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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] ima: kernel build support for loading the kernel module signing key
Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2021 14:48:45 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b631513d0b5200577bb613ee23e2cdf7ad4bd175.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210409143507.191443-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On Fri, 2021-04-09 at 10:35 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> Kernel modules are currently only signed when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled.
> The kernel module signing key is a self-signed CA only loaded onto the
> .builtin_trusted_key keyring.  On secure boot enabled systems with an arch
> specific IMA policy enabled, but without MODULE_SIG enabled, kernel modules
> are not signed, nor is the kernel module signing public key loaded onto the
> IMA keyring.
> 
> In order to load the the kernel module signing key onto the IMA trusted
> keyring ('.ima'), the certificate needs to be signed by a CA key either on
> the builtin or secondary keyrings. The original version of this patch set
> created and loaded a kernel-CA key onto the builtin keyring. The kernel-CA
> key signed the kernel module signing key, allowing it to be loaded onto the
> IMA trusted keyring.
> 
> However, missing from this version was support for the kernel-CA to sign the
> hardware token certificate. Adding that support would add additional
> complexity.
> 
> Since the kernel module signing key is embedded into the Linux kernel at
> build time, instead of creating and loading a kernel-CA onto the builtin
> trusted keyring, this version makes an exception and allows the 
> self-signed kernel module signing key to be loaded directly onto the 
> trusted IMA keyring.

Thanks,  Nayna.

Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git 
next-integrity

Mimi


      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-09 18:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-09 14:35 [PATCH v4 0/3] ima: kernel build support for loading the kernel module signing key Nayna Jain
2021-04-09 14:35 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] keys: cleanup build time module signing keys Nayna Jain
2021-04-09 14:35 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key Nayna Jain
2021-04-09 14:35 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring Nayna Jain
2021-04-09 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]

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