From: "Michael Weiß" <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
To: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@google.com>,
"Hao Luo" <haoluo@google.com>, "Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Quentin Monnet" <quentin@isovalent.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Miklos Szeredi" <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
"Amir Goldstein" <amir73il@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, gyroidos@aisec.fraunhofer.de,
"Michael Weiß" <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 14/14] device_cgroup: Allow mknod in non-initial userns if guarded
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 12:50:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231018105033.13669-15-michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231018105033.13669-1-michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
If a container manager restricts its unprivileged (user namespaced)
children by a device cgroup, it is not necessary to deny mknod()
anymore. Thus, user space applications may map devices on different
locations in the file system by using mknod() inside the container.
A use case for this, we also use in GyroidOS, is to run virsh for
VMs inside an unprivileged container. virsh creates device nodes,
e.g., "/var/run/libvirt/qemu/11-fgfg.dev/null" which currently fails
in a non-initial userns, even if a cgroup device white list with the
corresponding major, minor of /dev/null exists. Thus, in this case
the usual bind mounts or pre populated device nodes under /dev are
not sufficient.
To circumvent this limitation, allow mknod() by checking CAP_MKNOD
in the userns by implementing the security_inode_mknod_nscap(). The
hook implementation checks if the corresponding permission flag
BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD_UNS is set for the device in the bpf program.
To avoid to create unusable inodes in user space the hook also checks
SB_I_NODEV on the corresponding super block.
Further, the security_sb_alloc_userns() hook is implemented using
cgroup_bpf_current_enabled() to allow usage of device nodes on super
blocks mounted by a guarded task.
Signed-off-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
---
security/device_cgroup/lsm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup/lsm.c b/security/device_cgroup/lsm.c
index a963536d0a15..6bc984d9c9d1 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup/lsm.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup/lsm.c
@@ -66,10 +66,37 @@ static int devcg_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
return __devcg_inode_mknod(mode, dev, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
+static int devcg_sb_alloc_userns(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (cgroup_bpf_current_enabled(CGROUP_DEVICE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int devcg_inode_mknod_nscap(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ if (!cgroup_bpf_current_enabled(CGROUP_DEVICE))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ // avoid to create unusable inodes in user space
+ if (dentry->d_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NODEV)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return __devcg_inode_mknod(mode, dev, BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD_UNS);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF */
+
static struct security_hook_list devcg_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, devcg_inode_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, devcg_inode_mknod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dev_permission, devcg_dev_permission),
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_userns, devcg_sb_alloc_userns),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod_nscap, devcg_inode_mknod_nscap),
+#endif
};
static int __init devcgroup_init(void)
--
2.30.2
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-18 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-18 10:50 [RFC PATCH v2 00/14] device_cgroup: guard mknod for non-initial user namespace Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/14] device_cgroup: Implement devcgroup hooks as lsm security hooks Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/14] vfs: Remove explicit devcgroup_inode calls Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/14] device_cgroup: Remove explicit devcgroup_inode hooks Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/14] lsm: Add security_dev_permission() hook Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/14] device_cgroup: Implement dev_permission() hook Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/14] block: Switch from devcgroup_check_permission to security hook Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/14] drm/amdkfd: " Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/14] device_cgroup: Hide devcgroup functionality completely in lsm Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/14] lsm: Add security_inode_mknod_nscap() hook Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/14] lsm: Add security_sb_alloc_userns() hook Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/14] vfs: Wire up security hooks for lsm-based device guard in userns Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/14] bpf: Add flag BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD_UNS for device access Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/14] bpf: cgroup: Introduce helper cgroup_bpf_current_enabled() Michael Weiß
2023-10-18 10:50 ` Michael Weiß [this message]
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