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* [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
@ 2021-01-26  8:26 Bui Quang Minh
  2021-01-26  9:36 ` Lorenz Bauer
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bui Quang Minh @ 2021-01-26  8:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ast, daniel, davem, kuba, hawk, john.fastabend, andrii, kafai,
	songliubraving, yhs, kpsingh, jakub, lmb
  Cc: netdev, bpf, linux-kernel, minhquangbui99

In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.

Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.

Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 4 ++--
 net/core/sock_map.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index f6e9c68afdd4..e849c3e8a49f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static struct hlist_head *dev_map_create_hash(unsigned int entries,
 	int i;
 	struct hlist_head *hash;
 
-	hash = bpf_map_area_alloc(entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
+	hash = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) entries * sizeof(*hash), numa_node);
 	if (hash != NULL)
 		for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
 			INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&hash[i]);
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int dev_map_init_map(struct bpf_dtab *dtab, union bpf_attr *attr)
 
 		spin_lock_init(&dtab->index_lock);
 	} else {
-		dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(dtab->map.max_entries *
+		dtab->netdev_map = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) dtab->map.max_entries *
 						      sizeof(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *),
 						      dtab->map.numa_node);
 		if (!dtab->netdev_map)
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 64b5ec14ff50..7a42016a981d 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	bpf_map_init_from_attr(&stab->map, attr);
 	raw_spin_lock_init(&stab->lock);
 
-	stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc(stab->map.max_entries *
+	stab->sks = bpf_map_area_alloc((u64) stab->map.max_entries *
 				       sizeof(struct sock *),
 				       stab->map.numa_node);
 	if (!stab->sks) {
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
  2021-01-26  8:26 [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc Bui Quang Minh
@ 2021-01-26  9:36 ` Lorenz Bauer
  2021-01-27  4:23   ` Bui Quang Minh
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Lorenz Bauer @ 2021-01-26  9:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bui Quang Minh
  Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, David S . Miller,
	Jakub Kicinski, hawk, John Fastabend, Andrii Nakryiko,
	Martin Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, kpsingh, Jakub Sitnicki,
	Networking, bpf, LKML

On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 at 08:26, Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
> the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
> can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
> bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
>
> Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.

Some quick thoughts:
* Should this have a Fixes tag?
* Seems like there are quite a few similar calls scattered around
(cpumap, etc.). Did you audit these as well?
* I'd prefer a calloc style version of bpf_map_area_alloc although
that might conflict with Fixes tag.

Lorenz

-- 
Lorenz Bauer  |  Systems Engineer
6th Floor, County Hall/The Riverside Building, SE1 7PB, UK

www.cloudflare.com

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
  2021-01-26  9:36 ` Lorenz Bauer
@ 2021-01-27  4:23   ` Bui Quang Minh
  2021-01-27  5:09     ` Bui Quang Minh
  2021-01-28  0:41     ` Daniel Borkmann
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bui Quang Minh @ 2021-01-27  4:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Lorenz Bauer
  Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, David S . Miller,
	Jakub Kicinski, hawk, John Fastabend, Andrii Nakryiko,
	Martin Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, kpsingh, Jakub Sitnicki,
	Networking, bpf, LKML

On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 09:36:57AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 at 08:26, Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
> > the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
> > can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
> > bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
> >
> > Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.
> 
> Some quick thoughts:
> * Should this have a Fixes tag?

Ok, I will add Fixes tag in later version patch.

> * Seems like there are quite a few similar calls scattered around
> (cpumap, etc.). Did you audit these as well?

I spotted another bug after re-auditting. In hashtab, there ares 2 places using
the same calls

	static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
	{
		/* ... snip ... */
		if (htab->n_buckets == 0 ||
		    htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket))
			goto free_htab;

		htab->buckets = bpf_map_area_alloc(htab->n_buckets *
						   sizeof(struct bucket),
						   htab->map.numa_node);
	}

This is safe because of the above check.

	static int prealloc_init(struct bpf_htab *htab)
	{
		u32 num_entries = htab->map.max_entries;
		htab->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(htab->elem_size * num_entries,
						 htab->map.numa_node);
	}

This is not safe since there is no limit check in elem_size.

In cpumap,

	static struct bpf_map *cpu_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
	{
		cmap->cpu_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(cmap->map.max_entries *
						   sizeof(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *),
						   cmap->map.numa_node);
	}

I think this is safe because max_entries is not permitted to be larger than NR_CPUS.

