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From: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] tracing: Add test for user space strings when filtering on string pointers
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:49:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yt9dczkyt2v6.fsf@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220107225840.003487216@goodmis.org> (Steven Rostedt's message of "Fri, 07 Jan 2022 17:56:57 -0500")

Hi Steve,

Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> writes:

> From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
>
> Pingfan reported that the following causes a fault:
>
>   echo "filename ~ \"cpu\"" > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/filter
>   echo 1 > events/syscalls/sys_enter_at/enable
>

[..]

> +static __always_inline char *test_string(char *str)
> +{
> +	struct ustring_buffer *ubuf;
> +	char __user *ustr;
> +	char *kstr;
> +
> +	if (!ustring_per_cpu)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	ubuf = this_cpu_ptr(ustring_per_cpu);
> +	kstr = ubuf->buffer;
> +
> +	if (likely((unsigned long)str >= TASK_SIZE)) {

I think that would not work on architectures where addresses for kernel
and user space could overlap, i.e. with different address spaces?

> +		/* For safety, do not trust the string pointer */
> +		if (!strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(kstr, str, USTRING_BUF_SIZE))
> +			return NULL;
> +	} else {
> +		/* user space address? */
> +		ustr = str;
> +		if (!strncpy_from_user_nofault(kstr, ustr, USTRING_BUF_SIZE))
> +			return NULL;
> +	}
> +	return kstr;
> +}

      parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-11 20:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-07 22:56 [PATCH 0/2] tracing: Fix filtering on string pointers Steven Rostedt
2022-01-07 22:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] tracing: Have syscall trace events use trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve() Steven Rostedt
2022-01-10  7:06   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2022-01-07 22:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] tracing: Add test for user space strings when filtering on string pointers Steven Rostedt
2022-01-08 19:04   ` kernel test robot
2022-01-08 19:04     ` kernel test robot
2022-01-10  3:15   ` Pingfan Liu
2022-01-10 15:34     ` Steven Rostedt
2022-01-11 20:49   ` Sven Schnelle [this message]

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