bpf.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Hou Tao <houtao@huaweicloud.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>, x86@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	houtao1@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 2/3] x86/mm: Disallow vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault()
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 15:18:03 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6f1aa71b-13f3-0972-3cb0-62f431de7e48@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e83eb3e8-6d08-462b-9ffe-d843e439d7da@intel.com>

Hi,

On 1/23/2024 8:18 AM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> On 1/18/2024 11:30 PM, Hou Tao wrote:
>> From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
>>
>> When trying to use copy_from_kernel_nofault() to read vsyscall page
>> through a bpf program, the following oops was reported:
>>
>>   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffff600000
>>   #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
>>   #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
>>   PGD 3231067 P4D 3231067 PUD 3233067 PMD 3235067 PTE 0
>>   Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
>>   CPU: 1 PID: 20390 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.7.0+ #58
>>   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ......
>>   RIP: 0010:copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110
>>   ......
>>   Call Trace:
>>    <TASK>
>>    ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110
>>    bpf_probe_read_kernel+0x1d/0x50
>>    bpf_prog_2061065e56845f08_do_probe_read+0x51/0x8d
>>    trace_call_bpf+0xc5/0x1c0
>>    perf_call_bpf_enter.isra.0+0x69/0xb0
>>    perf_syscall_enter+0x13e/0x200
>>    syscall_trace_enter+0x188/0x1c0
>>    do_syscall_64+0xb5/0xe0
>>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
>>    </TASK>
>>   ......
>>   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>>
>> The oops happens as follows: A bpf program uses bpf_probe_read_kernel()
>> to read from vsyscall page, bpf_probe_read_kernel() invokes
>> copy_from_kernel_nofault() in turn and then invokes __get_user_asm(). A
>> page fault exception is triggered accordingly, but handle_page_fault()
>> considers the vsyscall page address as a userspace address instead of
>> a kernel space address, so the fix-up set-up by bpf isn't applied.
> This comment and the one in the code below seem contradictory and
> confusing. Do we want the vsyscall page address to be considered as a
> userspace address or not?

Now handle_page_fault() has already considered the vsyscall page as a
userspace address, and in the patch we update copy_from_kernel_nofault()
to consider vsyscall page as a userspapce address as well.
>
> IIUC, the issue here is that the vsyscall page (in xonly mode) is not
> really mapped and therefore running copy_from_kernel_nofault() on this
> address is incorrect. This patch fixes this by making
> copy_from_kernel_nofault() return an error for a vsyscall address.
>

Yes, but the issue may occur for vsyscall=none case as well. Because
fault_in_kernel_space() invoked by handle_page_fault() will return
false, so in do_user_addr_fault(), when smap feature is enabled, the
invocation of copy_from_kernel_nofault() will trigger oops due to the
following code snippet:

        if (unlikely(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) &&
                     !(error_code & X86_PF_USER) &&
                     !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))) {
                /*
                 * No extable entry here.  This was a kernel access to an
                 * invalid pointer.  get_kernel_nofault() will not get here.
                 */
                page_fault_oops(regs, error_code, address);
                return;
        }

>> Because the exception happens in kernel space and page fault handling is
>> disabled, page_fault_oops() is invoked and an oops happens.
>>
>> Fix it by disallowing vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault().
>>
> [Maybe I have misunderstood the issue here and following questions are
> not even relevant.]
>
> But, what about vsyscall=emulate? In that mode the page is actually
> mapped. Would we want the page read to go through then?

Er, Now the vsyscall page is considered as a userspace address, I think
we should reject its read through copy_from_kernel_nofault() even it is
mapped.

>
>> Originally-from: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Documentation/process/maintainer-tip.rst says to use "Originally-by:"

Thanks for the tip. Will update.
>
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
>> index 6993f026adec9..bb454e0abbfcf 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
>> @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
>>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>>  
>> +#include "mm_internal.h"
>> +
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>  bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
>>  {
>> @@ -15,6 +17,10 @@ bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
>>  	if (vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE)
>>  		return false;
>>  
>> +	/* vsyscall page is also considered as userspace address. */
> A bit more explanation about why this should happen might be useful.
>
>> +	if (is_vsyscall_vaddr(vaddr))
>> +		return false;
>> +
>>  	/*
>>  	 * Allow everything during early boot before 'x86_virt_bits'
>>  	 * is initialized.  Needed for instruction decoding in early


  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-25  7:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-19  7:30 [PATCH bpf 0/3] Fix the read of vsyscall page through bpf Hou Tao
2024-01-19  7:30 ` [PATCH bpf 1/3] x86/mm: Move is_vsyscall_vaddr() into mm_internal.h Hou Tao
2024-01-20  0:35   ` Sohil Mehta
2024-01-20  1:29     ` Hou Tao
2024-01-19  7:30 ` [PATCH bpf 2/3] x86/mm: Disallow vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault() Hou Tao
2024-01-23  0:18   ` Sohil Mehta
2024-01-25  7:18     ` Hou Tao [this message]
2024-01-19  7:30 ` [PATCH bpf 3/3] selftest/bpf: Test the read of vsyscall page under x86-64 Hou Tao
2024-01-22  6:30   ` Yonghong Song
2024-01-25  6:37     ` Hou Tao
2024-01-23  0:25   ` Sohil Mehta
2024-01-25  7:54     ` Hou Tao

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=6f1aa71b-13f3-0972-3cb0-62f431de7e48@huaweicloud.com \
    --to=houtao@huaweicloud.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=houtao1@huawei.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=sohil.mehta@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xrivendell7@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).