From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dominik Czarnota <dominik.czarnota@trailofbits.com>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>, Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
"Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>,
Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>,
Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>,
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>,
Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>,
Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] kprobes: Do not expose probe addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 18:00:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiZi-v8Xgu_B3wV0B4RQYngKyPeONdiXNgrHJFU5jbe1w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200702232638.2946421-5-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 4:26 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> The kprobe show() functions were using "current"'s creds instead
> of the file opener's creds for kallsyms visibility. Fix to use
> seq_file->file->f_cred.
Side note: I have a distinct - but despite that possibly quite
incorrect - memory that I've discussed with somebody several years ago
about making "current_cred()" simply warn in any IO context.
IOW, we could have read and write just increment/decrement a
per-thread counter, and have current_cred() do a WARN_ON_ONCE() if
it's called with that counter incremented.
The issue of ioctl's is a bit less obvious - there are reasons to
argue those should also use open-time credentials, but on the other
hand I think it's reasonable to pass a file descriptor to a suid app
in order for that app to do things that the normal user cannot.
But read/write are dangerous because of the "it's so easy to fool suid
apps to read/write stdin/stdout".
So pread/pwrite/ioctl/splice etc are things that suid applications
very much do on purpose to affect a file descriptor. But plain
read/write are things that might be accidental and used by attack
vectors.
If somebody is interested in looking into things like that, it might
be a good idea to have kernel threads with that counter incremented by
default.
Just throwing this idea out in case somebody wants to try it. It's not
just "current_cred", of course. It's all the current_cred_xxx() users
too. But it may be that there are a ton of false positives because
maybe some code on purpose ends up doing things like just *comparing*
current_cred with file->f_cred and then that would warn too.
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-03 1:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-02 23:26 [PATCH 0/5] Refactor kallsyms_show_value() users for correct cred Kees Cook
2020-07-02 23:26 ` [PATCH 1/5] kallsyms: Refactor kallsyms_show_value() to take cred Kees Cook
2020-07-02 23:26 ` [PATCH 2/5] module: Refactor section attr into bin attribute Kees Cook
2020-07-03 6:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-03 15:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-08 16:10 ` Jessica Yu
2020-07-02 23:26 ` [PATCH 3/5] module: Do not expose section addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG Kees Cook
2020-07-08 16:12 ` Jessica Yu
2020-07-02 23:26 ` [PATCH 4/5] kprobes: Do not expose probe " Kees Cook
2020-07-03 1:00 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2020-07-03 15:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-03 15:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-05 20:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-05 20:19 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-10 14:09 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-07-02 23:26 ` [PATCH 5/5] bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok() Kees Cook
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