From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756963Ab1FFIce (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2011 04:32:34 -0400 Received: from hera.kernel.org ([140.211.167.34]:34271 "EHLO hera.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755982Ab1FFIcc (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2011 04:32:32 -0400 Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2011 08:31:41 GMT From: tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski Message-ID: Cc: mingo@redhat.com, brgerst@gmail.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, mikpe@it.uu.se, richard.weinberger@gmail.com, jj@chaosbits.net, JBeulich@novell.com, tglx@linutronix.de, Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com, luto@MIT.EDU, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@MIT.EDU, andi@firstfloor.org, bp@alien8.de, arjan@infradead.org, mingo@elte.hu Reply-To: mingo@redhat.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, brgerst@gmail.com, mikpe@it.uu.se, richard.weinberger@gmail.com, jj@chaosbits.net, JBeulich@novell.com, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@MIT.EDU, Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@MIT.EDU, andi@firstfloor.org, bp@alien8.de, arjan@infradead.org, mingo@elte.hu In-Reply-To: References: To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip:x86/vdso] x86-64: Document some of entry_64.S Git-Commit-ID: 8b4777a4b50cb0c84c1152eac85d24415fb6ff7d X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.3 (hera.kernel.org [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 06 Jun 2011 08:31:41 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Commit-ID: 8b4777a4b50cb0c84c1152eac85d24415fb6ff7d Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/8b4777a4b50cb0c84c1152eac85d24415fb6ff7d Author: Andy Lutomirski AuthorDate: Sun, 5 Jun 2011 13:50:18 -0400 Committer: Ingo Molnar CommitDate: Sun, 5 Jun 2011 21:30:32 +0200 x86-64: Document some of entry_64.S Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jesper Juhl Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jan Beulich Cc: richard -rw- weinberger Cc: Mikael Pettersson Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Louis Rilling Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fc134867cc550977cc996866129e11a16ba0f9ea.1307292171.git.luto@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 2 + 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt b/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7869f14 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +This file documents some of the kernel entries in +arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S. A lot of this explanation is adapted from +an email from Ingo Molnar: + +http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20110529191055.GC9835%40elte.hu> + +The x86 architecture has quite a few different ways to jump into +kernel code. Most of these entry points are registered in +arch/x86/kernel/traps.c and implemented in arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +and arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S. + +The IDT vector assignments are listed in arch/x86/include/irq_vectors.h. + +Some of these entries are: + + - system_call: syscall instruction from 64-bit code. + + - ia32_syscall: int 0x80 from 32-bit or 64-bit code; compat syscall + either way. + + - ia32_syscall, ia32_sysenter: syscall and sysenter from 32-bit + code + + - interrupt: An array of entries. Every IDT vector that doesn't + explicitly point somewhere else gets set to the corresponding + value in interrupts. These point to a whole array of + magically-generated functions that make their way to do_IRQ with + the interrupt number as a parameter. + + - emulate_vsyscall: int 0xcc, a special non-ABI entry used by + vsyscall emulation. + + - APIC interrupts: Various special-purpose interrupts for things + like TLB shootdown. + + - Architecturally-defined exceptions like divide_error. + +There are a few complexities here. The different x86-64 entries +have different calling conventions. The syscall and sysenter +instructions have their own peculiar calling conventions. Some of +the IDT entries push an error code onto the stack; others don't. +IDT entries using the IST alternative stack mechanism need their own +magic to get the stack frames right. (You can find some +documentation in the AMD APM, Volume 2, Chapter 8 and the Intel SDM, +Volume 3, Chapter 6.) + +Dealing with the swapgs instruction is especially tricky. Swapgs +toggles whether gs is the kernel gs or the user gs. The swapgs +instruction is rather fragile: it must nest perfectly and only in +single depth, it should only be used if entering from user mode to +kernel mode and then when returning to user-space, and precisely +so. If we mess that up even slightly, we crash. + +So when we have a secondary entry, already in kernel mode, we *must +not* use SWAPGS blindly - nor must we forget doing a SWAPGS when it's +not switched/swapped yet. + +Now, there's a secondary complication: there's a cheap way to test +which mode the CPU is in and an expensive way. + +The cheap way is to pick this info off the entry frame on the kernel +stack, from the CS of the ptregs area of the kernel stack: + + xorl %ebx,%ebx + testl $3,CS+8(%rsp) + je error_kernelspace + SWAPGS + +The expensive (paranoid) way is to read back the MSR_GS_BASE value +(which is what SWAPGS modifies): + + movl $1,%ebx + movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx + rdmsr + testl %edx,%edx + js 1f /* negative -> in kernel */ + SWAPGS + xorl %ebx,%ebx +1: ret + +and the whole paranoid non-paranoid macro complexity is about whether +to suffer that RDMSR cost. + +If we are at an interrupt or user-trap/gate-alike boundary then we can +use the faster check: the stack will be a reliable indicator of +whether SWAPGS was already done: if we see that we are a secondary +entry interrupting kernel mode execution, then we know that the GS +base has already been switched. If it says that we interrupted +user-space execution then we must do the SWAPGS. + +But if we are in an NMI/MCE/DEBUG/whatever super-atomic entry context, +which might have triggered right after a normal entry wrote CS to the +stack but before we executed SWAPGS, then the only safe way to check +for GS is the slower method: the RDMSR. + +So we try only to mark those entry methods 'paranoid' that absolutely +need the more expensive check for the GS base - and we generate all +'normal' entry points with the regular (faster) entry macros. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S index 8a445a0..72c4a77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ /* * entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines. * + * Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt + * * NOTE: This code handles signal-recognition, which happens every time * after an interrupt and after each system call. *