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* [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
@ 2022-12-06 20:14 syzbot
  2022-12-07  6:38 ` John Fastabend
  2023-01-21  2:06 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2022-12-06 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, davem, edumazet, jakub, john.fastabend, kuba, linux-kernel,
	netdev, pabeni, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    6a30d3e3491d selftests: net: Use "grep -E" instead of "egr..
git tree:       net
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1576b11d880000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc4b2e0a8e8a8366
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14e1656b880000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1077da23880000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bbee3d5fc908/disk-6a30d3e3.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bf9e258de70e/vmlinux-6a30d3e3.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/afaa6696b9e0/bzImage-6a30d3e3.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90003cd7fa8 (stack is ffffc90003cd8000..ffffc90003ce0000)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 3636 Comm: syz-executor238 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00135-g6a30d3e3491d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mark_lock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4598 [inline]
 mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4543 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x847/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5009
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3447
 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1721 [inline]
 sock_map_close+0x75/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1610
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 sock_map_close+0x6dc/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1616
 inet_release+0x132/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:428
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:488
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650
 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1365
 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xb3d/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:820
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
 get_signal+0x21b1/0x2440 kernel/signal.c:2858
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x86/0x2300 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f48595660b9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f485956608f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffebff98f98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000120
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f48595660b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffebff99138 R09: 00007ffebff99138
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4859529940
R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	00 00                	add    %al,(%rax)
   2:	00 00                	add    %al,(%rax)
   4:	41 57                	push   %r15
   6:	41 56                	push   %r14
   8:	41 55                	push   %r13
   a:	41 89 d5             	mov    %edx,%r13d
   d:	48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 	movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rdx
  14:	fc ff df
  17:	41 54                	push   %r12
  19:	49 89 f4             	mov    %rsi,%r12
  1c:	55                   	push   %rbp
  1d:	53                   	push   %rbx
  1e:	48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 	sub    $0x138,%rsp
  25:	48 8d 5c 24 38       	lea    0x38(%rsp),%rbx
* 2a:	48 89 3c 24          	mov    %rdi,(%rsp) <-- trapping instruction
  2e:	48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a 	movq   $0x41b58ab3,0x38(%rsp)
  35:	b5 41
  37:	48 c1 eb 03          	shr    $0x3,%rbx
  3b:	48                   	rex.W
  3c:	c7                   	.byte 0xc7
  3d:	44 24 40             	rex.R and $0x40,%al


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* RE: [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
  2022-12-06 20:14 [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release syzbot
@ 2022-12-07  6:38 ` John Fastabend
  2022-12-07  8:12   ` Eric Dumazet
  2023-01-21  2:06 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: John Fastabend @ 2022-12-07  6:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot, bpf, davem, edumazet, jakub, john.fastabend, kuba,
	linux-kernel, netdev, pabeni, syzkaller-bugs

syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> syzbot found the following issue on:
> 
> HEAD commit:    6a30d3e3491d selftests: net: Use "grep -E" instead of "egr..
> git tree:       net
> console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1576b11d880000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc4b2e0a8e8a8366
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
> compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14e1656b880000
> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1077da23880000
> 
> Downloadable assets:
> disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bbee3d5fc908/disk-6a30d3e3.raw.xz
> vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bf9e258de70e/vmlinux-6a30d3e3.xz
> kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/afaa6696b9e0/bzImage-6a30d3e3.xz
> 
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> 
> BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90003cd7fa8 (stack is ffffc90003cd8000..ffffc90003ce0000)
> stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 3636 Comm: syz-executor238 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00135-g6a30d3e3491d #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
> RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
> Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
> RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
> RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
> RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
> RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
> R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
> R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
> FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  mark_lock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4598 [inline]
>  mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4543 [inline]
>  __lock_acquire+0x847/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5009
>  lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
>  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
>  lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3447
>  lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1721 [inline]
>  sock_map_close+0x75/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1610

I'll take a look likely something recent.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
  2022-12-07  6:38 ` John Fastabend
@ 2022-12-07  8:12   ` Eric Dumazet
  2022-12-08  9:07     ` John Fastabend
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2022-12-07  8:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Fastabend
  Cc: syzbot, bpf, davem, jakub, kuba, linux-kernel, netdev, pabeni,
	syzkaller-bugs

On Wed, Dec 7, 2022 at 7:38 AM John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> syzbot wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > syzbot found the following issue on:
> >
> > HEAD commit:    6a30d3e3491d selftests: net: Use "grep -E" instead of "egr..
> > git tree:       net
> > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1576b11d880000
> > kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc4b2e0a8e8a8366
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
> > compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> > syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14e1656b880000
> > C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1077da23880000
> >
> > Downloadable assets:
> > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bbee3d5fc908/disk-6a30d3e3.raw.xz
> > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bf9e258de70e/vmlinux-6a30d3e3.xz
> > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/afaa6696b9e0/bzImage-6a30d3e3.xz
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90003cd7fa8 (stack is ffffc90003cd8000..ffffc90003ce0000)
> > stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > CPU: 0 PID: 3636 Comm: syz-executor238 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00135-g6a30d3e3491d #0
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
> > RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
> > Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
> > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
> > RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
> > RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
> > RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
> > R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
> > R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
> > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
> > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > Call Trace:
> >  <TASK>
> >  mark_lock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4598 [inline]
> >  mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4543 [inline]
> >  __lock_acquire+0x847/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5009
> >  lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
> >  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
> >  lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3447
> >  lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1721 [inline]
> >  sock_map_close+0x75/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1610
>
> I'll take a look likely something recent.

