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From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	 "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	 "Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@intel.com>,
	 "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
	 "Kuppuswamy,
	Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@intel.com>,
	 "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
	 "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 "Wunner, Lukas" <lukas.wunner@intel.com>,
	 Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
	 "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	 "Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	 "aarcange@redhat.com" <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>,  Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>,
	 "jbachmann@google.com" <jbachmann@google.com>,
	 "pgonda@google.com" <pgonda@google.com>,
	 "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
	 "Lange, Jon" <jlange@microsoft.com>,
	 "linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	 Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 19:47:38 +0100 (CET)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YEU.7.76.2301251819300.3004@gjva.wvxbf.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y9FHsvVoPbgMR2s3@kroah.com>

On Wed, 25 Jan 2023, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> Argument that it doesn't work?  I thought that ship sailed a long time 
> ago but I could be wrong as I don't really pay attention to that stuff 
> as it's just vaporware :)

Greg, are you sure you are talking about *SEV-SNP* here? (*)

That ship hasn't sailed as far as I can tell, it's being actively worked 
on.

With SEV-SNP launch attestation, FDE, and runtime remote attestation (**) 
one thing that you get is a way how to ensure that the guest image that 
you have booted in a (public) cloud hasn't been tampered with, even if you 
have zero trust in the cloud provider and their hypervisor.

And that without the issues and side-channels previous SEV and SEV-ES had.

Which to me is a rather valid usecase in today's world, rather than 
vaporware.

(*) and corresponding Intel-TDX support counterpart, once it exists

(**) which is not necessarily a kernel work of course, but rather 
     userspace integration work, e.g. based on Keylime

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-01-25 18:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-25 12:28 Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 12:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 13:42   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 14:13     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-25 15:29       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 14:23       ` Richard Weinberger
2023-01-26 14:58         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 15:13           ` Richard Weinberger
2023-01-26 15:22             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 15:55             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-27  9:02             ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-26 15:43         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-27 11:23         ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-30 11:30       ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-25 14:22     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 14:30       ` James Bottomley
2023-01-25 14:57       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 15:16         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 15:45           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-25 16:02             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-25 17:47               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-25 15:50           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 18:47           ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2023-01-26  9:19           ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-25 21:53         ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-26 10:48           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 11:24             ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-26 13:32             ` Samuel Ortiz
     [not found]           ` <CAGXJix9-cXNW7EwJf0PVzj_Qmt5fmQvBX1KvXfRX5NAeEpnMvw@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-26 10:58             ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-26 13:15               ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-26 16:07                 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-27  7:02                   ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-26 15:44             ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-26 16:25               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-26 21:41                 ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-27  7:17               ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-25 20:13       ` Jiri Kosina
2023-01-26 13:13       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 15:29   ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 16:40     ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-01-26  8:08       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 11:19     ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 11:29       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 12:30         ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 13:28           ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 13:50             ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 20:54             ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-01-27 19:24             ` James Bottomley
2023-01-30  7:42               ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-30 12:40                 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-31 11:31                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 13:28                     ` James Bottomley
2023-01-31 15:14                       ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-31 17:39                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 10:52                           ` Christophe de Dinechin Dupont de Dinechin
2023-02-01 11:01                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 13:15                               ` Christophe de Dinechin Dupont de Dinechin
2023-02-01 16:02                                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 17:13                                   ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-06 18:58                                     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-02  3:24                               ` Jason Wang
2023-02-01 10:24                         ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-31 16:34                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 17:49                         ` James Bottomley
2023-02-02 14:51                     ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-03 14:05                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27  9:32           ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-26 13:58         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 17:48           ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 18:06             ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 18:14               ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 16:29     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27  8:52       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27 10:04         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27 12:25           ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27 14:32             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27 20:51             ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-01-30 11:36 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-30 12:00   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-30 15:14     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-31 10:06   ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 16:52     ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-02 11:31       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-07  0:27 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-02-07  6:03   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-07 19:53     ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-02-07 21:55       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08  1:51       ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-02-08  9:31         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 10:44           ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-08 10:58             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 16:19               ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-08 17:29                 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 18:02                   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-08 18:58                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-02-09 19:48                       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-08 13:00             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 13:42             ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-02-08  7:19       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 10:16       ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-08 13:15         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-09 14:30           ` Reshetova, Elena

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