In stackmap, there is a place that I'm not very sure about

	static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
	{
		u32 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + smap->map.value_size;
		smap->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(elem_size * smap->map.max_entries,
						 smap->map.numa_node);
	}

This is called after another bpf_map_area_alloc in stack_map_alloc(). In the first
bpf_map_area_alloc() the argument is calculated in an u64 variable; so if in the second
one, there is an integer overflow then the first one must be called with size > 4GB. I 
think the first one will probably fail (I am not sure about the actual limit of vmalloc()),
so the second one might not be called.

Overall, I think it is error prone in this pattern, maybe we should use typecasting in all
similar calls or make a comment why we don't use typecasting. As I see typecasting is not so
expensive and we can typecast the sizeof() operand so this change only affect 32-bit
architecture.

> * I'd prefer a calloc style version of bpf_map_area_alloc although
> that might conflict with Fixes tag.

Yes, I think the calloc style will prevent this kind of integer overflow bug.

Thank you,
Quang Minh.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
  2021-01-27  4:23   ` Bui Quang Minh
@ 2021-01-27  5:09     ` Bui Quang Minh
  2021-01-28  0:41     ` Daniel Borkmann
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bui Quang Minh @ 2021-01-27  5:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Lorenz Bauer
  Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, David S . Miller,
	Jakub Kicinski, hawk, John Fastabend, Andrii Nakryiko,
	Martin Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, kpsingh, Jakub Sitnicki,
	Networking, bpf, LKML

On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:23:41AM +0700, Bui Quang Minh wrote:
> > * Seems like there are quite a few similar calls scattered around
> > (cpumap, etc.). Did you audit these as well?
> 
> I spotted another bug after re-auditting. In hashtab, there ares 2 places using
> the same calls
> 
> 	static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
> 	{
> 		/* ... snip ... */
> 		if (htab->n_buckets == 0 ||
> 		    htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket))
> 			goto free_htab;
> 
> 		htab->buckets = bpf_map_area_alloc(htab->n_buckets *
> 						   sizeof(struct bucket),
> 						   htab->map.numa_node);
> 	}
> 
> This is safe because of the above check.
> 
> 	static int prealloc_init(struct bpf_htab *htab)
> 	{
> 		u32 num_entries = htab->map.max_entries;
> 		htab->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(htab->elem_size * num_entries,
> 						 htab->map.numa_node);
> 	}
> 
> This is not safe since there is no limit check in elem_size.

So sorry but I rechecked and saw this bug in hashtab has been fixed with commit
e1868b9e36d0ca

Thank you,
Quang Minh.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
  2021-01-27  4:23   ` Bui Quang Minh
  2021-01-27  5:09     ` Bui Quang Minh
@ 2021-01-28  0:41     ` Daniel Borkmann
  2021-05-17 15:10       ` Bui Quang Minh
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2021-01-28  0:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bui Quang Minh, Lorenz Bauer
  Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, hawk,
	John Fastabend, Andrii Nakryiko, Martin Lau, Song Liu,
	Yonghong Song, kpsingh, Jakub Sitnicki, Networking, bpf, LKML

On 1/27/21 5:23 AM, Bui Quang Minh wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 09:36:57AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
>> On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 at 08:26, Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
>>> the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
>>> can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
>>> bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
>>>
>>> Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.
>>
>> Some quick thoughts:
>> * Should this have a Fixes tag?
> 
> Ok, I will add Fixes tag in later version patch.
> 
>> * Seems like there are quite a few similar calls scattered around
>> (cpumap, etc.). Did you audit these as well?
> 
[...]
> In cpumap,
> 
> 	static struct bpf_map *cpu_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
> 	{
> 		cmap->cpu_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(cmap->map.max_entries *
> 						   sizeof(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *),
> 						   cmap->map.numa_node);
> 	}
> 
> I think this is safe because max_entries is not permitted to be larger than NR_CPUS.

Yes.

> In stackmap, there is a place that I'm not very sure about
> 
> 	static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
> 	{
> 		u32 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + smap->map.value_size;
> 		smap->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(elem_size * smap->map.max_entries,
> 						 smap->map.numa_node);
> 	}
> 
> This is called after another bpf_map_area_alloc in stack_map_alloc(). In the first
> bpf_map_area_alloc() the argument is calculated in an u64 variable; so if in the second
> one, there is an integer overflow then the first one must be called with size > 4GB. I
> think the first one will probably fail (I am not sure about the actual limit of vmalloc()),
> so the second one might not be called.