Fact that sock_map_close  can call itself seems risky.
We might issue a one time warning and keep the host alive.

diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 81beb16ab1ebfcb166f51f89a029fe1c28a629a4..a79771a6627b9b2f38ae6ce153ceff9e8c0be8d4
100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -1612,17 +1612,25 @@ void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
        psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
        if (unlikely(!psock)) {
                rcu_read_unlock();
+               saved_close = sk->sk_prot->close;
                release_sock(sk);
-               return sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout);
+       } else {
+               saved_close = psock->saved_close;
+               sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
+               rcu_read_unlock();
+               sk_psock_stop(psock);
+               release_sock(sk);
+               cancel_work_sync(&psock->work);
+               sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
+       }
+       /* Make sure we do not recurse to us.
+        * This is a bug, we can leak the socket instead
+        * of crashing on a stack overflow.
+        */
+       if (saved_close == sock_map_close) {
+               WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+               return;
        }
-
-       saved_close = psock->saved_close;
-       sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
-       rcu_read_unlock();
-       sk_psock_stop(psock);
-       release_sock(sk);
-       cancel_work_sync(&psock->work);
-       sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
        saved_close(sk, timeout);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_map_close);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
  2022-12-07  8:12   ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2022-12-08  9:07     ` John Fastabend
  2023-01-05 13:07       ` Jakub Sitnicki
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: John Fastabend @ 2022-12-08  9:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Dumazet, John Fastabend
  Cc: syzbot, bpf, davem, jakub, kuba, linux-kernel, netdev, pabeni,
	syzkaller-bugs

Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 7, 2022 at 7:38 AM John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > syzbot wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > syzbot found the following issue on:
> > >
> > > HEAD commit:    6a30d3e3491d selftests: net: Use "grep -E" instead of "egr..
> > > git tree:       net
> > > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1576b11d880000
> > > kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc4b2e0a8e8a8366
> > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
> > > compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> > > syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14e1656b880000
> > > C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1077da23880000
> > >
> > > Downloadable assets:
> > > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bbee3d5fc908/disk-6a30d3e3.raw.xz
> > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bf9e258de70e/vmlinux-6a30d3e3.xz
> > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/afaa6696b9e0/bzImage-6a30d3e3.xz
> > >
> > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > >
> > > BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90003cd7fa8 (stack is ffffc90003cd8000..ffffc90003ce0000)
> > > stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > > CPU: 0 PID: 3636 Comm: syz-executor238 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00135-g6a30d3e3491d #0
> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
> > > RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
> > > Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48 c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
> > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
> > > RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
> > > RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
> > > RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
> > > R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
> > > R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
> > > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > > CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
> > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > > Call Trace:
> > >  <TASK>
> > >  mark_lock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4598 [inline]
> > >  mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4543 [inline]
> > >  __lock_acquire+0x847/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5009
> > >  lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
> > >  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
> > >  lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3447
> > >  lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1721 [inline]
> > >  sock_map_close+0x75/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1610
> >
> > I'll take a look likely something recent.
> 
> Fact that sock_map_close  can call itself seems risky.
> We might issue a one time warning and keep the host alive.

Agree seems better to check the condition than loop on close.
I still need to figure out the bug that got into this state
though. Thanks.

> 
> diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
> index 81beb16ab1ebfcb166f51f89a029fe1c28a629a4..a79771a6627b9b2f38ae6ce153ceff9e8c0be8d4
> 100644
> --- a/net/core/sock_map.c
> +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
> @@ -1612,17 +1612,25 @@ void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
>         psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
>         if (unlikely(!psock)) {
>                 rcu_read_unlock();
> +               saved_close = sk->sk_prot->close;
>                 release_sock(sk);
> -               return sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout);
> +       } else {
> +               saved_close = psock->saved_close;
> +               sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
> +               rcu_read_unlock();
> +               sk_psock_stop(psock);
> +               release_sock(sk);
> +               cancel_work_sync(&psock->work);
> +               sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
> +       }
> +       /* Make sure we do not recurse to us.
> +        * This is a bug, we can leak the socket instead
> +        * of crashing on a stack overflow.
> +        */
> +       if (saved_close == sock_map_close) {
> +               WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> +               return;
>         }
> -
> -       saved_close = psock->saved_close;
> -       sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
> -       rcu_read_unlock();
> -       sk_psock_stop(psock);
> -       release_sock(sk);
> -       cancel_work_sync(&psock->work);
> -       sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
>         saved_close(sk, timeout);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_map_close);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
  2022-12-08  9:07     ` John Fastabend
@ 2023-01-05 13:07       ` Jakub Sitnicki
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Sitnicki @ 2023-01-05 13:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Fastabend, Eric Dumazet
  Cc: syzbot, bpf, davem, kuba, linux-kernel, netdev, pabeni, syzkaller-bugs

