From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>,
Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: For review: seccomp_user_notif(2) manual page [v2]
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 20:20:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez3nH2Oiz9wMSpvUxxX_TRYTT98d3Nj1vnCuJOj9CCXH8Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <93cfdc79-4c48-bceb-3620-4c63e9f4822e@gmail.com>
On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 8:14 PM Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
<mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 10/29/20 2:42 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > As discussed at
> > <https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0m4Y24ZBZCh+Tf4ORMm9_q4n7VOzpGjwGF7_Fe8EQH=Q@mail.gmail.com>,
> > we need to re-check checkNotificationIdIsValid() after reading remote
> > memory but before using the read value in any way. Otherwise, the
> > syscall could in the meantime get interrupted by a signal handler, the
> > signal handler could return, and then the function that performed the
> > syscall could free() allocations or return (thereby freeing buffers on
> > the stack).
> >
> > In essence, this pread() is (unavoidably) a potential use-after-free
> > read; and to make that not have any security impact, we need to check
> > whether UAF read occurred before using the read value. This should
> > probably be called out elsewhere in the manpage, too...
> >
> > Now, of course, **reading** is the easy case. The difficult case is if
> > we have to **write** to the remote process... because then we can't
> > play games like that. If we write data to a freed pointer, we're
> > screwed, that's it. (And for somewhat unrelated bonus fun, consider
> > that /proc/$pid/mem is originally intended for process debugging,
> > including installing breakpoints, and will therefore happily write
> > over "readonly" private mappings, such as typical mappings of
> > executable code.)
> >
> > So, uuuuh... I guess if anyone wants to actually write memory back to
> > the target process, we'd better come up with some dedicated API for
> > that, using an ioctl on the seccomp fd that magically freezes the
> > target process inside the syscall while writing to its memory, or
> > something like that? And until then, the manpage should have a big fat
> > warning that writing to the target's memory is simply not possible
> > (safely).
>
> Thank you for your very clear explanation! It turned out to be
> trivially easy to demonstrate this issue with a slightly modified
> version of my program.
>
> As well as the change to the code example that I already mentioned
> my reply of a few hours ago, I've added the following text to the
> page:
>
> Caveats regarding the use of /proc/[tid]/mem
> The discussion above noted the need to use the
> SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID ioctl(2) when opening the
> /proc/[tid]/mem file of the target to avoid the possibility of
> accessing the memory of the wrong process in the event that the
> target terminates and its ID is recycled by another (unrelated)
> thread. However, the use of this ioctl(2) operation is also
> necessary in other situations, as explained in the following
> pargraphs.
(nit: paragraphs)
> Consider the following scenario, where the supervisor tries to
> read the pathname argument of a target's blocked mount(2) system
> call:
[...]
> Seem okay?
Yeah, sounds good.
> By the way, is there any analogous kind of issue concerning
> pidfd_getfd()? I'm thinking not, but I wonder if I've missed
> something.
When it is used by a seccomp supervisor, you mean? I think basically
the same thing applies - when resource identifiers (such as memory
addresses or file descriptors) are passed to a syscall, it generally
has to be assumed that those identifiers may become invalid and be
reused as soon as the syscall has returned.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-30 19:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-26 9:55 For review: seccomp_user_notif(2) manual page [v2] Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 13:54 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-10-26 14:30 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-26 14:32 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-10-29 1:42 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <20201029020438.GA25673@cisco>
2020-10-29 4:43 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-29 14:19 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-30 19:14 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-31 8:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-11-02 13:49 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-29 19:14 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-30 19:20 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2020-10-31 8:51 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-11-02 14:13 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-29 8:53 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-10-29 20:37 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-30 20:27 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-10-31 16:27 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-11-02 8:07 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-11-02 19:45 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-11-02 19:49 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-11-02 20:04 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-29 15:26 ` Christian Brauner
2020-10-29 19:53 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2020-10-30 19:24 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-30 20:07 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
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