From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
"zhujianwei (C)" <zhujianwei7@huawei.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Hehuazhen <hehuazhen@huawei.com>,
"Christian Ehrhardt" <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>,
"Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek" <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Subject: Re: new seccomp mode aims to improve performance
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 23:00:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202006152255.514C33D1@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200602124431.GA123838@gardel-login>
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 02:44:31PM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> We have that actually, it's this line you pasted above:
>
> SystemCallArchitectures=native
>
> It means: block all syscall ABIs but the native one for all processes
> of this service.
Gotcha. And I see this now as I'm working on the code to generating
bitmaps automatically. After systemd-resolved applies the 26th filter,
the "compat" bitmap goes from effectively a duplicate of the native
syscall map to blocking everything.
after filter 25:
...
[ 5.405296] seccomp: syscall bitmap: compat 0-4: SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
[ 5.405297] seccomp: syscall bitmap: compat 5: filter
...
[ 5.405326] seccomp: syscall bitmap: compat 380: filter
[ 5.405327] seccomp: syscall bitmap: compat 381-439: SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
after filter 26:
...
[ 5.405498] seccomp: syscall bitmap: compat 0-439: SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
So that seems to be working as expected. :)
--
Kees Cook
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-16 6:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-29 12:48 new seccomp mode aims to improve performance zhujianwei (C)
2020-05-29 15:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-05-29 16:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-29 17:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-05-29 19:27 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-31 17:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-06-01 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-01 2:08 ` 答复: " zhujianwei (C)
2020-06-01 3:30 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-06-02 2:42 ` 答复: " zhujianwei (C)
2020-06-02 3:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-06-02 11:13 ` 答复: " zhujianwei (C)
2020-06-02 11:34 ` zhujianwei (C)
2020-06-02 18:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-03 4:51 ` 答复: " zhujianwei (C)
2020-06-01 10:11 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-06-01 12:32 ` Paul Moore
2020-06-02 12:53 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-06-02 15:03 ` Paul Moore
2020-06-02 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-01 18:21 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-02 12:44 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-06-02 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-06-16 6:00 ` Kees Cook [this message]
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