From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754391AbcIILPC (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Sep 2016 07:15:02 -0400 Received: from terminus.zytor.com ([198.137.202.10]:44098 "EHLO terminus.zytor.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754523AbcIILN5 (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Sep 2016 07:13:57 -0400 Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 04:13:42 -0700 From: tip-bot for Dave Hansen Message-ID: Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave@sr71.net, tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@kernel.org Reply-To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dave@sr71.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.com> References: <20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.com> To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Default to a restrictive init PKRU Git-Commit-ID: acd547b29880800d29222c4632d2c145e401988c X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Commit-ID: acd547b29880800d29222c4632d2c145e401988c Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/acd547b29880800d29222c4632d2c145e401988c Author: Dave Hansen AuthorDate: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 09:30:21 -0700 Committer: Thomas Gleixner CommitDate: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 13:02:28 +0200 x86/pkeys: Default to a restrictive init PKRU PKRU is the register that lets you disallow writes or all access to a given protection key. The XSAVE hardware defines an "init state" of 0 for PKRU: its most permissive state, allowing access/writes to everything. Since we start off all new processes with the init state, we start all processes off with the most permissive possible PKRU. This is unfortunate. If a thread is clone()'d [1] before a program has time to set PKRU to a restrictive value, that thread will be able to write to all data, no matter what pkey is set on it. This weakens any integrity guarantees that we want pkeys to provide. To fix this, we define a very restrictive PKRU to override the XSAVE-provided value when we create a new FPU context. We choose a value that only allows access to pkey 0, which is as restrictive as we can practically make it. This does not cause any practical problems with applications using protection keys because we require them to specify initial permissions for each key when it is allocated, which override the restrictive default. In the end, this ensures that threads which do not know how to manage their own pkey rights can not do damage to data which is pkey-protected. I would have thought this was a pretty contrived scenario, except that I heard a bug report from an MPX user who was creating threads in some very early code before main(). It may be crazy, but folks evidently _do_ it. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net Cc: arnd@arndb.de Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/pkeys.h | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index a4f4d69..3725976 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1643,6 +1643,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. initrd= [BOOT] Specify the location of the initial ramdisk + init_pkru= [x86] Specify the default memory protection keys rights + register contents for all processes. 0x55555554 by + default (disallow access to all but pkey 0). Can + override in debugfs after boot. + inport.irq= [HW] Inport (ATI XL and Microsoft) busmouse driver Format: diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h index b406889..34684ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h @@ -100,5 +100,6 @@ extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long init_val); extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long init_val); +extern void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void); #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 3fc03a0..4700401 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include +#include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include @@ -505,6 +506,9 @@ static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(void) copy_kernel_to_fxregs(&init_fpstate.fxsave); else copy_kernel_to_fregs(&init_fpstate.fsave); + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) + copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(); } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c index e6113bb..ddc5494 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c @@ -121,3 +121,41 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey */ return vma_pkey(vma); } + +#define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey) (PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY)) + +/* + * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive + * as possible. This ensures that any threads clone()'d early + * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access + * to data which is pkey-protected later on. + */ +u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) | + PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) | + PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) | + PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) | + PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15); + +/* + * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU + * registers. This is called from a very specific context where + * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU + * directly. The fact that PKRU is only available when we are + * using eagerfpu mode makes this possible. + */ +void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) +{ + u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value); + /* + * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init + * state' which increases context switch cost. Avoid + * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0. + */ + if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru()) + return; + /* + * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate' + * with the baseline from the process. + */ + write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot); +} diff --git a/include/linux/pkeys.h b/include/linux/pkeys.h index 8ff2112..e4c08c1 100644 --- a/include/linux/pkeys.h +++ b/include/linux/pkeys.h @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, return 0; } +static inline void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) +{ +} + #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ #endif /* _LINUX_PKEYS_H */