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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Florent Revest <revest@google.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 13:41:15 +0100
Message-ID: <20200327124115.GA8318@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2241c806-65c9-68f5-f822-9a245ecf7ba0@tycho.nsa.gov>

On 27-Mär 08:27, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 3/26/20 8:24 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Thu, 26 Mar 2020, KP Singh wrote:
> > 
> > > +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > > +			const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > > +{
> > > +	/* Only CAP_MAC_ADMIN users are allowed to make changes to LSM hooks
> > > +	 */
> > > +	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> > > +		return -EPERM;
> > > +
> > 
> > Stephen, can you confirm that your concerns around this are resolved
> > (IIRC, by SELinux implementing a bpf_prog callback) ?
> 
> I guess the only residual concern I have is that CAP_MAC_ADMIN means
> something different to SELinux (ability to get/set file security contexts
> unknown to the currently loaded policy), so leaving the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check
> here (versus calling a new security hook here and checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
> the implementation of that hook for the modules that want that) conflates
> two very different things.  Prior to this patch, there are no users of
> CAP_MAC_ADMIN outside of individual security modules; it is only checked in
> module-specific logic within apparmor, safesetid, selinux, and smack, so the
> meaning was module-specific.

As we had discussed, We do have a security hook as well:

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200324180652.GA11855@chromium.org/

The bpf_prog hook which can check for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and implement
module specific logic for LSM programs. I thougt that was okay?

Kees was in favor of keeping the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check here:

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202003241133.16C02BE5B@keescook

If you feel strongly and Kees agrees, we can remove the CAP_MAC_ADMIN
check here, but given that we already have a security hook that meets
the requirements, we probably don't need another one.

- KP


> 
> 
> 
> 

  reply index

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-26 14:28 [PATCH bpf-next v7 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:27   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:28   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:29   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:12   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 19:39     ` KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:24   ` James Morris
2020-03-27 12:27     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-27 12:41       ` KP Singh [this message]
2020-03-27 13:43         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-27 14:29           ` KP Singh
2020-03-27 16:36           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-03-27 18:59             ` Kees Cook
2020-03-27 19:17               ` KP Singh
2020-03-27  3:12   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-03-27 15:06     ` KP Singh
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 5/8] bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:29   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:30   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:24   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 19:44     ` KP Singh
2020-03-27  0:31   ` James Morris
2020-03-26 14:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v7 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-03-26 19:31   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-26 20:56     ` KP Singh
2020-03-26 22:01       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-03-27  0:33   ` James Morris

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