BPF Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security Module list 
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 14:29:30 -0800
Message-ID: <3fb823a6-b5ec-9341-e788-91b197fc9e7f@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202002241136.C4F9F7DFF@keescook>

On 2/24/2020 1:41 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 10:45:27AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 2/24/2020 9:13 AM, KP Singh wrote:
>>> On 24-Feb 08:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 2/23/2020 2:08 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 08:22:59PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>>> If I'm understanding this correctly, there are two issues:
>>>>>> 1- BPF needs to be run last due to fexit trampolines (?)
>>>>> no.
>>>>> The placement of nop call can be anywhere.
>>>>> BPF trampoline is automagically converting nop call into a sequence
>>>>> of directly invoked BPF programs.
>>>>> No link list traversals and no indirect calls in run-time.
>>>> Then why the insistence that it be last?
>>> I think this came out of the discussion about not being able to
>>> override the other LSMs and introduce a new attack vector with some
>>> arguments discussed at:
>>>   https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109194302.GA85350@google.com/
>>> Let's say we have SELinux + BPF runnng on the system. BPF should still
>>> respect any decisions made by SELinux. This hasn't got anything to
>>> do with the usage of fexit trampolines.
>> The discussion sited is more about GPL than anything else.
>> The LSM rule is that any security module must be able to
>> accept the decisions of others. SELinux has to accept decisions
>> made ahead of it. It always has, as LSM checks occur after
>> "traditional" checks, which may fail. The only reason that you
>> need to be last in this implementation appears to be that you
>> refuse to use the general mechanisms. You can't blame SELinux
>> for that.
> Okay, this is why I wanted to try to state things plainly. The "in last
> position" appears to be the result of a couple design choices:
> -the idea of "not wanting to get in the way of other LSMs", while
>  admirable, needs to actually be a non-goal to be "just" a stacked LSM
>  (as you're saying here Casey). This position _was_ required for the
>  non-privileged LSM case to avoid security implications, but that goal
>  not longer exists here either.


> -optimally using the zero-cost call-outs (static key + fexit trampolines)
>  meant it didn't interact well with the existing stacking mechanism.


> So, fine, these appear to be design choices, not *specifically*
> requirements. Let's move on, I think there is more to unpack here...


>>>>>> 2- BPF hooks don't know what may be attached at any given time, so
>>>>>>    ALL LSM hooks need to be universally hooked. THIS turns out to create
>>>>>>    a measurable performance problem in that the cost of the indirect call
>>>>>>    on the (mostly/usually) empty BPF policy is too high.
>>>>> also no.
> AIUI, there was some confusion on Alexei's reply here. I, perhaps,
> was not as clear as I needed to be. I think the later discussion on
> performance overheads gets more into the point, and gets us closer to
> the objections Alexei had. More below...


>>>   This approach still had the issues of an indirect call and an
>>>   extra check when not used. So this was not truly zero overhead even
>>>   after special casing BPF.
>> The LSM mechanism is not zero overhead. It never has been. That's why
>> you can compile it out. You get added value at a price. You get the
>> ability to use SELinux and KRSI together at a price. If that's unacceptable
>> you can go the route of seccomp, which doesn't use LSM for many of the
>> same reasons you're on about.
>> [...]
>>>>>> So, trying to avoid the indirect calls is, as you say, an optimization,
>>>>>> but it might be a needed one due to the other limitations.
>>>>> I'm convinced that avoiding the cost of retpoline in critical path is a
>>>>> requirement for any new infrastructure in the kernel.
>>>> Sorry, I haven't gotten that memo.
> I agree with Casey here -- it's a nice goal, but those cost evaluations have
> not yet(?[1]) hit the LSM world. I think it's a desirable goal, to be
> sure, but this does appear to be an early optimization.

Thanks for helping clarify that.

>> [...]
>> It can do that wholly within KRSI hooks. You don't need to
>> put KRSI specific code into security.c.
> This observation is where I keep coming back to.
> Yes, the resulting code is not as fast as it could be. The fact that BPF
> triggers the worst-case performance of LSM hooking is the "new" part
> here, from what I can see.

I haven't put this oar in the water before, but mightn't it be
possible to configure which LSM hooks can have BPF programs installed
at compile time, and thus address this issue for the "production" case?
I fully expect that such a configuration option would be hideously ugly
both to implement and use. If the impact of unused BPF hooks is so
great a concern, perhaps it would be worthwhile.

> I suspect the problem is that folks in the BPF subsystem don't want to
> be seen as slowing anything down, even other subsystems, so they don't
> want to see this done in the traditional LSM hooking way (which contains
> indirect calls).

I get that, and it is a laudable goal, but ...

> But the LSM subsystem doesn't want special cases (Casey has worked very
> hard to generalize everything there for stacking). It is really hard to
> accept adding a new special case when there are still special cases yet
> to be worked out even in the LSM code itself[2].

... like Kees says, this isn't the only use case we have to deal with. 

