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From: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
To: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Subject: Re: BPF CO-RE and array fields in context struct
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2021 12:44:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAA-VZPmxh8o8EBcJ=m-DH4ytcxDFmo0JKsm1p1gf40kS0CE3NQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAA-VZPniKnO4ZkYztkt0uL0s5TdKuwTRvoz5KORJg+MY-bVcHw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 8:19 AM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com> wrote:
>
> Hi
>
> I've been investigating the use of BPF CO-RE. I discovered that if I
> include vmlinux.h and have all structures annotated with
> __attribute__((preserve_access_index)), including the context struct,
> then a prog that accesses an array field in the context struct, in
> some particular way, cannot pass the verifier.
>
> A bunch of manual reduction plus creduce gives me this output:
>
>   struct bpf_sock_ops {
>     int family;
>     int remote_ip6[];
>   } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
>   __attribute__((section("sockops"))) int b(struct bpf_sock_ops *d) {
>     int a = d->family;
>     int *c = d->remote_ip6;
>     c[2] = a;
>     return 0;
>   }
>
> With Debian clang version 11.1.0-4+build1, this compiles to
>
>   0000000000000000 <b>:
>          0: b7 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 r2 = 4
>          1: bf 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = r1
>          2: 0f 23 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 += r2
>          3: 61 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
>          4: 63 13 08 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r3 + 8) = r1
>          5: b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r0 = 0
>          6: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit
>
> And the prog will be rejected with this verifier log:
>
>   ; __attribute__((section("sockops"))) int b(struct bpf_sock_ops *d) {
>   0: (b7) r2 = 32
>   1: (bf) r3 = r1
>   2: (0f) r3 += r2
>   last_idx 2 first_idx 0
>   regs=4 stack=0 before 1: (bf) r3 = r1
>   regs=4 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r2 = 32
>   ; int a = d->family;
>   3: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +20)
>   ; c[2] = a;
>   4: (63) *(u32 *)(r3 +8) = r1
>   dereference of modified ctx ptr R3 off=32 disallowed
>   processed 5 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states
> 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0
>
> Looking at check_ctx_reg() and its callsite at check_mem_access() in
> verifier.c, it seems that the verifier really does not like when the
> context pointer has an offset, in this case the field offset of
> d->remote_ip6.
>
> I thought this is just an issue with array fields, that field offset
> relocations may have trouble expressing two field accesses (one struct
> member, one array memory). However, further testing reveals that this
> is not the case, because if I simplify out the local variables, the
> error is gone:
>
>   struct bpf_sock_ops {
>     int family;
>     int remote_ip6[];
>   } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
>   __attribute__((section("sockops"))) int b(struct bpf_sock_ops *d) {
>     d->remote_ip6[2] = d->family;
>     return 0;
>   }
>
> is compiled to:
>
>   0000000000000000 <b>:
>          0: 61 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
>          1: 63 21 0c 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r1 + 12) = r2
>          2: b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r0 = 0
>          3: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit
>
> and is loaded as:
>
>   ; d->remote_ip6[2] = d->family;
>   0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +20)
>   ; d->remote_ip6[2] = d->family;
>   1: (63) *(u32 *)(r1 +40) = r2
>   invalid bpf_context access off=40 size=4
>
> I believe this error is because d->remote_ip6 is read-only, that this
> modification might be more of a product of creduce, but we can see
> that the CO-RE adjected offset of the array element from the context
> pointer is correct: 32 to remote_ip6, 8 array index, so total offset
> is 40.
>
> Also note that removal of __attribute__((preserve_access_index)) from
> the first (miscompiled) program produces exactly the same bytecode as
> this new program (with no locals).
>
> What is going on here? Why does the access of an array in context in
> this particular way cause it to generate code that would not pass the
> verifier? Is it a bug in Clang/LLVM, or is it the verifier being too
> strict?

Additionally, testing the latest LLVM main branch, this test case,
which does not touch array fields at all, fails but succeeded with
clang version 11.1.0:

  struct bpf_sock_ops {
    int op;
    int bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags;
  } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
  enum { a, b } static (*c)() = (void *)9;
  enum d { e } f;
  enum d g;
  __attribute__((section("sockops"))) int h(struct bpf_sock_ops *i) {
    switch (i->op) {
    case a:
      f = g = c(i, i->bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags);
      break;
    case b:
      f = g = c(i, i->bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags);
    }
    return 0;
  }

The bad code generation of latest LLVM:

  0000000000000000 <h>:
         0: 61 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
         1: 15 02 01 00 01 00 00 00 if r2 == 1 goto +1 <LBB0_2>
         2: 55 02 0b 00 00 00 00 00 if r2 != 0 goto +11 <LBB0_3>

  0000000000000018 <LBB0_2>:
         3: b7 03 00 00 04 00 00 00 r3 = 4
         4: bf 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = r1
         5: 0f 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 += r3
         6: 61 22 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r2 + 0)
         7: 85 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 call 9
         8: 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 ll
        10: 63 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r0
        11: 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 ll
        13: 63 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r0

  0000000000000070 <LBB0_3>:
        14: b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r0 = 0
        15: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit

The good code generation of LLVM 11.1.0:

  0000000000000000 <h>:
         0: 61 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
         1: 25 02 08 00 01 00 00 00 if r2 > 1 goto +8 <LBB0_2>
         2: 61 12 04 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 4)
         3: 85 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 call 9
         4: 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 ll
         6: 63 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r0
         7: 18 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 ll
         9: 63 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r0

  0000000000000050 <LBB0_2>:
        10: b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r0 = 0
        11: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit

A bisect points me to this commit in LLVM as the first bad commit:

  commit 54d9f743c8b0f501288119123cf1828bf7ade69c
  Author: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
  Date:   Wed Sep 2 22:56:41 2020 -0700

      BPF: move AbstractMemberAccess and PreserveDIType passes to
EP_EarlyAsPossible

      Move abstractMemberAccess and PreserveDIType passes as early as
      possible, right after clang code generation.

  [...]

      Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D87153

YiFei Zhu

  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-22 20:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-22 16:19 BPF CO-RE and array fields in context struct YiFei Zhu
2021-11-22 20:44 ` YiFei Zhu [this message]
2021-11-23  0:24   ` Yonghong Song
2021-11-23 16:15     ` YiFei Zhu
2021-11-23 20:08       ` Yonghong Song
2021-11-23 20:14         ` YiFei Zhu
2021-11-22 23:56 ` Yonghong Song

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