFSdbRZJQSBg3La2I dzp0BxAVoUQDSnKtE4wpHQnMQ5Zh6gAJK9mzwu6kcotU3AeRmENHO19KAxYNJqBQn7Nm AEjaHsCC9Qldb8KVcG5eb7kQR03yrRkIWcgA47Oiicbs34wuTukKSek2Ywx3vjFz5ns2 uyFJ6AI8E7dDZOyGU5LLh1RDmnx0i2NyvO0wUeo/MDQDKAUUq4gvQGpoegnhWqJF+n8G ChDgrIKWwSnsfVP/U8togjWdbf27xGmY4NPNOXKyIgnac8sjqP2rTdj7/ybPV+afW+2l euCg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAX0+1i5TDWTncGKm7b/Of402ZTRAE2XUu3KF7QVBB4yX5YPPapi BmoP8WBEf551TXyQiNBm/D/zuKeJrebQfK94 X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw1yRv1Lvlj4b/qzRYNiehInvLnccniboB47LbD/6n+0FpFdxyh/c9QXVRmnP7ZYupHxKhIzMKUChtQA6Na X-Received: by 2002:a1f:1e4a:: with SMTP id e71mr11807432vke.2.1552929475245; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:17:55 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robin Murphy , Kees Cook , Kate Stewart , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Andrew Morton , Ingo Molnar , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Shuah Khan , Vincenzo Frascino , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Steven Rostedt , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dmitry Vyukov , Kostya Serebryany , Evgeniy Stepanov , Lee Smith , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Chintan Pandya , Luc Van Oostenryck , Dave Martin , Kevin Brodsky , Szabolcs Nagy , Andrey Konovalov Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: andreyknvl at google.com (Andrey Konovalov) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: andreyknvl@google.com (Andrey Konovalov) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Message-ID: <20190318171734.RJdWUERi6zuT7kaI23LECw9yCkIXKiUIA224Cz1SZ94@z> This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andrey Konovalov Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 Message-ID: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=m.gmane.org@lists.infradead.org To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robin Murphy , Kees Cook , Kate Stewart , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Andrew Morton , Ingo Molnar , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Shuah Khan , Vincenzo Frascino , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Steven Rostedt , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@k Cc: Kevin Brodsky , Chintan Pandya , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Szabolcs Nagy , Andrey Konovalov , Lee Smith , Kostya Serebryany , Dmitry Vyukov , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Luc Van Oostenryck , Dave Martin , Evgeniy Stepanov List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F78FC10F0E for ; 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[209.85.220.73]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id u134sor3412323vku.5.2019.03.18.10.17.55 for (Google Transport Security); Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:17:55 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of 3w9kpxaokcjiw9zd0k69h72aa270.ya8749gj-886hwy6.ad2@flex--andreyknvl.bounces.google.com designates 209.85.220.73 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.73; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b=eTZPglq7; spf=pass (google.com: domain of 3w9kpxaokcjiw9zd0k69h72aa270.ya8749gj-886hwy6.ad2@flex--andreyknvl.bounces.google.com designates 209.85.220.73 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=3w9KPXAoKCJIw9zD0K69H72AA270.yA8749GJ-886Hwy6.AD2@flex--andreyknvl.bounces.google.com; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=UykDW4hFaDHfzyUH5xSGMBQs4gGYEgUL/nC+SEDYWFU=; b=eTZPglq7PxVqxdqVAjoMC4HmmCrWD8Td2oOWhHZFu/cW19YPVAKsaJLDurjgd2ljVf XFoitnM7dNKXaO1X3w5n48lJ0Y+z6lMVYoHTi6MyqIKBKDduB9n8l/eQ3eoQ6ApOGJcf g0Ut1Mty7B6R+MM5DXRurd3w783o+tqjI10hk93IissEzK7cyNctMDjvmU3Tdk6WDEwH ffIMuMSLEoDbieTKF2ybjM0vJlmx+cWPNY/uy7bo6luMmancF6Vim1Jp4tv/8hL6d3pb M2HFyE+DxIM6V89Ha75sQlU/Ar8a05rWTSWi6zpfjkxsTGWw3NraARaPUHt9My5Uw9OY 7lHA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw1yRv1Lvlj4b/qzRYNiehInvLnccniboB47LbD/6n+0FpFdxyh/c9QXVRmnP7ZYupHxKhIzMKUChtQA6Na X-Received: by 2002:a1f:1e4a:: with SMTP id e71mr11807432vke.2.1552929475245; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:17:55 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robin Murphy , Kees Cook , Kate Stewart , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Andrew Morton , Ingo Molnar , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Shuah Khan , Vincenzo Frascino , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Steven Rostedt , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dmitry Vyukov , Kostya Serebryany , Evgeniy Stepanov , Lee Smith , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Chintan Pandya , Luc Van Oostenryck , Dave Martin , Kevin Brodsky , Szabolcs Nagy , Andrey Konovalov Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4E7AC10F00 for ; 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Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:17:55 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 18:17:34 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog Subject: [PATCH v12 02/13] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robin Murphy , Kees Cook , Kate Stewart , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Andrew Morton , Ingo Molnar , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Shuah Khan , Vincenzo Frascino , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Steven Rostedt , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190318_101757_537683_E52C93E4 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 14.02 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Kevin Brodsky , Chintan Pandya , Jacob Bramley , Ruben Ayrapetyan , Szabolcs Nagy , Andrey Konovalov , Lee Smith , Kostya Serebryany , Dmitry Vyukov , Ramana Radhakrishnan , Luc Van Oostenryck , Dave Martin , Evgeniy Stepanov Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si return ret; } -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the - * current addr_limit. + * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), + * untag the pointer before checking. */ #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) @@ -234,10 +235,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) void __user *safe_ptr; asm volatile( - " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " bics xzr, %3, %2\n" " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" : "=&r" (safe_ptr) - : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit), + "r" (untagged_addr(ptr)) : "cc"); csdb(); -- 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel