Re: [PATCH 4/7] KEYS: Introduce a builtin root of trust key flag

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"dwmw2@infradead.org" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"pvorel@suse.cz" <pvorel@suse.cz>,
	"tiwai@suse.de" <tiwai@suse.de>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] KEYS: Introduce a builtin root of trust key flag
Date: Fri, 08 Apr 2022 12:55:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b8965652274b49ba7c6f67cad6d42965cf984b42.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <EF1544D5-54E8-4D47-82F8-F9337CA7AEA0@oracle.com>

On Fri, 2022-04-08 at 15:27 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
> > On Apr 8, 2022, at 8:40 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 21:53 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> 
> >> The first type of key to use this is X.509.  When a X.509 certificate
> >> is self signed, has the kernCertSign Key Usage set and contains the
> >> CA bit set this new flag is set.
> >> 
> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> >> 
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
> >> index 7febc4881363..97f6a1f86a27 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/key.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/key.h
> >> @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ struct key {
> >> #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL	7	/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
> >> #define KEY_FLAG_KEEP		8	/* set if key should not be removed */
> >> #define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING	9	/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
> >> +#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN_ROT	10	/* set if key is a builtin Root of Trust key */
> >> 
> >> 	/* the key type and key description string
> >> 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
> >> @@ -290,6 +291,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
> >> #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION	0x0008	/* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
> >> #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING		0x0010	/* allocating a user or user session keyring */
> >> #define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP		0x0020	/* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */
> >> +#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN_ROT		0x0040  /* Add builtin root of trust key */
> > 
> > Since the concept of root of trust is not generic, but limited to
> > specific keyrings, the root CA certificate signing keys on the
> > "machine" keyring need to be identified.  Similar to the
> > KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN/KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, new flags
> > KEY_ALLOC_MACHINE/KEY_FLAG_MACHINE should be defined instead.
> 
> I’m open to renaming these, however this name change seems confusing to me.  
> This flag gets set when the X.509 certificate contains the three CA requirements 
> identified above.  The remaining keys in the machine keyring can be used for 
> anything else.

Renaming the flag to KEY_ALLOC_MACHINE/KEY_FLAG_MACHINE differentiates
between the "builtin" keys from the "machine" keys.  The trust models
are very different.

> Plus this flag can be set for keys loaded into the secondary trusted 
> keyring (6th patch in the series).  When an intermediate CA gets loaded into the 
> secondary, the flag is set as well.

Please include a full explanation with the motivation in the patch
description as to why support for intermediary CAs is required for the
"end-user" use case.

thanks,

Mimi