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From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/3] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:39:28 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251431260.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm>

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, we're filling RSB on context 
switch in order to protect from various classess of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 53eb14a65610..fe32103fcdc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
-		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 			       (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
+			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
 			       spectre_v2_module_string());
 		return ret;
 
-- 
2.12.3


-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-25 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-25 12:37 [PATCH v7 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
2018-09-25 12:38 ` [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 12:30   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Apply " tip-bot for Jiri Kosina
2018-09-27 20:18   ` [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/speculation: apply " Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27 20:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-25 12:38 ` [PATCH v7 2/3] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Jiri Kosina
2018-09-26 12:31   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Jiri Kosina
2018-09-25 12:39 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2018-09-26 12:31   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs tip-bot for Jiri Kosina

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