>>>>> Networking stack converted all such places to conditional calls.
>>>>> In BPF land we converted indirect calls to direct jumps and direct calls.
>>>>> It took two years to do so. Adding new indirect calls is not an option.
>>>>> I'm eagerly waiting for Peter's static_call patches to land to convert
>>>>> a lot more indirect calls. May be existing LSMs will take advantage
>>>>> of static_call patches too, but static_call is not an option for BPF.
>>>>> That's why we introduced BPF trampoline in the last kernel release.
>>>> Sorry, but I don't see how BPF is so overwhelmingly special.
>>> My analogy here is that if every tracepoint in the kernel were of the
>>> type:
>>> if (trace_foo_enabled) // <-- Overhead here, solved with static key
>>>    trace_foo(a);  // <-- retpoline overhead, solved with fexit trampolines
> This is a helpful distillation; thanks.
> static keys (perhaps better described as static branches) make sense to
> me; I'm familiar with them being used all over the place[3]. The resulting
> "zero performance" branch mechanism is extremely handy.
> I had been thinking about the fexit stuff only as a way for BPF to call
> into kernel functions directly, and I missed the place where this got
> used for calling from the kernel into BPF directly. KP walked me through
> the fexit stuff off list. I missed where there NOP stub ("noinline int
> bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) { return 0; }") was being patched by BPF in
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200220175250.10795-6-kpsingh@chromium.org/
> The key bit being "bpf_trampoline_update(prog)"
>>> It would be very hard to justify enabling them on a production system,
>>> and the same can be said for BPF and KRSI.
>> The same can be and has been said about the LSM infrastructure.
>> If BPF and KRSI are that performance critical you shouldn't be
>> tying them to LSM, which is known to have overhead. If you can't
>> accept the LSM overhead, get out of the LSM. Or, help us fix the
>> LSM infrastructure to make its overhead closer to zero. Whether
>> you believe it or not, a lot of work has gone into keeping the LSM
>> overhead as small as possible while remaining sufficiently general
>> to perform its function.
>> No. If you're too special to play by LSM rules then you're special
>> enough to get into the kernel using more direct means.
> So, I see the primary conflict here being about the performance
> optimizations. AIUI:
> - BPF subsystem maintainers do not want any new slowdown associated
>   with BPF


> - LSM subsystem maintainers do not want any new special cases in
>   LSM stacking


> So, unless James is going to take this over Casey's objections, the path
> forward I see here is:
> - land a "slow" KRSI (i.e. one that hooks every hook with a stub).
> - optimize calling for all LSMs
> Does this seem right to everyone?

This would be my first choice. The existing list-of-hooks mechanism is
an "obvious" implementation. I have been thinking about possible ways to
make it better, but as y'all may have guessed, I haven't seen all the cool
new optimization techniques.

> -Kees
> [1] There is a "known cost to LSM", but as Casey mentions, it's been
> generally deemed "acceptable". There have been some recent attempts to
> quantify it, but it's not been very clear:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c98000ea-df0e-1ab7-a0e2-b47d913f50c8@tycho.nsa.gov/ (lore is missing half this conversation for some reason)
> [2] Casey's work to generalize the LSM interfaces continues and it quite
> complex:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20200214234203.7086-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com/
> [3] E.g. HARDENED_USERCOPY uses it:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/mm/usercopy.c?h=v5.5#n258
> and so does the heap memory auto-initialization:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/mm/slab.h?h=v5.5#n676

  reply index

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-20 17:52 [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs KP Singh
2020-02-21  2:25   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-21 11:47     ` KP Singh
     [not found]   ` <0ef26943-9619-3736-4452-fec536a8d169@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-02-21 11:44     ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 18:23       ` Casey Schaufler
     [not found]     ` <202002211946.A23A987@keescook>
2020-02-23 22:08       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-24 16:32         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-24 17:13           ` KP Singh
2020-02-24 18:45             ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-24 21:41               ` Kees Cook
2020-02-24 22:29                 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-02-25  5:41                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-25 15:31                   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 19:31                   ` KP Singh
2020-02-26  0:30                   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-26  5:15                     ` KP Singh
2020-02-26 15:35                       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-25 19:29                 ` KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 4/8] bpf: lsm: Add support for enabling/disabling BPF hooks KP Singh
2020-02-21 18:57   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 19:11     ` James Morris
2020-02-22  4:26   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 5/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-02-21  2:17   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-21 12:02     ` KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-02-25  6:45   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-02-20 17:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-02-21 19:19 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/8] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 19:41   ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 22:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-21 23:09       ` KP Singh
2020-02-21 23:49         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-22  0:22       ` Kees Cook
2020-02-22  1:04         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-22  3:36           ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27 18:40 ` Dr. Greg

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=3fb823a6-b5ec-9341-e788-91b197fc9e7f@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \


* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

BPF Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0 bpf/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 bpf bpf/ https://lore.kernel.org/bpf \
	public-inbox-index bpf

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:

AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git