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From: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
To: containers@lists.linux.dev, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Austin Kuo <hckuo2@illinois.edu>,
	Claudio Canella <claudio.canella@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
	Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
	Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jinghao Jia <jinghao7@illinois.edu>,
	Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@oracle.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 05/12] samples/bpf: Add eBPF seccomp sample programs
Date: Mon, 10 May 2021 12:22:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5f7c10074e10f994f3984a564531d5d9285d53eb.1620499942.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1620499942.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu>

From: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>

This adds a sample program that uses seccomp-eBPF, called
test_seccomp. It shows the simple ability to code seccomp filters
in C.

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Link: https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2018-February/038573.html
Co-developed-by: Jinghao Jia <jinghao7@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jinghao Jia <jinghao7@illinois.edu>
[YiFei: change from bpf_load to libbpf]
Co-developed-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
---
 samples/bpf/Makefile            |  3 ++
 samples/bpf/test_seccomp_kern.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 samples/bpf/test_seccomp_user.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 samples/bpf/test_seccomp_kern.c
 create mode 100644 samples/bpf/test_seccomp_user.c

diff --git a/samples/bpf/Makefile b/samples/bpf/Makefile
index 45ceca4e2c70..d49e7f91eba6 100644
--- a/samples/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/samples/bpf/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ tprogs-y += task_fd_query
 tprogs-y += xdp_sample_pkts
 tprogs-y += ibumad
 tprogs-y += hbm
+tprogs-y += test_seccomp
 
 # Libbpf dependencies
 LIBBPF = $(TOOLS_PATH)/lib/bpf/libbpf.a
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ task_fd_query-objs := task_fd_query_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS)
 xdp_sample_pkts-objs := xdp_sample_pkts_user.o
 ibumad-objs := ibumad_user.o
 hbm-objs := hbm.o $(CGROUP_HELPERS)
+test_seccomp-objs := test_seccomp_user.o
 
 # Tell kbuild to always build the programs
 always-y := $(tprogs-y)
@@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ always-y += ibumad_kern.o
 always-y += hbm_out_kern.o
 always-y += hbm_edt_kern.o
 always-y += xdpsock_kern.o
+always-y += test_seccomp_kern.o
 
 ifeq ($(ARCH), arm)
 # Strip all except -D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ option needed to handle linux
diff --git a/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_kern.c b/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_kern.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..efd42f47d9c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_kern.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/bpf.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/unistd.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/errno.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+#define ARCH	AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+#define ARCH	AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+#else
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ARCH
+/* Returns EPERM when trying to close fd 999 */
+SEC("seccomp")
+int bpf_prog1(struct seccomp_data *ctx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Make sure this BPF program is being run on the same architecture it
+	 * was compiled on.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->arch != ARCH)
+		return SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM;
+	if (ctx->nr == __NR_close && ctx->args[0] == 999)
+		return SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM;
+
+	return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+}
+#else
+#warning Architecture not supported -- Blocking all syscalls
+SEC("seccomp")
+int bpf_prog1(struct seccomp_data *ctx)
+{
+	return SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM;
+}
+#endif
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_user.c b/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_user.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba17e18666b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/bpf/test_seccomp_user.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct bpf_object *obj;
+	char filename[256];
+	int prog_fd;
+
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s_kern.o", argv[0]);
+
+	if (bpf_prog_load(filename, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP, &obj, &prog_fd))
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	if (prog_fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: no program found: %s\n",
+			strerror(prog_fd));
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* set new_new_privs so non-privileged users can attach filters */
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+		perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if (syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER,
+		    SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_EXTENDED, &prog_fd)) {
+		perror("seccomp");
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	close(111);
+	assert(errno == EBADF);
+	close(999);
+	assert(errno == EPERM);
+
+	printf("close syscall successfully filtered\n");
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-10 17:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-10 17:22 [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 00/12] eBPF seccomp filters YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 01/12] seccomp: Move no_new_privs check to after prepare_filter YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 02/12] bpf, seccomp: Add eBPF filter capabilities YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 03/12] seccomp, ptrace: Add a mechanism to retrieve attached eBPF seccomp filters YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 04/12] libbpf: recognize section "seccomp" YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` YiFei Zhu [this message]
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 06/12] lsm: New hook seccomp_extended YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 07/12] bpf/verifier: allow restricting direct map access YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 08/12] seccomp-ebpf: restrict filter to almost cBPF if LSM request such YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 09/12] yama: (concept) restrict seccomp-eBPF with ptrace_scope YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 10/12] seccomp-ebpf: Add ability to read user memory YiFei Zhu
2021-05-11  2:04   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-05-11  7:14     ` YiFei Zhu
2021-05-12 22:36       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-05-13  5:26         ` YiFei Zhu
2021-05-13 14:53           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-13 17:12             ` YiFei Zhu
2021-05-13 17:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 11/12] bpf/verifier: support NULL-able ptr to BTF ID as helper argument YiFei Zhu
2021-05-10 17:22 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 12/12] seccomp-ebpf: support task storage from BPF-LSM, defaulting to group leader YiFei Zhu
2021-05-11  1:58   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-05-11  5:44     ` YiFei Zhu
2021-05-12 21:56       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-05-10 17:47 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 00/12] eBPF seccomp filters Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-11  5:21   ` YiFei Zhu
2021-05-15 15:49     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-20  9:05       ` Christian Brauner
     [not found]     ` <fffbea8189794a8da539f6082af3de8e@DM5PR11MB1692.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2021-05-16  8:38       ` Tianyin Xu
2021-05-17 15:40         ` Tycho Andersen
2021-05-17 17:07         ` Sargun Dhillon
     [not found]         ` <108b4b9c2daa4123805d2b92cf51374b@DM5PR11MB1692.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2021-05-20  8:16           ` Tianyin Xu
2021-05-20  8:56             ` Christian Brauner
2021-05-20  9:37               ` Christian Brauner
2021-06-01 19:55               ` Kees Cook
2021-06-09  6:32                 ` Jinghao Jia
2021-06-09  6:27               ` Jinghao Jia
     [not found]             ` <00fe481c572d486289bc88780f48e88f@DM5PR11MB1692.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2021-05-20 22:13               ` Tianyin Xu
     [not found]         ` <eae2a0e5038b41c4af87edcb3d4cdc13@DM5PR11MB1692.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2021-05-20  8:22           ` Tianyin Xu
2021-05-24 18:55             ` Sargun Dhillon

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