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From: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 02/13] bpf: correct slot_type marking logic to allow more stack slot sharing
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2021 18:35:26 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210913153537.2162465-3-ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210913153537.2162465-1-ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>

From: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>

commit 0bae2d4d62d523f06ff1a8e88ce38b45400acd28 upstream.

Verifier is supposed to support sharing stack slot allocated to ptr with
SCALAR_VALUE for privileged program. However this doesn't happen for some
cases.

The reason is verifier is not clearing slot_type STACK_SPILL for all bytes,
it only clears part of them, while verifier is using:

  slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL

as a convention to check one slot is ptr type.

So, the consequence of partial clearing slot_type is verifier could treat a
partially overridden ptr slot, which should now be a SCALAR_VALUE slot,
still as ptr slot, and rejects some valid programs.

Before this patch, test_xdp_noinline.o under bpf selftests, bpf_lxc.o and
bpf_netdev.o under Cilium bpf repo, when built with -mattr=+alu32 are
rejected due to this issue. After this patch, they all accepted.

There is no processed insn number change before and after this patch on
Cilium bpf programs.

Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: adjusted context for 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                       |  5 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index a5259ff30073..b6f008dcb30c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1039,6 +1039,10 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 		/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
+		/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
+		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)
+			for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
+				state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC;
 
 		/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
 		 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
@@ -1056,6 +1060,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		    register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno]))
 			type = STACK_ZERO;
 
+		/* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 			state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
 				type;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index c7d17781dbfe..6b9ed915c6b0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -956,15 +956,45 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
 			/* mess up with R1 pointer on stack */
 			BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -7, 0x23),
-			/* fill back into R0 should fail */
+			/* fill back into R0 is fine for priv.
+			 * R0 now becomes SCALAR_VALUE.
+			 */
 			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+			/* Load from R0 should fail. */
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 8),
 			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 		},
 		.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
-		.errstr = "corrupted spill",
+		.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv",
 		.result = REJECT,
 		.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
 	},
+	{
+		"check corrupted spill/fill, LSB",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
+			BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0xcafe),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+		.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
+	},
+	{
+		"check corrupted spill/fill, MSB",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
+			BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0x12345678),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+		.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
+	},
 	{
 		"invalid src register in STX",
 		.insns = {
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-13 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-13 15:35 [PATCH 4.19 00/13] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-34556/CVE-2021-35477 Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 01/13] bpf/verifier: per-register parent pointers Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` Ovidiu Panait [this message]
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/13] bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/13] bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in raw mode Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/13] bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in unpriv mode Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/13] bpf: Sanity check max value for var_off stack access Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/13] selftests/bpf: Test variable offset " Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 08/13] bpf: track spill/fill of constants Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/13] selftests/bpf: fix tests due to const spill/fill Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/13] bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4 Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/13] bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 12/13] bpf: verifier: Allocate idmap scratch in verifier env Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-13 15:35 ` [PATCH 4.19 13/13] bpf: Fix pointer arithmetic mask tightening under state pruning Ovidiu Panait
2021-09-15 12:39 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/13] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-34556/CVE-2021-35477 Greg KH

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