From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests verifying unprivileged bpf behaviour
Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 20:00:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAADnVQKsz4jrajs3bNkz75gUgA2eQxTV93TfWLu6HL3FSm4a8g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1652970334-30510-3-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com>
On Thu, May 19, 2022 at 7:26 AM Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> wrote:
> +void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled(void)
> +{
> + char *map_paths[NUM_MAPS] = { PINPATH "array",
> + PINPATH "percpu_array",
> + PINPATH "hash",
> + PINPATH "percpu_hash",
> + PINPATH "perfbuf",
> + PINPATH "ringbuf",
> + PINPATH "prog_array" };
> + int map_fds[NUM_MAPS];
> + struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *skel;
> + char unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig[32] = {};
> + char perf_event_paranoid_orig[32] = {};
> + struct bpf_prog_info prog_info = {};
> + __u32 prog_info_len = sizeof(prog_info);
> + struct perf_event_attr attr = {};
> + int prog_fd, perf_fd, i, ret;
> + __u64 save_caps = 0;
> + __u32 prog_id;
> +
> + skel = test_unpriv_bpf_disabled__open_and_load();
> + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open"))
> + return;
> +
> + skel->bss->test_pid = getpid();
> +
> + map_fds[0] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.array);
> + map_fds[1] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_array);
> + map_fds[2] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.hash);
> + map_fds[3] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_hash);
> + map_fds[4] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.perfbuf);
> + map_fds[5] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.ringbuf);
> + map_fds[6] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.prog_array);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MAPS; i++)
> + ASSERT_OK(bpf_obj_pin(map_fds[i], map_paths[i]), "pin map_fd");
> +
> + /* allow user without caps to use perf events */
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid", perf_event_paranoid_orig,
> + "-1"),
> + "set_perf_event_paranoid"))
> + goto cleanup;
> + /* ensure unprivileged bpf disabled is set */
> + ret = sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled",
> + unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig, "2");
> + if (ret == -EPERM) {
> + /* if unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1, we get -EPERM back; that's okay. */
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(strcmp(unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig, "1"),
> + "unpriviliged_bpf_disabled_on"))
> + goto cleanup;
> + } else {
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "set unpriviliged_bpf_disabled"))
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
Alan,
same as in v3 the BPF CI complained when selftests are built with clang.
/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c:267:7:
error: variable 'perf_fd' is used uninitialized whenever 'if'
condition is true [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "set unpriviliged_bpf_disabled"))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c:301:8:
note: uninitialized use occurs here
close(perf_fd);
^~~~~~~
/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c:267:3:
note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "set unpriviliged_bpf_disabled"))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Looks like clang found the real issue.
I've addressed with:
- int prog_fd, perf_fd, i, ret;
+ int prog_fd, perf_fd = -1, i, ret;
while applying.
Please pay attention to CI errors.
To repro do: make LLVM=1 -j
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-21 3:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-19 14:25 [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour Alan Maguire
2022-05-19 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/2] " Alan Maguire
2022-05-19 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests verifying unprivileged bpf behaviour Alan Maguire
2022-05-21 3:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2022-05-21 3:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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