On Thu, Dec 08, 2022 at 01:07 AM -08, John Fastabend wrote:
> Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 7, 2022 at 7:38 AM John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > syzbot wrote:
>> > > Hello,
>> > >
>> > > syzbot found the following issue on:
>> > >
>> > > HEAD commit:    6a30d3e3491d selftests: net: Use "grep -E" instead of "egr..
>> > > git tree:       net
>> > > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1576b11d880000
>> > > kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc4b2e0a8e8a8366
>> > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
>> > > compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for
>> > > Debian) 2.35.2
>> > > syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14e1656b880000
>> > > C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1077da23880000
>> > >
>> > > Downloadable assets:
>> > > disk image:
>> > > https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bbee3d5fc908/disk-6a30d3e3.raw.xz
>> > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bf9e258de70e/vmlinux-6a30d3e3.xz
>> > > kernel image:
>> > > https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/afaa6696b9e0/bzImage-6a30d3e3.xz
>> > >
>> > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>> > > Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> > >
>> > > BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90003cd7fa8 (stack is
>> > > ffffc90003cd8000..ffffc90003ce0000)
>> > > stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>> > > CPU: 0 PID: 3636 Comm: syz-executor238 Not tainted
>> > > 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00135-g6a30d3e3491d #0
>> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
>> > > Google 10/26/2022
>> > > RIP: 0010:mark_lock.part.0+0x26/0x1910 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4593
>> > > Code: 00 00 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df
>> > > 41 54 49 89 f4 55 53 48 81 ec 38 01 00 00 48 8d 5c 24 38 <48> 89 3c 24 48
>> > > c7 44 24 38 b3 8a b5 41 48 c1 eb 03 48 c7 44 24 40
>> > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003cd7fb8 EFLAGS: 00010096
>> > > RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: ffffc90003cd7ff0 RCX: ffffffff8162a7bf
>> > > RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88801f65e238 RDI: ffff88801f65d7c0
>> > > RBP: ffff88801f65e25a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff910f4aff
>> > > R10: fffffbfff221e95f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801f65e238
>> > > R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
>> > > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> > > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>> > > CR2: ffffc90003cd7fa8 CR3: 000000000c28e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
>> > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>> > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>> > > Call Trace:
>> > >  <TASK>
>> > >  mark_lock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4598 [inline]
>> > >  mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4543 [inline]
>> > >  __lock_acquire+0x847/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5009
>> > >  lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
>> > >  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
>> > >  lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3447
>> > >  lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1721 [inline]
>> > >  sock_map_close+0x75/0x7b0 net/core/sock_map.c:1610
>> >
>> > I'll take a look likely something recent.
>> 
>> Fact that sock_map_close  can call itself seems risky.
>> We might issue a one time warning and keep the host alive.
>
> Agree seems better to check the condition than loop on close.
> I still need to figure out the bug that got into this state
> though. Thanks.

I know what is happening. We're not restoring sk_prot in the child
socket on clone.

tcp_bpf_clone() callback currently restores sk_prot only if the
listener->sk_prot is &tcp_bpf_prots[*][TCP_BASE]. It should also check
for TCP_BPF_RX/TXRX.

It's a regression that slipped through with c5d2177a72a1 ("bpf, sockmap:
Fix race in ingress receive verdict with redirect to self"). And we're
clearly missing selftest coverage for this scenario.

I can fix that.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release
  2022-12-06 20:14 [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release syzbot
  2022-12-07  6:38 ` John Fastabend
@ 2023-01-21  2:06 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-01-21  2:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: andrii, ast, bpf, daniel, davem, edumazet, error27, hdanton,
	jakub, john.fastabend, kafai, kernel-team, kpsingh, kuba,
	linux-kernel, lkp, lmb, netdev, oe-kbuild-all, oe-kbuild, pabeni,
	songliubraving, syzkaller-bugs, yhs

syzbot has bisected this issue to:

commit 38207a5e81230d6ffbdd51e5fa5681be5116dcae
Author: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Nov 19 18:14:17 2021 +0000

    bpf, sockmap: Attach map progs to psock early for feature probes

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=106884b9480000
start commit:   c8451c141e07 Merge tag 'acpi-6.2-rc2' of git://git.kernel...
git tree:       upstream
final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=126884b9480000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=146884b9480000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=2651619a26b4d687
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04c21ed96d861dccc5cd
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14a1a692480000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1575dc34480000

Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38207a5e8123 ("bpf, sockmap: Attach map progs to psock early for feature probes")

For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-01-21  2:06 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2022-12-06 20:14 [syzbot] BUG: stack guard page was hit in inet6_release syzbot
2022-12-07  6:38 ` John Fastabend
2022-12-07  8:12   ` Eric Dumazet
2022-12-08  9:07     ` John Fastabend
2023-01-05 13:07       ` Jakub Sitnicki
2023-01-21  2:06 ` syzbot

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