I would sanity check this as well. Looks like k*alloc()/v*alloc() call sites typically
use array_size() which returns SIZE_MAX on overflow, 610b15c50e86 ("overflow.h: Add
allocation size calculation helpers").

Thanks,
Daniel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
  2021-01-28  0:41     ` Daniel Borkmann
@ 2021-05-17 15:10       ` Bui Quang Minh
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bui Quang Minh @ 2021-05-17 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Daniel Borkmann, Lorenz Bauer
  Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, hawk,
	John Fastabend, Andrii Nakryiko, Martin Lau, Song Liu,
	Yonghong Song, kpsingh, Jakub Sitnicki, Networking, bpf, LKML

On 1/28/21 7:41 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 1/27/21 5:23 AM, Bui Quang Minh wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 09:36:57AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
>>> On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 at 08:26, Bui Quang Minh 
>>> <minhquangbui99@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
>>>> the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer 
>>>> which
>>>> can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
>>>> bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
>>>>
>>>> Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.
>>>
>>> Some quick thoughts:
>>> * Should this have a Fixes tag?
>>
>> Ok, I will add Fixes tag in later version patch.
>>
>>> * Seems like there are quite a few similar calls scattered around
>>> (cpumap, etc.). Did you audit these as well?
>>
> [...]
>> In cpumap,
>>
>>     static struct bpf_map *cpu_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
>>     {
>>         cmap->cpu_map = bpf_map_area_alloc(cmap->map.max_entries *
>>                            sizeof(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *),
>>                            cmap->map.numa_node);
>>     }
>>
>> I think this is safe because max_entries is not permitted to be larger 
>> than NR_CPUS.
> 
> Yes.
> 
>> In stackmap, there is a place that I'm not very sure about
>>
>>     static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
>>     {
>>         u32 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + 
>> smap->map.value_size;
>>         smap->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(elem_size * 
>> smap->map.max_entries,
>>                          smap->map.numa_node);
>>     }
>>
>> This is called after another bpf_map_area_alloc in stack_map_alloc(). 
>> In the first
>> bpf_map_area_alloc() the argument is calculated in an u64 variable; so 
>> if in the second
>> one, there is an integer overflow then the first one must be called 
>> with size > 4GB. I
>> think the first one will probably fail (I am not sure about the actual 
>> limit of vmalloc()),
>> so the second one might not be called.
> 
> I would sanity check this as well. Looks like k*alloc()/v*alloc() call 
> sites typically
> use array_size() which returns SIZE_MAX on overflow, 610b15c50e86 
> ("overflow.h: Add
> allocation size calculation helpers").

Hi,

I almost forget about this patch, I have checked the bpf_map_area_alloc 
in in stackmap.c and I can see that integer overflow cannot happen in 
this stackmap.c case.

In stack_map_alloc(),

	u64 cost;
	...
	cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap);
	cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket));
	smap = bpf_map_area_alloc(cost, bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr)); (1)
	...
	prealloc_elems_and_freelist(smap);

In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(),

	u32 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + smap->map.value_size;
	smap->elems = bpf_map_area_alloc(elem_size * smap->map.max_entries, 
smap->map.numa_node); (2)

Argument calculation at (1) is safe. Argument calculation at (2) can 
potentially result in an integer overflow in 32-bit architecture. 
However, if the integer overflow happens, it means argument at (1) must 
be 2**32, which cannot pass the SIZE_MAX check in __bpf_map_area_alloc()

In __bpf_map_area_alloc()

	if (size >= SIZE_MAX)
		return NULL;

So I think the original patch has fixed instances of this bug pattern.

Thank you,
Quang Minh.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-05-17 16:27 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-01-26  8:26 [PATCH] bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc Bui Quang Minh
2021-01-26  9:36 ` Lorenz Bauer
2021-01-27  4:23   ` Bui Quang Minh
2021-01-27  5:09     ` Bui Quang Minh
2021-01-28  0:41     ` Daniel Borkmann
2021-05-17 15:10       ` Bui Quang Minh

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